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THE CHARITABLE STATUS OF NONPROFIT
HOSPITALS: TOWARD A DONATIVE THEORY
OF TAX EXEMPTION
Mark A. Hall*
John D. Colombo**
Abstract This Article examines the growing controversy over the multi-billion dollar
charitable tax exemption enjoyed by nonprofit hospitals. It begins by articulating four
criteria for evaluating a rationale of the charitable exemption: deservedness, incorporating
the elements of worth and need; proportionality; universality; and historical consistency.
The Article then employs these criteria to refute three conventional explanations of why
nonprofit hospitals are exempt: because health care is a per se charitable activity; because
the treatment of indigent patients relieves a government burden; and because nonprofit
hospitals provide community benefits. The Article also uses these criteria to refute two
academic theories: Boris Bittker's income measurement rationale and Henry Hansmann's
capital subsidy theory.
This Article proposes a "donative theory" as an alternative rationale for the charitable
exemption. The donative theory posits that "charity" describes an entity capable of
attracting a substantial level of philanthropic support from the public at large. Donations
exist where there is a combined failure of private markets and direct public funding to
supply a shared public benefit at the optimally desired level. Donative institutions deserve
a tax subsidy because the public's support signals their worth, and the free-rider tendency
that affects all giving assures the need for an additional, shadow subsidy. The Article
further demonstrates that the donative theory comports with the statutory scheme and the
four centuries of legal history that shape the legal concept of charity. In particular, the
donative theory provides the only explanation of the tax law's otherwise unjustifiable reliance on the law of charitable trusts.
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INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of western civilization, religion, education, and
other charitable activities have been exempt from various forms of taxation.1 In the United States, federal tax law has relieved charitable
1. "Real property taxation, and exemption therefrom, seems to be about as old as history....
One historian reports that the 'economic equilibrium of the state was endangered' by the fact that
the tax exempt temples owned fifteen percent of the cultivable land and vast amounts of slaves
and other personal property during the reign of Ramses III about 1200 B.C." Sierk, State Tax
Exemptions of Non-Profit Organizations, 19 CLEV. ST. L. Rav. 281, 282 (1970). See Ezra 7:24
("[l]t shall not be lawful to impose toll, tribute, or custom upon... priests.., or ministers of the
house of God .... ); Genesis 47:24 ("Joseph made it a law over the land of Egypt unto this day,
that Pharaoh should have the fifth part; except the land of the priests only, which became not
Pharaoh's ....
"); A. BALK, THE FREE LIST: PROPERTY WITHOUT TAXES 20-21 (1971)
(referring to history of ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome and concluding "[e]xemptions probably
are as old as taxes").
England has had a charitable exemption in its income tax law since it was enacted in 1799 and
reintroduced in 1842. M. CHESTERMAN, CHARITIES, TRUSTS AND SOCIAL WELFARE 58-59
(1979). British charities enjoy only a 50% exemption from local property taxes by right, but
localities may exempt the remainder in their discretion. Id. at 243.
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organizations from income tax since the law's inception,2 and charities
have enjoyed exemption from state and local property taxes even
longer.3 The long history of the charitable exemption has made it a
virtually immutable part of the tax laws-so much so that the thought
of taxing charitable organizations on the same basis as profit-making
enterprises seems contrary to nature.4 It is startling to learn, then,
that we have no clear understanding of why the charitable exemption
exists or what it covers.' Various commentators have observed:
"despite th[e] long history of the tax [laws], or perhaps because of this
long history, there is very little logic, or reason, or legislative history to
support . . . the tax exemption"; 6 "the statutory phrases 'exclusively
2. The earliest codification of an exemption for charitable entities appears to have been the
Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556 (1894). The complete history of the federal
charitable exemption is traced in many sources, including Liles & Blum, Development of the
Federal Tax Treatment of Charities,39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 6 (Autumn 1975); Persons,
Osborn & Feldman, Criteria for Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3), in 4 U.S. DEPT. OF
TREASURY, RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY

AND PUBLIC NEEDS 1909, 1924-25 (1977) [hereinafter FILER COMMISSION PAPERS].
3. See generally J. JENSEN, PROPERTY TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1931); Adler,
Historical Origin of the Exemption From Taxation of CharitableInstitutions, in WESTCHESTER
COUNTY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, TAX EXEMPTIONS OF REAL ESTATE: AN INCREASING

MENACE 15-17 (1922).
4. Belknap, The FederalIncome Tax Exemption of CharitableOrganizations:Its History and
Underlying Policy, in FILER COMMISSION PAPERS, supra note 2, at 2025, 2029-30 (by 1894, the
custom of exempting education, religion, and care of the poor was "so grounded in the nature of
our Government as to represent a practically irrevocable law"). Even those most critical of the
exemption suggest its repeal in only the most tentative tones, preferring a reformulation instead.
See A. BALK, supra note 1,at 128.
5. Modern scholars have a fair idea of the basis for the exemption in prior ages, but there is no
agreement on its rationale in modern times. In ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome, temples and
other religious institutions were not taxed because it was thought they were owned by the gods
themselves and were thus beyond the reach of mortal taxing authorities. In medieval England,
churches, monasteries and the like were not taxed, at first because in feudal times there was no
centralized government capable of imposing such a tax; indeed, the churches themselves were a
sort of taxing authority, collecting tithes from feudal lords. This power distribution changed
dramatically later in England's history when churches were not only taxed but confiscated as
part of the suppression of clerical power during the Reformation. However, the charitable
exemption survived during this time by expanding its reach to secular charities as a way of
further undermining the church's influence. In the American colonies, churches were at first not
taxed because the colonies were established as theocracies and no government taxes itself. The
religious exemption continued even after the constitutional adoption of the separation principle,
though, largely for reasons of historical Anglo-American tradition. Thus, it was expanded to
cover education and other secular charitable purposes because that was the pattern that prevailed
in England at the time. The present form of charitable exemption is essentially unchanged from
this time, when its political rationales disappeared. See generally A. BALK, supra note 1, at
23-27; Adler, supra note 3, at 14-80; Belknap, supra note 4, at 2027-28; Persons, Osborn &
Feldman, supra note 2, at 1914, 1923; Stimson, The Exemption of Propertyfrom Taxation in the
United States, 18 MINN. L. REV. 411, 416-18 (1934).
6. UnrelatedBusiness Income Tax: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House
Comm. on Ways. and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1987) [hereinafter UBIT Hearings]
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used for charitable purposes' [and] 'purely public charity' seem to
mean less than nothing";7 and "think[ing] more seriously about what
is meant by the concept of charity [is] a task that is about four hundred years overdue." 8
A clear answer to this puzzle has tremendous practical importance
to federal and state governments hard-pressed to balance strained
budgets in the face of the steadily increasing size of the exempt sector, 9
(statement of 0. Donaldson Chapoton, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of the
Treasury).
7. Comment, JudicialRestoration of the GeneralPropertyTax Base, 44 YALE L.J. 1075, 1087

(1935).
8. Hansmann, The Two Independent Sectors, A Paper Presented at the Independent Sector
Spring Research Forum 5 (Mar. 17, 1988) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Washington
Law Review) [hereinafter Hansmann, The Two Independent Sectors]; see also J. DOUGLAS, WHY
CHARrIy?: THE CASE FOR A THIRD SECTOR 55-56 (1983) ("mhe question 'what is a charity?'
is quite surprisingly difficult to answer.... Although the lawyers have been wrestling with the
problem for centuries, they have not been able to define precisely what are the both necessary and
sufficient conditions for charitable status."); B. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 115
(1988) (" 'Nonprofits are a whole can of worms that Congress has yet to look at in a broad way.
I have been blowing the trumpet for years to get lawmakers to spell out clearly what should be
tax-exempt and what should not be.' ") (quoting former IRS Commissioner); Belknap, supranote
4, at 2031 (the original federal adoption of the exemption occurred "without debate and virtually
without comment;" and "[t]he Congressional Record will be searched in vain for any fuller
expression of the policy underlying the exemption" than so that these institutions "'may not
suffer under the bill' ") (quoting Congressman Tucker, who introduced the amendment
containing the exemption); Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizationsfrom
Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 302 (1976) (Congress has groped along,
"enunciat[ing] no developed theory"); Chisolm & Young, Introduction to What is Charity?, 39
CASE W. REs. 653, 655 (1989) ("[E]xamination of history has not yet given us a satisfying
answer to the question, 'what is charity?'... [W]e find [in the IRC] ... no systematic set of rules
and policies thoughtfully derived from a careful rationale."); Hansmann, Unfair Competitionand
the UnrelatedBusiness Income Tax, 75 VA. L. REv. 605, 635 (1989) [hereinafter Hansmann,
Unfair Competition] ("The truly difficult and important issue involving the tax treatment of
nonprofits concerns not the UBIT but rather the scope of the basic exemption that underlies it,
and that is where future debate should focus.").
Professor Heller suggests that the charitable exemption is conventionally considered an "easy
case" and maintains that only through a Critical Legal Studies (CLS) style of analysis is it
possible to perceive the exemption's "indeterminacy." Heller, Is the CharitableExemption from
Property Taxation an Easy Case? General ConcernsAbout Legal Economicsand Jurisprudence,in
ESSAYS ON THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

183, 185 (D. Rubinfeld ed.

1979). Heller misperceives both the conventional view of the exemption and the insights that
CLS has to offer to this problem. Heller's own analysis reveals that it is not the exemption that
he treats as the "easy case" but the taxation of property itself, for the core of his argument is
focused on problems that exist with the a priori definition of a standard tax base, from which the
exemption is a departure. He only briefly explains why the exemption is a "hard" case, see id. at
210-11, and the arguments he musters are ones that academicians and lawmakers have been
conversant in since the seminal work of Professor Surrey on tax expenditures, see S. SURREY &

P.

MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES

(1985).

9. "[T]he tax benefits granted to charities and other exempt organizations by the United
States are almost unique in their generosity." Stofie, FederalTax Support of Charitiesand Other
Exempt Organizations: The Need for a NationalPolicy, 20 U.S. CAL. L. CENTER TAX INST. 27,
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and to nonprofit organizations that increasingly must defend their
favored tax status against the roving eyes of revenue-hungry tax collectors and legislators. 10 This topic also holds considerable intellectual
challenge. The academic field of nonprofit enterprise has flowered
during the past decade and a half as researchers from various disciplines began to recognize that this "third sector" of the economy (distinct from proprietary markets and government) has been neglected as
a separate topic of serious inquiry. These pathbreaking scholars made
impressive progress toward explaining why nonprofit organizations
30-31 n. 11 (1968). "[B]y careful planning, one now can live much of his life on tax-exempt
property." A. BALK, supra note 1, at 5; see also B. WEISBROD, supra note 8, at 62 (nonprofits
"engage in hundreds of distinct activities; they are growing at the rate of thousands per year; they
employ millions of workers; and they have hundreds of billions of dollars of annual revenues and
assets").
According to one rough estimate, one-third of all property is tax exempt. Two-thirds of this
amount, however, constitutes government property, generally not calculated in the tax base. A.
BALK, supra note 1, at 11-12. Therefore, an estimate that is more representative for the present
purposes is that approximately 10% of private property is exempt. See Gabler & Shannon, The
Exemption of Religious, Educational and Charitable Institutions From Property Taxation, in
FILER COMMISSION PAPERS, supra note 2, at 2535 (roughly one-ninth of private property is
exempt); Stone, supra, at 31 (in the mid-1960s, the amount of income tax foregone, $5 billion,
was enough to provide a 10% tax cut). Some have assigned much higher estimates to particular
locales. See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 981 (5th ed.
1988) (in 1963-1964, "the value of exempt non-governmental property amounted to
approximately 22 percent of the assessed value of all taxable property in Illinois, 19 percent in
California, 36 percent in Florida, and 78 percent in Louisiana."). Accurate figures are difficult to
obtain because tax assessors do not generally bother to value precisely exempt property.
The amount of exempt property has grown considerably over the past few decades, faster than
the value of the tax base. See A. BALK, supra at 1; B. WEISBROD, supra note 8, at 62 (the number
of exempt firms has tripled in 20 years whereas for-profit firms have only doubled in number over
the same period); Gabler & Shannon, supra, at 2536-38. The number of categories of federally
exempt activities has grown from 90 to 260 since 1965. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
TAX POLICY: COMPETITION BETWEEN TAXABLE BUSINESSES AND TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS, BRIEFING REPORT TO THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION 14 (Feb. 1987)
[hereinafter GAO, TAX POLICY]. Correspondingly, the number of federally exempt entities has
doubled over the last 20 years, to 866,000. UBIT Hearings, supra note 6, at 26.
The charitable exemption specifically is by far the largest component of the private exempt
sector. Charitable organizations, now numbering 366,000, represent over two-fifths of all
federally exempt entities and over half of the exempt sector's total receipts and assets (amounting
to $114.6 billion and $176.3 billion respectively). See GAO, TAX POLICY, supra, at 15. "[T]he
broad range of mutual benefit organizations exempt under provisions other than section 501(c)(3)
and section 501(c)(4) accounted for only 10 percent of current operating expenditures of all
nonprofits in 1984." UBIT Hearings,supra note 6, at 27.
10. See infra notes 48-52, 57-66 and accompanying text (concerning various court and
legislative challenges to hospitals' tax exemption). A few scholars have advocated or suggested
the outright repeal of the exemption. See Bennett, Real Property Tax Exemptions of Non-Profit
Organizations,16 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 150, 166 (1967) ("[A] solution would appear to be
the abolition of all non-governmental property tax exemptions, completely."); Clark, Does the
Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1417, 1476 (1980) (suggesting
repealing property tax exemption for hospitals); Stimson, supra note 5 (same).
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exist, what their central characteristics are, and how they should be
regulated.11 These studies, however, have not"satisfactorily
explained
1 3
12
nonprofits.
most
subsidizes
system
tax
the
why
This Article undertakes to answer two related inquiries: what organizations are charitable, and why are they exempt from taxation.
Understanding the core concept of charity will facilitate identifying
the rationale for exempting charities from taxation; this rationale will
in turn guide us in applying the charitable category in borderline
cases. Working in the opposite direction, identifying a correct rationale for the exemption will reveal-or at least permit the formulation
of-a sensible definition of "charitable."
This Article approaches these questions in the context of the exempt
status of nonprofit hospitals, a context chosen for several reasons.
First, recent challenges to hospitals' tax exemption provide the most
visible manifestation' of these issues in. recent years. The Utah
11. The leading discussions include . DOUGLAS, supra note 8; THE ECONOMICS OF
NONPROFrr INSTITUTIONS (S. Rose-Ackerman ed. 1986); B. WEISBROD, supra note 8; Ellman,
Another Theory ofNonprofit Corporations, 80 MICH. L. REv. 999 (1982); Hansmann, The Role of
Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980). See generally R. GASSLER, THE ECONOMICS OF
NONPROFIT ENTERPRISE (1986); E. JAMES & S. ROsE-ACKERMAN, THE NONPROFIT
ENTERPRISE IN MARKET ECONOMICS (1986); THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH
HANDBOOK (W. Powell, ed. 1987); Yoder, Economic Theories of For-Profitand Not-for-Profit
Organizations, in INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, FOR PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 19 (B.
Gray ed. 1986).
12. Characterization of the tax exemption for charitable organizations and the tax deduction
for charitable contributions as a "subsidy" raises certain issues that have remained at the core of
debate among tax academics regarding the relationship of tax law to the exemption and
deduction. While most tax commentators accept the "subsidy" characterization, see, eg., S.
SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 223 (1973); S. SURREY & P. MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES 219-20 (1985); Hochmann & Rodgers, The Optimal Tax Treatment of
Charitable Contributions, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 1, 2 (1977); Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A
Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, others do not. For example, Boris Bittker has opined that
the tax exemption is simply an outgrowth of the inability to accurately measure the income of
nonprofit organizations. As a result, Bittker finds the exemption and charitable contribution
deduction consistent with a taxing system that attempts to measure income. For a discussion of
Bittker's theory, see infra notes 279-90 and accompanying text. See, eg., Bittker, Charitable
Contributions:Tax Deductionsor Matching Grants?, 28 TAX L. REv. 37 (1972). See generally C.
KAHN, PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS IN THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 88 (1960) (discussing rationales
for the charitable contribution deduction). As explained infra notes 286-90, the income
measurement theory does not provide a complete justification for the current scope of the
exemption for charitable institutions. Therefore, this Article follows the predominant view that
the exemption constitutes a subsidy, and seeks to justify the exemption on this basis. See infra
note 69 and accompanying text.
13. See UBIT Hearings,supra note 6, at 37 (Statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury 0. Donaldson Chapoton) ("[A] comprehensive review of the standards and the
rationale for tax exemption has never been undertaken."); id. at 1864-65 (statement of Prof.
Harvey P. Dale, N.Y.U. School of Law) ("[W]e do not have any careful and comprehensive
rationale for the scope and operation of the tax exemption. We do not have any satisfactory
theory, legal or economic, to apply in making judgments about it."); see also supra note 8.
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Supreme Court shook the voluntary hospital sector to its core in 1985
by becoming the first court in modem times to revoke a hospital's
exemption for its failure to provide a sufficient level of charity care. 14
Since then, local taxing authorities in four other states have challenged
hospitals' exempt status, and legislative reexaminations are pending or
have occurred recently in over a dozen others.15 Most recently, Congress is considering legislation that would entirely revamp the justification for the federal income tax exemption enjoyed by hospitals. 6
Second, justification of the charitable status enjoyed by nonprofits is
imperative because hospital service is by far the single largest commercial activity that receives tax exempt status under the generic charitable label, 17 amounting to billions of dollars a year in lost revenue.' 8
Third, scholars studying the nonprofit sector are particularly intrigued
by markets like the hospital industry where proprietary, voluntary,
and government institutions coexist.' 9 These settings provide ideal
14. Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985).
15. See infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 64 & 66, 151.
17. J. BENNETT & T. DILORENZO, UNFAIR COMPETITION: THE PROFITS OF NONPROFITS 73
(1989) ("Although nonprofit hospitals comprise less than three percent of all nonprofit
organizations, they dominate the sector's expenditures: In 1982, nonprofit hospitals accounted
for more than half of all nonprofit-sector expenditures .... ").
18. Presently, the figure that has the widest currency places the value of the exemption at $8.5
billion. Copeland & Rudney, Federal Tax Subsidies for Not-For-Profit Hospitals, 1990 TAX
NOTES 1559, 1565. This number represents the sum of the following estimates: federal income
tax, $1.6 billion; tax-exempt bonds, $1.7 billion; deductible charitable contributions, $1.2 billion
(total federal, $4.5 billion); state and local income tax, $0.4 billion; property tax, $1.2 billion;
sales tax, $2.4 billion (total state and local, $4.0 billion). Id.; see also Baldwin, Legislatures,
Agencies Debating Whether Not-For-profit Hospitals Deserve Their Tax-exempt Status, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, May 22, 1987, at 34, 37 (the sales tax exemption for hospitals amounts to an
annual loss of $60 million in Oklahoma and $400 million in Florida); Clark, supra note 10, at
1417 & n.1 (the exemption for hospitals results in an estimated annual loss of $1 billion in
property tax revenues alone); Falcone & Warren, The Shadow Price of Pluralism: The Use of Tax
Expenditures To Subsidize Hospital Care in the United States, 13 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L.
735, 740-52 (1988) (by a rough, liberal estimate, the hospital exemption costs $3 billion a year in
income and property tax, $1.8 billion of this in federal income tax); Friedman, Hattis & Bogue,
Tax Exemption and Community Benefits of Not-For-Profit Hospitals, in 11 ADVANCES IN
HEALTH ECONOMICS AND HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH (1990) 131, 136-38 (value of
exemption in 1983-1985 estimated between $4.7 and $7.3 billion); Yoder, supra note 11, at 66 n.9
(the federal income tax exemption cost $1.6 billion in 1984, based on the average nominal tax
rate for the six largest proprietary hospital companies, but only $922 million based on the tax
rate for-profits actually paid as a result of various deferments). However, as a result of recent
cost containment measures in various public and private reimbursement programs, hospitals are
becoming less profitable than they had been in the recent past, reducing the value of the income
tax exemption. Still, Copeland & Rudney, supra, at 1565, observe that the exemption would be
worth $6.5 billion even if nonprofit hospitals had no surplus at all.
19. This Article uses "proprietary" to designate privately-owned, for-profit institutions.
Following the convention in the hospital industry, the term "voluntary" is used interchangeably
with "nonprofit" to designate privately-owned institutions incorporated under state not-for-profit
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laboratories for testing the comparative performance, and the relative
merits, of these three forms of organization.
The specific issue of hospital tax exemption has heightened importance because it sits at the confluence of larger social policy issues.
Thirty-seven million Americans have no private or governmental
health insurance, a thirty percent increase from 1979.20 Historically,
the uninsured have relied heavily on the largess of private hospitals for
critical care.2 1 However, stringent reimbursement controls recently
imposed by both private and governmental payors threaten to eliminate the ability of hospitals to cross-subsidize the care of the medically
indigent from revenues generated by paying patients.22 It is increasingly unrealistic to expect private hospitals to meet the public's
demand for charity care, precisely at a time when the greatest need
exists for such care.2 3 Thus, at the core of the tax-exempt debate lies
the issue whether nonprofit hospitals should continue to carry a significant share of this societal burden as payment for continued
exemption.
The tax-exempt debate also implicates social policy related to proprietary incentive in medicine. The health care delivery system has
experienced rampant commercialization during the past two decades,
becoming what a leading critic has called a "medical-industrial complex."'2 4 This change is epitomized by the rapid growth of large proprietary hospital chains such as Hospital Corporation of America
(HCA) and Humana.25 Influential voices decry the corporatization of
health care as inimical to the humanistic values traditionally held
corporations codes. Government institutions are those owned or controlled by government
entities. In a typical metropolitan area all three types of hospitals often coexist.
20. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE UNINSURED:
BACKGROUND DATA AND ANALYSIS 3 (May 1988). "In addition, there are millions of
underinsured people, whose limited insurance puts them at substantial risk of having out-ofpocket expenses upwards of 10 percent of their total income. The best data on this topic...
found that depending on the definition used, from 5 to 18 percent of the population under age 65
was underinsured." Yoder, supra note 11, at 116 n.1.
21. J. BENNETr & T. DILORENZO, supra note 17, at 84 (quoting the American Hospital
Association's (AHA) claim that nonprofit hospitals gave $22 billion in free medical care to the
poor over a five-year period).
22. These developments are surveyed in Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior:
Legal Barriersto Health Care Cost Containment 137 U. PA. L. REv. 431, 435-37 (1988).
23. Sullivan & Moore, A CriticalLook at Recent Developments in Tax Exempt Hospitals,23 J.
HEALTH & HosP. L. 65, 66-71 (1990).
24. Relman, The New Medical-IndustrialComplex, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 963 (1980).
25. See J.HOLLINGSWORTH & E. HOLLINGSWORTH, CONTROVERSY ABOUT AMERICAN

HOSPITALS:

FUNDING, OWNERSHIP AND PERFORMANCE

66-67 (1987) ("In 1985 HCA owned

or managed 422 health care facilities, had revenues of $4.1 billion... and managed hospitals in

more than half a dozen foreign countries.").
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sacred in medicine, and thus view a limitation of tax exemption as a
direct attack on this ideological position.2 6 Others respond that the
crisis gripping the health care system is due largely to the past absence
of normal market forces, and thus see the exemption as a mindless
subsidy that tilts the playing field in favor of inefficient providers.2 7
"No study-of a hospital closing or a new technology in action-and
few summaries of these issues manage to emerge without being cast in
the language of good and evil, delight and doom, prudence and
waste." 2 8 The convergence of these several currents of controversy
render this seemingly mundane tax matter a provocative subject of
study.
This Article begins with a survey of the current law and some criteria for evaluating theories of exemption. The Article then proceeds
with a critique of both the conventional rationales for the charitable
exemption and the existing academic theories. Finding these explanations unsatisfactory, the Article then develops an alternative rationale
for the exemption. This "donative theory" of tax exemption maintains
that nonprofit organizations should be considered charitable-and
thus subsidized through the tax system--only if they are able to
attract a substantial degree of donative support from the public.29
26. See generally Relman, supra note 24.
27. See Clark, supra note 10 at 1460-62 (detailing the theoretical advantages of proprietary
incentive in hospital care); infra notes 202-213 and accompanying text. The gist of this debate,
which is only caricatured in the text, is captured cogently in Yoder, supra note 11, at 3-4,
especially in the exchange between Arnold Relman and Uwe Reinhardt reprinted in that volume,
id. at 209, and in Schlesinger, Marmor & Smithey, Nonprofit and For-Profit Medical Care:
Shifting Roles and Implicationsfor Health Policy, 12 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 427 (1987)
and Marmor, Schlesinger, & Smithey, A New Look at Nonprofits: Health Care Policy in a
Competitive Age, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 314-19 (1986) [hereinafter Marmor].
28. Marmor, Schlesinger & Smithey, Nonprofit Organizations and Health Care, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 221, 222 (W. Powell ed. 1987).
29. This Article restricts its examination to the theory of the exemption conferred through
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) and its analogues in state law. In short, this Article attempts to explain only
the charitable exemption. Thus, this Article does not address other grounds for granting tax
exempt status to noncharitable organizations. For instance, some nonprofits are considered
"exempt" from income taxes because they earn no income. These private, dues-supported
organizations-typified by labor unions, social clubs, and condominium associations-are
referred to as "mutual benefit organizations" because they exist in order to allow their members
to enjoy a benefit provided more efficiently on a collective basis than when purchased
individually. See ElIman, supra note 11, at 1032-42 (explaining the distinction between
charitable and mutual benefit nonprofits); Hansmann, supra note 11, at 892-93 (same); see also
Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 8, at 304 (noting the inherent difficulty of measuring the "income"
of many exempt entities). Their receipts do not constitute income because they merely pool
already-taxed income prior to its collective consumption. As explained by one case, "where
individuals have banded together to produce recreational facilities on a mutual basis, it would be
conceptually erroneous to impose a tax on the organization as a separate entity.... No income
of the sort usually taxed has been generated; the money has simply been shifted from one pocket
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II. THE LEGAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
A.

The Existing Law of Hospital Tax Exemption

L

FederalLaw and the Per Se Exempt View

The most visible source of law for the charitable exemption is section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. or Code), which
exempts from income taxes "[c]orporations ... organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition ... or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals ... .-"3o Legislative history, court decisions
and secondary commentary establish that the term "charitable" is not
intended to be distinct from the remainder of this rather peculiar
grouping of activities. Instead, "underlying all relevant parts of the
Code, is the intent that entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting certain common-law standards of charity."3 1 The specifically enumerated activities are presumptively eligible for exemption by virtue of
this legislative declaration of their charitable status, as long as they
meet other, organizational and operational requirements. The exemption also extends to other, nonenumerated organizations that pursue
purposes the law considers charitable. This statutory formulation conveniently allows us to examine the single term "charitable," which
to another, both within the same pair of pants.... [Als to these funds the organization does not
operate as a separate entity." McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 458 (D.D.C. 1972); see
also UBIT Hearings, supra note 6, at 34, 47.
This Article also does not address tax exemptions granted by states to attract profitable
industries to certain communities, thereby stimulating the local economy and creating new jobs.
This targeted form of exemption falls outside the scope of this Article because it is conferred on
an ad hoc basis without regard to the charitable status of the enterprise. See, eg., N.Y. REAL
PROP. TAX LAW §§ 489-aaa, 489-ddd(1)(b) (McKinney 1984) (50% tax exemption for new
industrial or commercial construction, phased out over ten years).
30. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1989). The statute continues by defining an exempt organization as
one, "no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting, to influence legislation... and which does not participate in, or intervene in ... any
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office."
31. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983); see Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)l(d)(2) (1959) ("The term 'charitable' is . . . not to be construed as limited by the separate
enumeration in section 501(c)(3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may fall within the broad
outlines of 'charity' as developed by judicial decisions."); B. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAXEXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 45 (4th ed. 1983) ("[T1he term 'charitable' may be considered a
generic term and, in its expansive sense, may be read to include 'religious,' 'scientific,'
'educational,' and like purposes ....
."); P. TREUSCH, TAX-EXEMPT CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATIONS 118 (3d ed. 1988) (" '[C]haritable' purpose was a catch-all category for most of
the more specific purposes that were later added.").

Washington Law Review

Vol. 66:307, 1991

combines these various activities into a unified concept of 501(c)(3)
exemption.32
Nonprofit hospitals, frequently termed "voluntary hospitals," have
come to epitomize the type of activity encompassed by the generic
concept of charity.3 3 Nonprofit hospitals have been characterized as
voluntary since the nineteenth century, when they were organized by
religious societies, heavily funded by donations, and staffed by doctors
who worked without compensation and nurses who worked for room
and board as part of their lifetime commitment to a religious order
devoted to caring for the poor. 34 The role of hospitals as "almshouses
for the poor" changed rapidly during the first half of the twentieth
32. This concept of what constitutes a charitable organization also appears in the definition of
"social welfare" organizations which are exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4). See UBITHearings,
supra note 6, at 46 (statement of 0. Donaldson Chapoton) ("The term 'social welfare' as used in
section 501(c)(4) is similar to 'charitable purposes' as used in section 501(c)(3) and there is a
substantial degree of overlap between the two provisions."); Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 8, at
331 (same). Unlike charitable organizations exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), however, social
welfare organizations are not eligible to receive tax-deductible donations. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)
(defining a deductible charitable contribution). On the other hand, social welfare organizations
are allowed to engage in certain political activities without sacrificing their exemption. See B.
HOPKINS, supra note 31, at 309. But see P. TREUSCH, supra note 31, at 324-25 (excessive
political activity may mean organization is no longer promoting social welfare); I.R.C. § 504
(prohibiting 501(c)(3) organization which has had its exempt status revoked due to excessive
political activity from qualifying as 501(c)(4) social welfare organization).
33. Indeed, in about half of the states they are specifically enumerated along with churches
and schools. See ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.030(a)(3) (1990); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.271.A.5
(Supp. 1990); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 214 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 12-81(16) (West 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.197 (West 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-

5-41(a)(5) (Harrison Supp. 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 246-32(a) (Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE
§ 63-105K (1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-201b (1989); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:1703 (West
1990) (exempting property owned by nonprofit entity organized for "health" purposes per
Louisiana Constitution art. 7, sec. 21); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 652(l)(K) (1990); MD.
TAX-PROP. CODE ANN. § 7-202(b)(1) (1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 272.02 (West 1989 & Supp.
1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-3 1-1(f) (Supp. 1990) (exempting hospitals which maintain one
charity ward); MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-6-201(l)(c) (1989) (exempting nonprofit health care
facilities); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 1986); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420-a(1)(a)
(McKinney 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-278.8 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-02-08 (1983);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2405(j) (West 1966 & Supp. 1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020204(a)(3) (Purdon 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-3-3(12) (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-37220(A)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 10-4-9.3 (Supp. 1990)
(exempting property used primarily for health care); TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.18 (Vernon
Supp. 1991) (exempting charitable organizations providing medical care); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 84.36.040 (1989); Wis. STAT. ANN.

§ 70.11(4m) (West

1989); Wyo. STAT. § 39-1-

201(a)(xxv) (1990).
It is ironic, but fitting, that one of the first locations where their charitable status has come
under attack is Tennessee, the "Volunteer State." See Downtown Hosp. Ass'n v. Tennessee State
Bd. of Equalization, 760 S.W.2d 954 (Tenn. App. 1988).
34. See, e.g., Board of Review v. Provident Hosp. & Training School Ass'n, 233 Il1. 243, 84
N.E. 216, 217 (1908); Sisters of Third Order of St. Francis v. Board of Review, 231 Ill. 317, 83
N.E. 272. 273 (1907).
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century with developments in anesthesia, surgical technique and other
aspects of medical science that suddenly transformed hospitals from
the dumping ground of humanity to the pinnacle establishment of the
health care delivery system. Still, nonprofit hospitals continued in
their voluntary tradition, despite opening their doors to paying
patients and a secular staff, by maintaining their commitment to treat
all patients regardless of their ability to pay and by their continued, if
partial, reliance on volunteer labor.35
The voluntary nature of nonprofit hospitals, however, has steadily
abated over the past generation as a consequence of widespread
employer-provided health insurance and massive governmental programs such as Medicare (for the elderly and disabled) and Medicaid
(for the poor). The advent of third-party payors transformed the character of the nonprofit hospital sector. Pressured by the emerging competition of investor-owned hospitals, nonprofit hospitals have
increasingly taken on the appearance of business enterprises by serving
mostly paying patients, decreasing their reliance on donations or volunteer labor, and striving to generate as much surplus revenue as possible through commercial transactions.3 6 Still, nonprofit hospitals for
a time have retained a remnant of their voluntary tradition by using
these generous sources of reimbursement for paying patients to crosssubsidize care for those who fall through the insurance cracks. This
remaining voluntary tradition threatens to collapse into a token effort
as a result of the sweeping restrictions in public and private insurance
over the past few years that have severely constrained the ability of
hospitals to shift the costs of indigent care to paying patients.37 The
merger of the operational characteristics of nonprofit and proprietary
hospitals that this trend portends (or, in the view of many, that has
35. The history of the hospital industry presented in this section is drawn from the following
sources: C. ROSENBERG, THE CARE OF STRANGERS (1987) (history of American hospitals); P.
STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 146-76, 430-38 (1982); R.
STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND

IN WEALTH: AMERICAN HOSPITALS IN THE TWENTIETH

CENTURY (1989).
36. "A corporate ethos originating among the investor-owned chains has spread throughout
the health-care system." Light, Corporate Medicinefor Profit, SCI. AM., Dec. 1986, at 38, 42.
"Throughout the country voluntary hospitals are attempting to model themselves after for-profit
hospitals." J. HOLLINGSWORTH & E. HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 25, at 129. "Even the
health care vocabulary is changing, infused with businesslike terms ... [such as] 'marketing,'
'market share,' 'industry,' 'profitability,' and 'productivity,' to cite a few." Jones, Duval &
Lesparre, Competition or Conscience? Mixed-Mission Dilemmas of the Voluntary Hospital, 24
INQUIRY 110, 113 (1987).
37. J. HOLLINGSWORTH & E. HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 25, at 137-38. See generally
Sloan, Valvona & Mullner, Identifying the Issues: A Statistical Profile, in UNCOMPENSATED
HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 16, 27-28 (1986).
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already occurred) 38 has forced voluntary hospitals to undertake a
thorough self-examination that seeks to redefine their distinct
"mission.", 39

These shifts in the character of the voluntary hospital sector are
mirrored in the shift of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) position
concerning the exempt status of nonprofit hospitals.' A 1956 ruling
reflected traditional notions of charity by requiring exempt hospitals
to treat indigent patients "to the extent of their financial ability."'" In
1969, three years after the implementation of Medicare and Medicaid,
the IRS altered its position regarding the standards for exemption in
response to the hospital industry's complaint that these public programs had greatly reduced the demand for charity care and rendered
the existing standard for exemption an anachronism.4 2
In Revenue Ruling 69-545, 4" the IRS abandoned the charity care
requirement imposed in 1956 and adopted a "per se" rule of hospital
38. See infra notes 236-41 and accompanying text.
39. The leader in this effort is David Seay, of the United Hospital Fund. See Seay &
Sigmond, Community Benefit Standardsfor Hospitals: Perceptionsand Performance, FRONTIERS
HEALTH SERVICES MGMT., Spr. 1989, at 3; Seay & Vladeck, Mission Matters, in IN SICKNESS
AND IN HEALTH: THE MISSION OF VOLUNTARY HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS 1 (1988). See
generally CATHOLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION, THE SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUDGET (1989)
(summary on file with Washington Law Review); AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION,
COMMUNITY BENEFIT AND
HOSPITALS (1988).

TAX-EXEMPT

STATUS:

A

SELF-ASSESSMENT

GUIDE

FOR

40. The following sources extensively discuss the history of the IRS rulings and their
relationship to the history of the nonprofit hospital sector: Bromberg, FinancingHealth Care and
the Effect of the Tax Law, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 156 (1975) [hereinafter Bromberg,

Financing Health Care]; Bromberg, The Charitable Hospital, 20 CATH. U.L. REV. 237 (1970)
[hereinafter 'Bromberg, Charitable Hospital]; Mancino, Income Tax Exemption of the
Contemporary Nonprofit Hospital, 32 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1015 (1988); Note, Nonprofit Hospitals
and the State Tax Exemption: An Analysis of the Issues Since Utah County v. Intermountain
Health Care, Inc., 9 VA. TAX REV. 599 (1990).
41. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202, 203. See generally Colombo, Are Associations of
Doctors Tax Exempt? Analyzing Inconsistencies in the Tax Exemption of Health Care Providers,
9 VA. TAX REV. 469 (1990).

42. Tax Reform, 1969: Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1427 (1969) (statement of Julius M. Griesman, attorney, AHA); see A. SOMERS, HOSPITAL
REGULATION: THE DILEMMA OF PUBLIC POLICY 41 (1969) ("Thanks to Medicare, Medicaid,

and numerous other public and private mechanisms for financing care for the indigent and
medically indigent, in a few years free hospital care will approach the vanishing point.");
Comment, FederalIncome Tax Exemption ForPrivate Hospitals, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 764
(1968) ("[Plublic programs for mandatory hospitalization insurance, as well as the ever
increasing coverage of private insurance plans, threaten to leave hospitals without patients who
require free or below-cost care."). Observe, though, that this argument falsely assumes that a
hospital that experiences no demand for charity care would not meet the requirements of the
1956 ruling. To the contrary, see infra note 44.
43. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. The timing of this ruling in relation to the legislative
calendar in 1969 is curious, to say the least. After complaints by the hospital industry regarding
the charity care requirement of Rev. Rul. 56-185 surfaced during House hearings on the 1969 tax
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exemption: an entity engaged in the "promotion of health" for the
general benefit of the community is pursuing a charitable purpose,
even though a portion of the community, such as indigents, are
excluded from participation.'
In this particular ruling, the IRS
stressed that the promotion of health for the general benefit of the
community had long been recognized as a charitable purpose under
the common law of charitable trusts.4 5 Though the hospital in question did not regularly accept charity patients, several factors, including
a board of directors drawn from the general community and an emergency room open to nonpaying patients, convinced the IRS that the
exemption should be continued.4 6 The per se standard was further
entrenched by a 1983 ruling establishing that even hospitals with limited services and no open emergency room, such as cancer hospitals,
reform legislation, the House passed a version of tax reform legislation which included a specific
exemption for "hospitals" in a revised § 501(c)(3). H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(j)
(1969). Rev. Rul. 69-545 was issued prior to Senate debate on the tax reform bill, and when the
issue arose in the Senate, the Finance Committee decided to delete this provision from the Senate
version of the legislation in light of the IRS action, and to reconsider the issue in connection with
upcoming debates on the scope of Medicare. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON MEDICARE AND MEDICAID PROBLEMS ISSUES AND
ALTERNATIVES 55 (Comm. Print 1970). In this report, the staff severely criticized the breadth
of the 1969 ruling, id. at 58, but no further legislative action was taken. This opaque legislative
background sheds no light on whether Congress agreed with the 1969 ruling.
44. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON MEDICARE
AND MEDICAID PROBLEMS, ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 55, 58 (Comm. Print 1970). It is
possible to maintain, based on a different reading of these rulings, that they indicate very little
shift in policy. The 1956 ruling did not necessarily require large amounts of free care by all taxexempt hospitals. As explained in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Ass'n v. Simon, 506 F.2d
1278, 1289-90 n.26 (1974), vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1976):
[Iospitals were required to provide free care only to the extent of their financial ability.
Hospitals operating at a deficit would have no obligation under Ruling 56-185. In addition
the Ruling qualified the "financial ability" standard by providing: "The fact that its charity
record is relatively low is not conclusive that a hospital is not operated for charitable
purposes.... It may also set aside earnings which it uses for improvements and additions to
hospital facilities.... A nominal charity record for a given period of time, in the absence of
charitable demands of the community, will not affect its right to continued exemption."
Nevertheless, it is clear that the 1956 ruling would not have allowed hospitals to refuse
repeated demands for treatment by uninsured patients if hospitals had the financial capacity to
meet those demands. See Bromberg, Charity and Change: Current Problems of Tax Exempt
Health and Welfare Organizationsin Perspective,in TAx PROBLEMS OF NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 1970, at 249, 256 (1970) (recounting history of revenue agents denying exemption to
hospitals under 1956 ruling based on their lack of demonstrated charity care). In contrast, the
1969 ruling lets the hospital decide whether to devote surplus revenues to charity care or to
hospital expansion. This Article therefore continues to treat these rulings as they have been
uniformly characterized by other scholars in this field. See generally supra note 40.
45. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, 118.
46. Id.
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could qualify for exemption merely by treating all patients able to
47
pay.
Public interest advocates mounted an aggressive challenge the lifting of the free care requirement for hospitals. In Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Association v. Simon,4" these advocates succeeded in
the district court, but they lost when the court of appeals upheld the
government on the merits of its 1969 ruling. The Supreme Court dismissed the case on procedural grounds, reasoning that indigent residents who might one day require free hospital services lack standing to
challenge a hospital's exemption,4 9 thus effectively terminating all
future attacks on the federal position. The D.C. Circuit's opinion nevertheless remains the most influential articulation of the per se exempt
status of hospitals. The court reasoned that "the rationale upon which
the [free care] definition of 'charitable' was predicated has largely disappeared," and that "[t]o continue to base the 'charitable' status of a
hospital strictly on the relief it provides for the poor fails to account
for these major changes in the area of health care [such as Medicare
and Medicaid]." 5 In essence, the court held that nonprofit hospitals
are charitable even if they do not provide free care because the concept
of what constitutes a charity must change "to recognize the changing
47. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94. For a more detailed discussion of the 1956, 1969, and
1983 rulings, see Colombo, supra note 41, at 473-81.
48. 506 F.2d 1278 (1974), vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
49. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). The Court found that the
connection between the government's ruling and any possible refusal of service to this class of
patients was too remote and speculative to constitute a case or controversy. It reasoned that
hospitals might choose to treat these plaintiffs anyway, or that they might choose to forego the
exemption (and thus be under no duty to treat) if the government were to adopt the plaintiffs'
position. The Court held that these two possibilities were so likely as to render "mere
speculation" the possibility that the plaintiffs would be treated only if the government changed its
position. This holding is so out of step with other precedents on causation in standing analysis
that it is taken as establishing a sui generis rule that no one other than the taxpayer may
challenge an IRS ruling. Compare United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (standing exists for law students to challenge ICC's
approval of a general, nationwide rate increase for railway freight based on the allegation that
this action will lead to more litter in Washington, D.C. because it will raise the costs of recycling)
with Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (parents of black students have no standing to
challenge IRS grant of tax exemption to racially discriminatory religious schools). See generally
B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFrs 115.9.4 (1981 & Supp.
1989).
50. Eastern Ky., 506 F.2d at 1288-89; see also SHARE v. Commissioner of Revenue, 363
N.W.2d 47, 52 (Minn. 1985) ("[M]ajor changes in the area of health care.., have necessitated
changes as well in definitional predicates .... ); Medical Center Hosp. v. City of Burlington, 152
Vt. 611, 566 A.2d 1352, 1356 (1989) ("[W]e do not believe that we are.., required to ignore the
immense sociological and economic changes that have taken place in the health care profession
cf Utah
.);
County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985) (changes
in health care result in revoking charitable status).
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economic, social and technological" environment in which hospitals
now function."1 This redefinition of charity is circular because it
assumes the question that it purports to answer-whether hospitals
should continue to enjoy charitable status. This view seems determined to reshape the concept of charity however necessary to fit the
predominant pattern of what most nonprofit hospitals are currently
doing. This unanalytic, question-begging approach characterizes
much of the argument in favor of granting the exemption to
hospitals.5 2
2. State Law and the Charity Care Standard
State statutes and constitutional provisions tend to follow a pattern
nearly identical to I.R.C. section 501(c)(3). Many states automatically
confer exemption from income tax on any organization that carries a
federal section 501(c)(3) exemption. 3 Property tax exemptions exist
51. Eastern Ky., 506 F.2d at 1288. As explained by the leading contrary opinion, hospitals:
argue that... the universal availability of insurance... make[s] the idea of a hospital solely
supported by philanthropy an anachronism. We believe this argument itself exposes the
weakness in the [hospitals'] position. It is precisely because such a vast system of thirdparty payers has developed . . . that the historical distinction between for-profit and
nonprofit hospitals has eroded.
Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 274 (Utah 1985); see also
Hyman, The Conundrum of Charitabiliy:Reassessing Tax Exemption for Hospitals, 16 AM. J. L.
& MED. 327, 331 (1990) ("Most articles have presupposed that tax exemption for hospitals is
desirable ....); id. at 379 ("We are invariably reminded that the conservative test is anachronistic ....
While this is true, it does not necessarily follow that the changed circumstances still
merit a tax exemption. Instead, perhaps the exemption is as anachronistic as the reasons that
originally gave rise to it. Things that were once tax-exempt can become taxable if circumstances
change ....
");id at 380 ("The right question to ask is whether the exemption itself makes sense,
and not whether the old beliefs about exemption are anachronistic.").
52. See Rammel & Parsons, Utah County & Intermountain Health Care: Utah's Unique
Method for Determining Charitable Property Tax Exemption-A Review of its Mandate and
Impact, 22 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 73, 77 (1989) (arguing for revised definition of charity because
"the Utah County court has articulated a standard for which compliance [by hospitals] is
virtually impossible"); Mancino, supra note 40, at 10 19-20 (maintaining that definition of charity
must change to keep up with changes in hospital industry); Bromberg, supra note 44, at 249
(same).
53. Eg., ALA. CODE § 40-18-32(11) (Supp. 1990); COLO. REv. STAT. § 39-22-117 (Supp.
1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-214(2) (West Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 220.13(2)(h) (West 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-25 (Harrison 1989); IDAHO CODE § 63-3026
(1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, 2-205(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 7932,113 (1989); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 141.040(g) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1989); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 5102(6) (1990) (imposing tax only on corporations taxable under the
I.R.C., thereby adopting I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) by implication); MD. TAx-GEN. CODE ANN. § 10104 (1988); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 63, § 30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 206.201(1) (West 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.05 (West 1989); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 143.441.2.(1) (Vernon Supp. 1990); NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-2714 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-4 (Supp. 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-09 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2359 (West
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by virtue of independent state law provisions, 54 but these are worded
in a strikingly similar fashion: the predominant pattern confers the
exemption on religious, educational and charitable organizations. 5' In
interpreting these statutes, the vast majority of states adhere to the
federal view that promotion of health for the general community constitutes a charitable purpose, regardless of whether the entity in question provides free or subsidized health care to the poor. 56 A small
minority of states, however, cling to the view that health care delivery
does not in and of itself deserve charitable status. These states require
some additional contribution to society, such as charity care, before
state law confers tax exempt status. 5 7 The leading judicial decision
1991); ORE. REV. STAT. § 317.080 (Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-7-105(1)(a) (1987); VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-401(5) (Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE § 11-24-5 (1987). It is especially curious
to note that Utah, which automatically confers an income tax exemption on organizations
meeting the requirements of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (and, by implication, the per se test), nevertheless
has refused to follow the per se rule for the property tax exemption. See infra notes 58-62 and
accompanying text.
In addition, a number of state income tax statutes which do not specifically refer to the I.R.C.
nevertheless adopt exemption language virtually identical to I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). E.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1201.4 (1980); ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-51-303 (1987); CAL. REV. & TAX
CODE § 23701(d) (West Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1902(b)(2) (1985); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 47:121(5) (West 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-7-29(a)(3) (Supp. 1990); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 15-31-102(l)(d) (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77:8 (1971); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 105-130.11(a)(3) (1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5811(3)(J) (1981).
54. Ginsberg, The Real Property Tax Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations:A Perspective, 53
TEMPLE L. Q. 291, 292 (1980) (every state has a statute on the subject and all but seven have a
constitutional provision).
55. While the exact language sometimes varies (for example, use of the word "church"
instead of "religious" or "benevolent" instead of "charitable"), and the statutory construction is
sometimes oblique (Washington, for example, uses a separate statutory section for each type of
exemption), all states except Maine and Vermont appear to follow this general regime in their
property tax exemption statutes, and these states differ only in the omission of an exemption for
general "educational" purposes. Maine's exemption statute, for example, contains a limited
exemption for property owned by "colleges," but not schools generally. ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 36, § 652 (1990). Similarly, Vermont exempts property owned or leased by "colleges,
academies or other public schools" but does not appear to exempt property owned by private
educational institutions. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3802(4) (1981). See also W. WELLFORD & J.
GALLAGHER, UNFAIR COMPETITION? THE CHALLENGE TO TAX EXEMPTION app. A (1988)
(50-state survey of the laws of charitable property tax exemption); Comment, Nonprofit
Hospitals: The Relationship Between Charitable Tax Exemptions and Care for Indigents, 43 Sw.
L.J. 759, 774 (1989).
56. Rammell & Parsons, supra note 52, at 73-74. For a state-by-state analysis of property tax
exemption laws as they apply to health care providers, see Taxation, in 2B HEALTH LAW
CENTER, HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL 37-152 (1988).
57. Rammell & Parsons, supra note 52, at 74. For example, in Hospital Utilization Project v.
Pennsylvania, 507 Pa. 1, 487 A.2d 1306 (1985), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the
denial of tax exemption to a nonprofit provider of statistical analysis of patient treatment and
cost data to hospitals because the services were provided on a fee-for-service basis. According to
the court, one element favoring the classification of an entity as a charity under Pennsylvania law
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supporting this view is Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care,
58
Inc.
In Utah County, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a county board
of equalization's denial of exempt status to two nonprofit hospitals,
based primarily on their failure to render sufficient charity care. After
examining the historical shift in the mission of nonprofit hospitals
from treating the poor to treating the community at large, the majority
noted that the hospitals in question derived virtually all their operating revenues from patient charges, 59 committed less than one percent
of their gross revenues to charity care,' and charged patients prevailing market rates. 6 1 According to the majority, the hospitals "confuse[d] the element of gift to the community, which an entity must
demonstrate in order to qualify as a charity under our Constitution,
with the concept of community benefit, which any of countless private
enterprises might provide."'6 2
In the wake of Utah County, taxing authorities revoked the exempt
status of nonprofit hospitals in Missouri, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and
Vermont, but state courts reversed in almost every instance. 63 Reconis that the entity "[d]onates or renders gratuitously a substantial portion of its services." Id. at
1317.
58. 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985).
59. Id. at 273.
60. Id. at 274.
61. Id at 273.
62. Id. at 276. Utah hospitals attempted to reverse this decision through a referendum
initiative that would have declared nonprofit hospitals per se exempt, but the measure was
defeated by a 50.1% to 49.9% vote. Salt Lake County subsequently revoked the exemption of
four 'other hospitals. See Jeppson, A Time for Action by Not-For-ProfitHospitals, FRONTIERS
HEALTH SERVICES MGMT., Spr. 1989, at 40, 41; Rammell & Parsons, supra note 52, at 81.
63. Callaway Community Hosp. Ass'n v. Craighead, 759 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. App. 1988); St.
Luke's Hosp. v. Board of Assessment Appeals, No. 88-C-2691 (Pa. C.P., Lehigh Co., Apr. 19,
1990); Downtown Hosp. Ass'n v. Tennessee State Bd. of Equalization, 760 S.W.2d 954 (Tenn.
App. 1988); Medical Center Hosp. v. City of Burlington, 152 Vt. 611, 566 A.2d 1352 (1989); see
generally NORTH CAROLINA

CENTER

FOR PUB. PoL'Y RESEARCH,

COMPARING

THE

PERFORMANCE OF FoR-PROFIT AND NOT-FOR-PROFIT HOSPITALS IN NORTH CAROLINA
159-66 (1989); Greene, Governmental Units Challenge Not-For-Profits' Tax Exemptions, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Dec. 4, 1987, at 67; Hudson, Not-For-Profit Hospitals Fight Tax-Exempt
Challenges, HOsPITALS, Oct. 20, 1990, at 32-37; Hyman, supra note 51, at 345-46; Pear, Tax
Exemptions of Nonprofit HospitalsScrutinized,N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1990, at Al, col. 2, B17, col.
5 ("Local officials have tried to revoke tax exemptions from nonprofit hospitals in at least 12
states.").
Pennsylvania appears to be the only state other than Utah with a legal climate hostile to
hospital tax exemption, although its precedents are presently much cloudier. In West Allegheny
Hospital v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals & Review, 500 Pa. 236, 455 A.2d 1170
(1982), the court upheld a hospital's exemption despite its low level of charity care. The same
court, however, subsequently ruled that an organization providing administrative support to
hospitals does not earn the exemption where the organization "has no ...open-admissions policy
... [and fails to prove that it] provides its services without regard to the [recipient's] ability to
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sideration of tax exemption for health care providers also has been on
the legislative agenda in more than a dozen states recently, although
these efforts have generally proved unsuccessful.' The issue has also
pay." Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 507 Pa. 1, 487 A.2d 1306, 1316 (1985).
Following this apparent inconsistency, one Pennsylvania trial court has upheld a hospital's
exemption, St. Luke's Hospital,supra, while another has revoked the exemption. School Dist. v.
Hamot Medical Center, No. 138-A-2989 (Pa. C.P., Erie Co., May 18, 1990). Hamot Medical
Center, however, presented unusually strong facts. The hospital failed to maintain an open
admissions policy of any kind. Moreover, the hospital violated the prohibition on private
inurement by transferring earnings to profit-making subsidiaries and by paying hospital
executives excessive compensation. Nevertheless, the most recent decision denied an exemption
to a diagnostic clinic solely on grounds of charity care, observing that "the Institute has failed to
prove that it donated a 'substantial' portion of its services." In re Pittsburgh NMR Inst., 557
A.2d 220, 224 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
Taxing authorities in Pittsburgh succeeded in collecting increased revenues from the
Presbyterian-University Hospital without revoking its exemption. The hospital agreed to pay
$11 million over 10 years for city services. Conversation with Dan Pelligrini, City Attorney,
Pittsburgh, Pa. (Aug. 17, 1988) (notes on file with the Washington Law Review); see also
Robinson, Via Donation or Tax, Cities Want More Revenues, HospITALS, Mar. 20, 1989, at 55.
Also, the Attorney General of Texas has sued Methodist Hospital of Houston, seeking to revoke
its property tax exemption. State v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., No. 494,212 (126th Jud. Dist. Travis
County, Tex. filed Nov. 26, 1990); see also Taylor, Charity Begins in Court? Hospital Sued in
Novel Lawsuit, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 18, 1991, at 3, col. 1 (discussing State v. Methodist Hosp. Sy and
commenting: "This [case] represents a new legal avenue, a new hook for examining the charitable
mission of a hospital.... There's no question everyone in the industry will be watching this
case").
64. North Carolina Center for Pub. Pol'y Research, supra note 63, at 159-66 (summarizing
the challenges to hospital exemptions across the country and discussing state-by-state activity in
detail); Baldwin, supra note 18, at 37 (discussing challenges to hospital exemption initated by in
the states of Florida and Oklahoma); Hudson, supra note 63, at 33 (same); Larkin, Financial
Success May Invite Local Tax Scrutiny, HOSPITALS, Oct. 5, 1988, at 30 (discussing challenges
pending in at least 20 state courts or legislatures); Robinson, Via Donation or Tax, Cities Want
More Revenues, HOSPITALS, Mar. 20, 1989, at 55 (same); Seay & Sigmond, supra note 39, at 4-5
("Currently, more than a dozen states have reexamined, or have begun to reexamine, the basic
tax-exemption policies for voluntary hospitals, as have numerous cities, counties, and other
municipalities.") (citing California, Iowa, Kansas, Minnisota, Mississippi, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia); Comment, supra note 55,
at 779 ("A 1988 survey ... reveals that at least nine states ... are reevaluating charitable tax
exemptions for nonprofit hospitals ....). "In 1987, at least 13 states considered changes in the
tax-exempt status of not-for-profit hospitals. Several states established study commissions to
look into the [issue]." NORTH CAROLINA CENTER FOR PUB. POL'Y RESEARCH, supra note 63,
at 159. See generally Barker, Reexamining of 501(c)(3) Exemption of Hospitals as Charitable
Organizations, 1990 TAX NOTES 339, 346-47.
Since 1923, Alabama has required hospitals to meet a statutorily-defined level of charity care
in order to receive a property tax exemption. See Gay v. State, 228 Ala. 253, 153 So. 767, 770
(1934). The current statutory provision exempts up to $75,000 worth of property used
exclusively for hospital purposes, if at least "15% of the [hospital's] business" is the treatment of
charity patients. ALA. CODE § 40-9-1 (Supp. 1990). Apparently, Alabama hospitals must
annually certify compliance with this requirement to be eligible for the exemption. Id.
It is also noteworthy that "public opinion is closely divided over whether or not hospitals
should pay taxes: 49 percent think they should; 43 percent do not." Seaver, Are Hospitals
Becoming Too Businesslike? HosPITALs, Feb. 20, 1990, at 86.
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attracted significant attention from Congress. One congressman has
publicly questioned the continued need for tax exemption of nonprofit
hospitals,6 5 and two major legislative efforts to change hospital exemp66
tion standards are underway.
Because subsequent courts have found the reasoning of Utah County
unconvincing,6 7 and because the reasoning of Eastern Kentucky is
facially unsatisfactory, 6 proper resolution of the tax-exempt status of
nonprofit hospitals is not likely to be based on whether health care is a
per se charitable enterprise, or whether free services to the poor is the
essence of the charitable exemption for hospitals. Moreover, resolving
this conflict for hospitals requires an understanding of how charity is
generally defined for tax purposes. This in turn requires the formulation of a comprehensive theory of what activities deserve subsidization
65. N.Y. Times, July 15, 1987, at A21, col. 1:
[Congressman Stark, a] key member of a Congressional tax-writing committee said today
that the Federal tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals was probably unwarranted because
they generally did not provide substantial amounts of charitable care ....
Mr. Stark, a
Democrat, said it was unlikely that Congress would revoke the tax exemption for nonprofit
hospitals. But he said such hospitals should be required to demonstrate the benefits they
provide to the community through charitable care.
See also Sullivan & Moore, A CriticalLook at Recent Developments in Tax Exempt Hospitals, 23
J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 65 (1990) (IRS officials warning that hospitals that close their emergency
rooms or dump emergency patients are threatening their exempt status).
66. In the current congressional session, Rep. Edward Roybal, Chairman of the House
Committee on Aging, introduced the "Charity Care and Hospital Tax-Exempt Status Reform
Act," H.R. 790, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REc. E395-97 (1991). This Bill would revoke
a hospital's exemption or impose an excise tax unless the hospital could show it returned 85% of
the value of all federal, state and local exemptions to the community through uncompensated
care, unique community benefits or other services not provided by for-profit hospitals. For
further description and analysis of this Bill, see infra note 151. In addition, Rep. Brian Donnelly,
a member of the House Ways and Means Committee and a ranking Democratic member of the
Subcommittee on Health, is preparing legislation that would incorporate ideas expressed by
Thomas Barker, Rep. Donnelly's legislative director, in an article published in July, 1990. See
Barker, supra note 64. Barker suggests a return to a charity care standard for exempt hospitals,
albeit a more flexible standard than originally contained in Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202.
Barker, supra note 64, at 350-51. Barker would also permit exemption for hospitals that could
demonstrate "a significant and substantial community benefit," such as by being the sole
community hospital as defined by Medicare. Id. at 351.
67. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. Even in Utah, the impact of the Utah County
holding has been severely diluted by the set of standards subsequently issued to implement this

decision.

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, NONPROFIT HOSPITAL AND NURSING HOME

CHARITABLE PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION STANDARDS (Dec. 18, 1990). These standards count
as charity care not only the charge-based value of free services, but also the value of community
service activities and the difference between the hospital's usual discounted charges and the
amount it receives from Medicare and Medicaid. Id. at 4. Moreover, these standards credit as
part of a hospital's "gift to the community" the donations of time and money the hospital receives
from the community. Id. at 4-5. This latter provision absurdly views the exemption as a means
to reimburse hospitals for another subsidy they receive.
68. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 66:307, 1991

through the tax system, in other words, why any nonprofit organization should be tax exempt.
B.

The Criteriafor Evaluating Theories of Exemption

Before undertaking a critique of the various bases for the charitable
exemption, it is helpful to articulate the precise criteria that a successful theory for exemption should satisfy. Such a theory should: (1)
identify activities deserving social subsidy, which entails a determination of both worthiness and neediness; (2) distribute the subsidy in
rough proportion to the degree of deservedness; (3) explain both the
income tax and the property tax exemption, and, ideally, explain the
related charitable deduction as well as the various operational constraints that attach to charitable status; and (4) align generally with an
intuitive concept of what constitutes a charity and the major historical
categories of exempt entities.69
1.

Deservedness

This Article follows the prevailing view that the charitable exemption constitutes an implicit government subsidy of the activities it covers because it deviates from the ordinary tax base-either income or
property.7 ° Accordingly, the exemption is justified only where there is
a convincing showing that the activity in question deserves a social
subsidy. There are two elements to deservedness: worthiness and neediness. At a minimum, exemption requires some reliable indication of
which activities out of the vast array of human endeavors are socially
worthy. But worthiness alone is not sufficient without neediness. An
organization may be willing to continue its meritorious pursuits absent
69. Some of these criteria have been suggested previously in Simon, The Tax Treatment of
Nonprofit Organizations:A Review of Federaland State Policies, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A
RESEARCH HANDBOOK 67, 76-78 (W. Powell ed. 1987); J. JENSEN, supra note 3, at 148:
A valid case for exemption should have at least three aspects. In the first place, the property
seeking exemption should be used in rendering a service affected with a bona fide public
interest.... In the second place, the service deserving such subsidy must be incapable of
being fostered adequately on a commercial, quid pro quo basis ....
In the third place, the
tax exemption method of subsidizing these services should not be used unless it can be done
without serious disproportion between the benefits and costs to localities interested.
See also S. SURREY, supra note 12, at 134; S. SURREY & P. MCDANIEL, supra note 12, at 72-83.
70. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544-45 (1983) ("[T]ax exemptions
... are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system .... "); see supra note 12.
The contrasting view looks for a justification of the exemption that would explain why charitable
income or property is not in the tax base to begin with. See P. SWORDS, CHARITABLE REAL
PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS IN NEW YORK STATE 200 (1981); see also Simon, supra note 69,
at 75; infra notes 286-90 and accompanying text (developing further reasons for rejecting this
minority view).
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a subsidy. If so, a subsidy is a waste of scarce government resources
that could be devoted to other, more productive causes. Even if the
level of service provided by the nonprofit sector would diminish without the exemption, the exemption is not necessary unless neither the
proprietary sector nor the government is capable of providing the
same social benefits as efficiently. Ideally, therefore, the definition of
charity should identify activities whose social benefits would be
irreplaceably reduced absent the subsidy.
2. Proportionality
In addition to guarding against subsidization of activities that are
unworthy or that simply do not need support, an ideal concept of
charity in the tax exemption arena should guard against oversubsidizing (or undersubsidizing) those activities that are deserving. In other
words, a proper concept of charity should at least roughly match the
level of support to the level of deservedness. In fact, most theories for
the exemption bestow tax relief in such a manner that "it would be
sheer coincidence if the value of the tax exemption were to match the
...actual needs for the service,"7 1 or, more perversely, in a fashion
that gives the greatest tax break to the least deserving.
Another way to capture the substance of the proportionality criterion is to ask whether it makes sense to administer a deserving subsidy
through an income or property tax exemption. It is not enough to
demonstrate that charitable institutions deserve government support;
it is necessary to show that tax subsidies represent the most sensible
vehicle for support, that some form of direct grant might not more
accurately approximate the optimal level of support, or that direct
government provision of the same service is not preferable.7"
71. Gabler & Shannon, supra note 9, at 2544.
72. A political cynic might contend that it is hopeless to formulate such a theory of charitable
exemption because "charity" is nothing more than an empty label that politicians place on
whatever activity they desire to subsidize, for reasons of political expediency, through the tax
system rather than through direct appropriations. One might also take issue with this criterion
less cynically by maintaining that the exemption is frequently the only way that deserving
organizations can obtain government support because legislators fear the voter approbation that
attends direct funding. These arguments are unconvincing for the following reasons.
First, the fact that political expediency might describe political reality at some level should not
deter the formulation of a more principled application of the exemption. Idealism aside, such
cynical characterizations of the charitable exemption are largely inaccurate. Legislators rarely
determine charitable status; the decision generally rests with taxing authorities. Even if
politicians were to make this choice, they might choose to fund the worthwhile activity in a
direct fashion if a coherent theory of the exemption foreclosed a tax subsidy as an option. Where
the legislature declined to subsidize the activity, and an unprincipled application of the
exemption was the only available option, perhaps the activity does not deserve support. A tax
subsidy is considered politically expedient precisely because it disguises a spending decision from
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Universality

Classification as a charitable organization carries with it not only
exemption from the federal corporate income tax but also a host of
other benefits and responsibilities. Organizations exempt under I.R.C.

501(c)(3) are generally eligible to receive tax deductible donations,7 3
and charitable status usually results in exemption from state and local
property, income, and sometimes sales tax as well. On the burden side
of the equation, the charitable exemption imposes certain limitations
on an organization's structure and on its scope of operation. It must

be truly nonprofit, so that no earnings inure to the benefit of a private
individual, and it may not engage in substantial political lobbying or in
any political campaigning.7 4 Moreover, the exemption does not
extend to earnings derived from activities unrelated to its exempt pur75
pose, even if those earnings ultimately support the exempt purpose.
A valid concept of charity or theory of exemption should offer a
cogent explanation for these tax benefits and operational constraints. 6
the legislators' political constituency. S. SURREY & P. MCDANIEL, supra note 12, at 104. If an
informed constituency objects to the expenditure, then any form of subsidy is improper. Witness,
for instance, the pork barrel politics that transpired during the Tax Reform Act of 1986. J.
BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GULCH 146-47 (1987).

73. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (1989).
74. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3). State exemption statutes which follow the language of I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) incorporate similar standards by implication. Other state property and income tax
exemption statutes explicitly contain the inurement prohibition. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.
§ 91A-1102(a)(5) (Harrison 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 246-32(e) (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 701l(4m) (West 1989). Even where the language is less precise, as in most state property tax
exemption provisions, lack of private inurement is generally considered essential to "charitable"
status. See, e.g., In re Claim of Assembly Homes v. Yellow Medicine County, 273 Minn. 197,
203-04, 140 N.W.2d 336, 340-41 (1966) (construing the words "purely public charity" as
incorporating a prohibition against private inurement). See generally 2B HEALTH LAW
CENTER, supra note 56, at 21. The same is true for the restriction on political activity. See, e.g.,
Pennsylvania v. American Anti-Vivisection Soc'y, 32 Pa. Commw. 70, 377 A.2d 1378 (1977)
(since primary activity of organization was political lobbying, organization was not a charity).
75. I.R.C. § 511-14. States generally do not have their own versions of the unrelated business
income tax contained in I.R.C. § 511, although state law may provide that income of an exempt
organization taxable under § 511 is also taxable at the state level. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-1832(c) (Supp. 1990); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1231 (Supp. 1990). See generally W.
WELLFORD & J. GALLAGHER, supra note 55, at app. A (surveying state tax exemption statutes).
76. Professor Harvey Dale disagrees with this universality criterion. Quoting the aphoristic
wisdom of H.L. Mencken that "[flor every complex problem, there is a solution which is simple,
elegant, . . and wrong," he maintains that the exemption is a creature of history, not logic, and
advocates a case-by-case approach to applying the exemption that allows it to grow haphazardly
like a coral reef. UBIT Hearings, supra note 6, at 1860, 1864 (statement of Harvey P. Dale,
Professor of Law and Director, Study on Law and Philanthropy, N.Y.U. School of Law); see also
H. Dale, Rationales for Tax Exemption 1 (Feb. 1, 1988) (unpublished manuscript) ("[N]o single
rationale can or should be expected to explain or justify tax-exempt status. The not-for-profit
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4. HistoricalConsistency
It is not our naive ambition either to repudiate the charitable
exemption or to reformulate it to fit some overly fine sense of intellectual aesthetics. The charitable exemption has evolved throughout centuries of experience to take on an almost universal presence and shape.
A complete reformulation or abandonment is impossible to contemplte for both political and pragmatic reasons." A successful theory,
therefore, should be roughly consistent with the present scope of the
exemption to encompass the major historical categories of exemp-

tion-religion, education, and social welfare. Ideally, it should also
comport with at least a general, unstudied sense of why the exemption
exists and what it attempts to do. In short, the theory should be intuitively correct.
This Article proceeds through a systematic critique of the existing

theories for the charitable exemption, employing these four criteria. It
begins by examining the conventional rationales for hospital exemption: health care per se, free services to the poor, relief of government
burden, and community benefit. It then addresses two unconventional
theories advanced by *academics: Professor Bittker's income measurement theory (that it is improper to conceive of charitable organizations as earning income) and Professor Hansmann's capital subsidy

theory (that it is defensible to use the exemption to help certain nonprofit firms to overcome their comparative disadvantage in accessing
capital markets). Finding these theories deficient, this Article then
outlines a proposal for the donative theory of the charitable
exemption.
sector of our society is complex and varied; its lineage is ancient. It would be unreasonably
simplistic to expect to capture its essence or justification within the compass of any theory.").
This theoretical agnosticism may be convincing in assessing the universe of exempt
organizations, as legislators award peripheral exemptions for a variety of reasons unrelated to the
charitable concept (such as to attract new industrial growth or to exempt organizations that do
not earn income); see supra note 29. Dale's perspective, however, cannot suffice for the core
charitable exemption that employs a structure purporting to define the scope of its benefits
through the single concept of charity. Therefore, it demands a coherent, organizing rationale. It
is possible that each limitation connected with the exemption (described in the preceding
paragraph of text) can be sustained as a side constraint on the exemption, one whose justification
is independent of the core rationale for the exemption. However, all these limitations are
generally thought to derive from the concept of charity as that term has been developed through
centuries of judicial decisions in the field of charitable trusts. See infra notes 97-107. This
unitary construction requires that we search for a cohesive concept of what constitutes a charity
and why it should be exempt. If no such unifying rationale for the charitable exemption exists, it
should be abandoned and replaced by a structure that forthrightly acknowledges whatever the
charitable label is masking.
77. This criterion does not seek to preserve 400 years of history merely for its own sake.
Rather, it attempts to place history in its appropriate relationship to the charitable exemption.
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A CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF TAX
EXEMPTION

A. Health Care Per Se and the Law of Charitable Trusts
The per se view of exemption employed by the IRS and a majority
of states is not new; it derives from an impressive and ancient lineage
in the law of charitable trusts. When Congress first enacted the charitable exemption in 1894 as part of the original income tax law, it lifted
its concept of charity whole cloth from this established body of precedent. Thus, when the IRS published regulations in 1959 stating that
charitable is to be understood according to its "generally accepted
legal sense ... as developed by judicial decisions," 7 8 and the Supreme
Court reiterated in 1983 that "underlying all relevant parts of the
Code... [are] certain common-law standards of charity," 79 they were
referring to the law of charitable trusts, specifically, the 1601 Statute
of Charitable Uses which first codified the legal concept of charity.8"
Nevertheless, commentators have generally ignored, or at least failed
to explain, the relationship between this body of law and the rationale
for tax exemption.8"
1. Health Care Under the Statute of Charitable Uses
Many sources of charitable trust law establish that health care is a
per se charitable enterprise, equivalent in its charitable stature to religion and education. This body of law came into prominence in 1601
with the Elizabethan Statute of Charitable Uses, which strengthened
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1959).
79. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983).
80. Id. at 588 ("The origins of [the] exemptions lie in the special privileges that have long
been extended to charitable trusts."); Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 8, at 301; Liles & Blum,
supra note 2, at 20-21; Thompson, The Unadministrability of the Federal Charitable Tax
Exemption: Causes, Effects and Remedies, 5 VA. TAX REV. 1, 12-13 (1985). Further support for
this proposition lies in the fact that Congress patterned the original income tax after the existing
English model. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 589 n.13 ("[T]he list of exempt organizations
appears to have been patterned upon English income tax statutes .... ). And, in the celebrated
case of Commissioners v. Pemsel, 1891 App. Cas. 531 (H.L.), decided just three years before the
1894 Congressional enactment, the House of Lords declared that the same concept of charity
would prevail throughout British law, applying equally to the law of charitable trusts and the law
of tax exemption. See L. SHERIDAN & G. KEETON, THE MODERN LAW OF CHARITIES 29 (3d

ed. 1983) (charity has "[a] [c]ommon [m]eaning for [a]ll [p]urposes"); id. at 299 ("There is, in
English law, only one definition of a charity. If an institution is a charity for purposes of general
activity and administration, it is a charity for income tax purposes."); Belknap, supra note 4, at
2031.
81. Accord Mancino, supra note 40, at 1017-18 (observing that academicians have overlooked
the common law of charitable trusts); Thompson, supra note 80, at 7 (maintaining that IRS
decisions have "blurred" the meaning of charity by departing from this body of common law
precedent).
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the mechanisms for preventing the misuse of assets given to charitable
purposes. The statute's preamble catalogued the various purposes for
which charitable trusts had until then been established. Despite its
haphazard content, this listing has become a virtual oracle of charitable trust law, achieving an "immortality of definition" through centuries of decisions that looked to it to determine which trusts qualified
82
for protection.
Although the Statute of Charitable Uses does not explicitly establish
that trusts to promote health care are charitable, the preamble does
recite that charitable trusts have been established for the "relief of
aged, impotent and poor people.",8 3 This language is ambiguous as to

whether these purposes are recited conjunctively or disjunctively,

4

but it has been generally supposed that the latter was intended. 5
This reading of the statute is confirmed in an earlier literary source,
Vision of Piers Plowman, a fourteenth century epic poem that contains
a remarkably similar catalogue of the worthy purposes for which rich
merchants are counseled by Truth to leave their fortunes in order to

gain full remission of their sins. This listing is explicit in its endorsement of gifts to "repair hospitals, [and] help sick people."" 6 A contemporaneous legal source, the 1634 Irish Statute of Charitable Uses,

similarly mentions dispositions for "the relief or maintenance of...
impotent persons, or for the building, re-edifying or maintaining in

82. W. JORDAN, PHILANTHROPY IN ENGLAND 1480-1660, at 112 (1959). Jordan's discussion
is typical of the reverential tones that trust law scholars use to describe the preamble. Id. at 112,
114 ("eloquent preamble," "almost casual but beautiful wording," and "sought to state and to
ennoble aspirations which had become and were to remain central to the structure of the liberal
society").
83. An Act To Redress the Mis-Employment of Lands, Goods and Stocks of Money
Heretofore Given to Certain Charitable Uses (Statute of Charitable Uses), 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 4,
reprinted in 7 STAT. AT LARGE 43 (Eng. 1763). This preamble is widely quoted, both in the
Middle English and in modem prose, by a number of secondary sources addressing charitable
trust and charitable exemption law. E.g., Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 8, at 331 n.81.
84. That is, it is unclear whether any one of these purposes standing alone is charitable, or
whether Parliament meant to refer to a trust that pursues all three objectives. One might also
question whether "impotent" only means disabled. The statute's only other reference to health
care is peculiarly limited to the "[m]aintenance of sicke and maymed Souldiers and marriners."
Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 4, reprintedin 7 STAT. AT LARGE 43 (Eng. 1763).
85. Bromberg, FinancingHealth Care, supra note 40, at 167 n.57.
86. Langland, Vision of Piers Plowman, in THE VISION OF A PEOPLES CHRIST PIERS
PLOWMAN 80 (F. Skeat ed. 1906), quoted in W. JORDAN, supra note 82, at 112; see also M.
FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 24 (1965); Bittker & Rahdert, supra note
8, at 331 n.81.
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repair of any . . . hospital,"'8 7 and other enactments from that era
include hospitals within the scope of charitable dispositions."8
Any doubt that the Elizabethan preamble included health care generally and hospitals specifically was conclusively eliminated by subsequent case law in both England and America. Massachusetts Justice
Gray included "relieving [ ] bodies from disease" in 1867, seventeen
years before the federal exemption was first enacted, when he rendered
what has become the classic American statement of charitable purposes.89 The Supreme Court held over a century ago that a charitable
trust is validly established to "erect[ ] a hospital for foundlings."9'
The leading modern British case holds that it "is now clearly established both in Australia and in England" that a "gift for the purpose of
a hospital is prima facie a good charitable gift... because of the use of
the word 'impotent' in the preamble to 43 Eliz. c.4." 9 Finally, the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts and similarly authoritative treatises
hold that a "trust for the promotion of health is charitable." 9 2
2. Deficiencies in Transplantingthe Charitable Trust Definition
Despite unanimity of authority that charitable trust law views the
promotion of health as per se charitable, there are considerable theoretical difficulties in blithely extending this per se approach to tax
exemption. The primary deficiency is encountered under the deserv87. 1634, 10 Chas. 1, sess. 2, ch. 1, quoted in L. SHERIDAN & G. KEETON, supra note 80, at
30.
88. Several antecedents to the statute that provided more limited protection to charitable
trusts confirm that by 1601 health care was an established charitable purpose. One act early in
the reign of Henry V created a charitable commission to attempt to remedy the decay of hospitals
that had been established by wealthy benefactors "for the sustenance of impotent persons, lazars,
witless men, poor women with child, and the poor generally." W. JORDAN, supra note 82, at
114. In 1572, Parliament passed another act to assist benefactors "who wished to found hospitals
and almshouses." Id. at 115. Further, an act in 1597 "relieved founders of hospitals,
almshouses, and houses of correction" from the necessity of "obtaining a special royal license or
an act of Parliament to achieve incorporation." 1d; see also M. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 86,
at 26 (discussing the latter two statutes).
89. Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 556 (1867).
90. Ould v. Washington Hosp. for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303, 308 (1877).
91. In re Resch's Will Trusts, [1969] 1 App. Cas. 514, 540 (P.C.).
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 372 (1959); see 4A A. SCOTT & W. FRATCHER,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 368 (1989) [hereinafter ScoTT ON TRUSTS] ("So too, it is well settled
that the promotion of health is a charitable purpose."); id. § 372 & n. 1 ("[a] trust for the
promotion of health is a charitable trust," even though the statute mentions only soldiers and
mariners; citing "numerous" cases); see also G. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 62 (6th ed. 1987); Bromberg,
The Charitable Hospital,supra note 40, at 240, 244; Bromberg, FinancingHealth Care, supra
note 40, at 167 (citing cases to show that "English law has long interpreted the charitable
purpose enumerated in the preamble ...in the disjunctive, thereby permitting a charitable trust
to operate for the benefit of sick or aged persons without reference to their financial condition").
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edness criterion. Simply put, because charitable trust law serves a
wholly different purpose than the charitable exemption, the trust definition of charity does not properly identify activities that deserve tax
support.
Charitable trust law exists primarily to protect assets which founders choose to devote to worthy causes. Trust law provides this assistance by creating rigorous enforcement mechanisms to police abuses of
these socially worthy trusts (such as authorizing attorneys general to
bring enforcement actions) and by exempting such trusts from some of
the technical requirements that apply to ordinary trusts.9 3 Unlike
ordinary trusts, charitable trusts need not have definite, identifiable
beneficiaries;9 4 they may exist in perpetuity, 95 and, through the cy pres
doctrine, courts will substitute a new, similar purpose to prevent them
from failing when their stated purpose becomes impossible to
achieve. 96 As a consequence of the limited resources required to meet

these objectives of charitable trust law, it covers a far broader subject
matter than is deserving of a tax exemption.
a.

The Scope of Charity Under Charitable Trust Law
To understand the breadth of subject matter encompassed by the

trust law concept of charity, it is necessary to place in proper context
93. Early English law developed a somewhat hostile attitude toward trusts (originally called
"uses" as a consequence of their conveyance of legal title to a nominal owner "for the use of"
another), because they originated in feudal times as devices for hiding land from creditors and
the exactions of landlords. The fraud and confusion caused by these unrecorded separations of
legal title from equitable title led to the 1535 Statute of Uses, which sought to abolish this device
altogether by declaring that, for land transfers, the beneficiary holds legal title as well. But the
statute failed under the strict construction of courts that continued to allow uses in personalty,
and uses upon uses (in other words, a transfer of title to X for the use of Y, who holds for the use
of Z). The term "trust" arose in Chancery as a means for distinguishing enforceable from
unenforceable uses. Nevertheless, trust law continued to impose numerous and technical
restrictions on these legal instruments. G. BOGERT, supra note 92, at §§ 7-13.
The more favorable treatment accorded charitable trusts evolved from the special treatment
that ecclesiastical courts accorded devises for religious purposes. The Chancery courts carried
on this tradition after the Reformation. L. SHERIDAN & G. KEETON, supra note 80, at 1-2;
Persons, Osborn & Feldman, supra note 2, at 1916-17.
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 209-10.
95. Id. § 365. Although it is sometimes misleadingly said that charitable trusts are relieved
from the application of the Rule Against Perpetuities, most trusts are not affected by the Rule
since they vest immediately upon the testator's death. See G. BOGERT, supra note 92, § 68. A
related limitation of greater importance derives from the law's general opposition to restraints on
alienation: "A private trust cannot be created so that it must continue for an unlimited period of
time . . . and [so] a provision that the trust shall never terminate even though all of the
beneficiaries wish to terminate it... is invalid." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 365
comment a. This durational restraint is the principal limitation from which charitable trusts are
relieved.
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399.
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the almost four centuries of case law after the Statute of Charitable
Uses. A significant portion of Anglo-American judicial resources were
devoted for a time to sorting out the concept of charity in trust law.
Many decisions found trusts to be noncharitable. These restrictive
decisions impose a host of arcane technicalities that derive from the
law's attempt to define a term that is more properly viewed as being
virtually without substantive content. The notion that charity is a limiting term arose from an historical accident centered on Parliament's
passage of the 1736 Mortmain Act, which reoriented the significance
of the charitable label.9 7 This shift in the statutory context threw the
meaning of charity into complete confusion, resulting in sporadically
restrictive holdings such as the absurd decision that a trust for "benevolent" purposes does not fall within the Statute of Charitable Uses.9 8
The stream of irreconcilable holdings emanating from this and other
equally inscrutable distinctions typifies the kind of law that gives attorneys a bad name. Through it all, judges claimed to be able to divine,
but not define, the "spirit and intendment" of the Statute of Charitable
Uses that constitutes the essence of the legal concept of charity.9 9
George Keeton, a leading British authority, has characterized their
efforts as "probably the worst exhibition of the operation of the technique of judicial precedent, which can be found in the law reports."' °
Anglo-American law took a large step toward sorting out this confused body of law in Commissioners v. Pemsel,10 perhaps the most
celebrated case in the history of charitable trusts. 102 The distinguished
jurist Lord McNaughten cut through centuries of mindless distinc97. The Mortmain statute responded to concerns at the time that the Church was pressuring
individuals to leave unduly large bequests to it at the expense of their disinherited families. This
legislation invalidated charitable bequests of land that were not executed through rigid
formalities more than one year prior to death. G. JONES, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CHARITY
1532-1827, at 109-10 (1969). To avoid these restrictions, "objects which were in danger of being
[stigmatized] as charitable often sought to divest themselves of this unwelcome status." Id. at
128. Affected legatees maintained that challenged gifts were not "charitable," and courts, often
struggling to uphold such gifts, began to draw unprincipled distinctions regarding what properly
should be deemed charitable.
98. Morice v. Durham, 10 Ves. 521, 7 Rev. Rep. 232 (1804); see Scott, Trustsfor Charitable
and Benevolent Purposes, 58 HARV. L. REV. 548 (1945).
99. L. SHERIDAN & G. KEETON, supra note 80, at 11; see G. JONES, supra note 97, at 133
("The equity, or 'spirit' of the preamble, as it was called, was elevated into the Delphic oracle of
legal charity."); Persons, Osborn & Feldman, supra note 2, at 1914.
100. Persons, Osborn & Feldman, supra note 2, at 1915 (quoting older edition of Keeton's
treatise).
101. 1891 App. Cas. 531 (H.L.).
102. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 589 (1983) ("These statements [in
Pemnsel] clearly reveal the legal background against which Congress enacted the first charitable
exemption statute in 1894 ....").
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tions by observing that the Statute of Charitable Uses was never
intended to define charity but was merely illustrative of the broad
range of particular objects of charitable trusts that happened to be in
vogue at the time. Accordingly, he encapsulated the legal concept of
charity in the following, enduring formulation: "'Charity' in its legal
sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty;
trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of
religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community, not
falling under any of the preceding heads."10 3 In 1960, England's
Nathan Commission adopted the Pemsel precedent in the Charities
Act of 1960, which finally repealed the Statute of Charitable Uses." 4
Similarly, in the United States, the Restatement of Trusts adopted
essentially the Pemsel formulation, including the residual category of
"other purposes the accomplishment of which is beneficial to the
community." 105
This residual category has been interpreted very broadly. For
example, courts have sustained as charitable a bequest for purposes as
trivial as "provid[ing] fishing facilities for the inhabitants of a
town." 10 6 The law of charitable trusts is willing to take such a generous view of the subject matter it protects because all that is at stake is
the societal cost of the procedural protection attending these trusts,
such as the additional case burden on courts hearing trust enforcement
actions. No societal resources are committed to funding the trust, in
contrast to the effect of a tax exemption. Given these relatively low
stakes, trust law is able to rely for subject-matter limitation simply on
the decision of public-spirited founders to endow whatever purpose
they desire. As one court explained:
What is the tribunal which is to decide whether the object is a beneficent
one? It cannot be the individual mind of a Judge .... On the other
hand, it cannot be the vox populi, for charities have been upheld for the
benefits of insignificant sects, and of peculiar people. It occurs to me
that the answer must be-that the benefit must be one which the founder
believes to be of public advantage, and his belief must be at least
rational, and not contrary either to the general law of the land, or to the
principles of morality. A gift of such a character, dictated by benevolence, believed to be beneficent, devoted to an appreciably important

103. Pemsel, 1891 App. Cas. at 583.
104. Persons, Osborn & Feldman, supra note 2, at 1915-16.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368(f) (1959).
106. Id. § 374 comment c, comment f; see also Scorr ON TRUSTS, supra note 92, § 374.2.
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object, and neither contra bonos mores nor contra legem, will, in my
opinion, be charitable in the eye of the law ....107
The essentially boundless nature of the subject matter considered
charitable in trust law is manifest in the Restatement's residual definitional category, which in a tautological fashion covers any purpose "if
its accomplishment is of such social interest to the community as to
justify permitting the property to be devoted to the purpose in
perpetuity."1" 8 This is no definition at all, for it explicitly eschews any
attempt to subsume social policy judgments within a concept of charitable, as occurs with ordinary rule-based legal analysis."co Instead, the
Restatement applies the term as a contentless label wherever its application seems justified as a matter of raw policy judgment.
This completely open-textured approach to defining the term "charitable" may be appropriate in trust law where the concern is procedural protection of an individual donor's gift to society. But reliance
on these trust law precedents in tax law defies logic where the policy
stakes are entirely different. Because a tax exemption represents a
government subsidy, a proper concept of charity for tax exemption
purposes must identify activities that deserve the financial support of
society. This cannot be accomplished by relying on an expansive concept of charity that reaches all activities worthy of protection under
trust law.
Most trust scholars would disagree with the assertion that the legal
concept of charity has no boundaries, but this misses the point. The
limits that trust law imposes are largely organizational and operational. Charitable status turns not so much on what is done but rather
on how it is done. The guiding precept that emerges from centuries of
abstruse case law is that charitable trusts must be created to provide
public, not private, benefit.1 10 This limitation requires that charities
benefit the public at large rather than the founder or the founder's
107. In re Cranston, [1897] 1 I.R. 431, 446-47 (Ir. H. Ct.), quoted in Scorr

ON TRUSTS,

supra note 92, § 374.7; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 374 comment I ("[Tlhe mere
fact that a majority of the people and the members of the court believe that the particular
purpose of the settlor is unwise or not adapted to the accomplishment of the general purposes,
does not prevent the trust from being charitable.").

108. RESTATEMENT
109.

(SECOND) OF

See P. ATIYAH & R.

TRUSTS § 368 comment b, § 374.

SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW

5-11 (1987).
110. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 312 (3d ed. 1933) defines charitable purposes as those "for a
general public use ... designed to benefit them from an educational, religious, moral or social
standpoint."
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family and friends.III Thus, charities must be nonprofit entities, their
earnings may not inure to the benefit of any private individual, they
may not engage in self-dealing transactions, they must serve a large
group, and they may not pursue purposes that contravene public
policy."

2

With these operational constraints satisfied, however, virtually any
substantive purpose will suffice. Charity is "broad enough to include
whatever will promote, in a legitimate way, the comfort, happiness
and improvement of an indefinite number of persons."' 3 Students of
the law of charity acknowledge that "[n]early everything produced by
... private industry-ranging from buildings and food to books and
music-contributes to our welfare.""' 4 This is why virtually no one

has succeeded in giving "charity" in trust law some definitional content. 1' 5 Instead, courts and commentators find themselves repeatedly
forced to rest on the unilluminating platitude that "charity is an evolv111. For instance, a trust to maintain a public graveyard is valid, but one to maintain a

particular tomb is not.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TRUSTS

§ 376 comment a. For further

elaboration of this distinction, see Atiyah, Public Benefit in Charities, 21 MOD. L. REv. 138
(1958).
112. See L. SHERIDAN & G. KEETON, supra note 80, at 32-50. See generally M.
CHESTERMAN, supra note 1, at 316 (discussing the connection between these organizational
limitations and the requirement of public benefit).
113. Harrington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485, 520, 82 N.W. 345, 357 (1900); see also Ould v.
Washington Hosp. for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303, 311 (1877) (charity includes "anything that
tends to promote the well-doing and well-being of social man"); Wilson v. First Nat'l Bank, 164
Iowa 402, 145 N.W. 948, 952 (1914) ("The word 'charity,' as used in the law ....
includes
substantially any scheme or effort to better the condition of society or any considerable part
thereof.").
114. Comment, Collaboration Between Nonprofit Universities and Commercial Enterpriser
The Rationalefor Exempting Nonprofit Universitiesfrom FederalIncome Taxation, 95 YALE L.J.
1857, 1864 (1986); accord J. JENSEN, supra note 3, at 148 ("In a sense, all legitimate economic
activities are affected with a public interest."); Ginsberg, supra note 54, at 312 ("The very
existence of land, whether left in its natural state or developed, is a benefit to society.");
Thompson, supra note 80, at 14 ("[T]he catch-all category of charity-purposes beneficial to the
community-is so broad, it can conceivably encompass almost any program to promote social
welfare . . ").
This truth is one of the classic lessons taught by the fundamental turn in Constitutional
jurisprudence that occurred earlier this century when, after over half a century of Supreme Court
efforts to confine social and economic legislation to businesses "affected with the public interest,"
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877), the Court abandoned substantive due process scrutiny
with respect to such legislation, observing, "there is no closed class or category of businesses
affected with a public interest ....
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934). Attempts to
police the substantive limits of the exemption under the rubric of "public benefit" would be as
flawed as the Supreme Court's attempt to police the substantive wisdom of economic and social
legislation.
115. ScoTr ON TRUSTS, supra note 92, § 368 ("The truth of the matter is that it is impossible
to frame a perfect definition of charitable purposes. There is no fixed standard to determine what
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ing concept which must be allowed to change and expand in response
'1 16
to the needs of society."
b.

The Need for a Principle to Limit the Exemption

If the trust concept is imported into tax law, essentially any legitimate nonprofit institution that serves the public at large might be eligible for charitable tax exemption. This principle largely matches what
has occurred in practice and thus meets at least the historical consistency criterion.1 17 However a definition of charity that contains essentially no substantive limiting principle, and thus imposes minimal
subject matter restrictions on which activities are exempt (i.e., restricts
only how the activity is organized and carried out), must be rejected
because such a definition contains no test to ascertain when the
exemption is either deserved or proportionate to the benefit society
receives. By classifying as "charitable" any activity which meets the
inherent procedural restrictions of charitable trust law, this test potentially provides exempt status, and the accompanying tax subsidy, to
activities that either might be provided just as well without a tax subsidy or to activities whose dollar value to the community is less than
the amount of the foregone tax revenues.
Binding the law of tax exemption to the same category of activities
covered by charitable trust law is thus manifestly absurd. This is especially so because a trust law precedent established by the decision of a
single donor would have the effect of exempting an entire industry
from taxation. Suppose, for instance, that a successful veterinarian left
her wealth in trust to promote the practice of veterinary medicine.
purposes are charitable."); L. SHERIDAN & G. KEETON, supra note 80, at 26 ("Judges long ago
abandoned the task of attempting to define what a charitable purpose is.").
For a particularly tortured attempt to tease some meaning out of the public benefit concept in
the context of distinguishing between legitimate public interest law firms and those established to
advance the interests of major commercial firms, see Houck, With Charityfor All, 93 YALE L.J.
1415 (1984).
116. Persons, Osborn & Feldman, supra note 2, at 1909.
117. See A. BALK, supra note 1, at 86 ("It seems to have become progressively easier for
almost any organization that engages in some activity of social or cultural significance to make
the tax-free list.
); Buchele, Justifying Real Property Tax Exemptions in Kansas, 27
WASHBURN L. REV. 252, 273 (1988) ("Almost every kind of organization not run for profit has
sought to escape taxation as a charitable institution."); Hansmann, The Two Independent
Sectors, supra note 8, at 4 ("[T]he exemptions have traditionally been read so broadly as to
encompass nearly all nonprofits of any financial significance. . . . In general, the words
'nonprofit' and 'tax-exempt' have been coterminous."); Comment, supra note 7, at 1087
("[A]lmost every kind of organization not run for profit and not exclusively a social or sporting
club has sought to escape taxation as a charitable institution. The courts have had to flounder in
a morass of strange facts ....").
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Such a trust would be sustained as charitable.11 Subsequently, any
proprietor of an animal hospital who chose to organize as a legitimate
nonprofit operation would qualify for exemption from federal income
tax, local property tax, and possibly state income and sales taxes as
well, even if the firm relied entirely on borrowed capital and charged
full market rates to all of its customers. 119
Such a potentially limitless extension of the exemption may at first
seem like a small risk because adopting the nonprofit form requires the
organizer to forgo any share of the profits, a sacrifice that most persons would not care to make absent an overriding commitment to benefitting the public. However, businesses do exist from which
organizers expect nothing more than full compensation for their labor;
such organizers would benefit by adopting a genuinely nonprofit form
of business that automatically ensures a substantial social subsidy,
even if they are thereby denied any return on capital.'2 0 Physician
group practices are just such a business. Even in a proprietary form,
the practice group essentially pays physician members the share of the
group income attributable to their patients,' 2 1 a remuneration system
that is not sacrificed by adopting the nonprofit form. Consequently,
physician groups have a strong incentive to seek property tax exemption for their real estate holdings, and sales tax exemption for their
purchase of equipment and supplies.' 2 2
118. See University of London v. Yarrow, 24 Eng. Rep. 649 (Ch. 1857) (upholding a trust to
establish a veterinary institute).
119. Even absent an established precedent in trust law, tying the exemption to the charitable
trust definition of charity would permit exemption in cases where merely theorizing that if a trust
for the same purpose were established, it would provide sufficient public benefits to deserve
protection from the Rule Against Perpetuities. See Warren, Krattenmaker & Snyder, Property
Tax Exemptions for Charitable, Educational, Religious and Governmental Institutions in
Connecticut, 4 CONN. L. REv. 181, 238 & n.212 (1971) (exemption for boy scout camp upheld
because "an institution is charitable when its property and funds are devoted to such purposes as
would support the creation of a valid charitable trust;" citing similar holdings for dining rooms,
women's residences, museums and the like).
120. An example pertinent to hospitals comes from the conversion of for-profit hospitals to a
nonprofit status. There have been several recent instances where the owners of a proprietary
hospital who wished to sell were unable to find a willing buyer at a sufficient price, so instead
they formed a nonprofit corporation to buy the assets of the hospital at their appraised price and
to give back to the owners a management contract. Conversation with Richard McAlee,
Esquire, Baltimore, Md. (Nov. 15, 1990) (notes on file with the Washington Law Review). It is
easy to see how such a transaction might lead to abuse of the exemption.
121. Any other form of distribution might violate fee splitting and referral fee prohibitions.
See generally Hall, Making Sense of Referral Fee Statutes, 13 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW
623 (1988).
122. In most cases, an income tax exemption would not be relevant to a group of physicians
because they usually organize in an entity, such as a partnership or S corporation, that is not
subject to a separate income tax. Instead, group earnings are taxed only to the individuals on a
pass-through basis. See generally W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL
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Hospitals may be under an equally powerful incentive to adopt the
nonprofit form merely to enjoy the exemption's subsidy. This incentive is likely because doctors strongly influence the organizational
form of hospitals and doctors have strong reasons to prefer a tax-subsidized hospital. The financial success of a hospital depends on its ability to attract competent doctors who in turn provide paying
patients. 123 Doctors in turn prefer hospitals with the most sophisticated equipment and the broadest range of services, regardless of the
profitability of these amenities. Doctors are generally unconcerned
about hospital profits because their income generated from patient fees
allows them to remain financially independent of hospitals. Because
doctors incur no cost from adopting the nonprofit form, they have a
much stronger reason to prefer a tax subsidy than do the corporate
organizers of hospitals. For hospitals this means that there is a particularly pressing need to guard against a self-justifying concept of charity that allows any activity to qualify automatically by virtue of its
1 24
nonprofit status.
TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS

1.01(1) (Supp. 1989). Using an exempt entity,

however, may permit doctors a tax advantage on earnings reinvested in capital equipment.
While depreciation deductions would permit a tax-free recovery of equipment costs over time, in
a taxable entity the value of the deductions will never equal the initial after-tax cost of the capital
investment. Suppose, for example, that a typical group practice requires $1 million in
equipment. One method for acquiring this equipment would be for the doctors to purchase it
with after-tax dollars. If the tax rate were 50%, the doctors would have to earn initially $2.0
million to pay $1 million in taxes and have $1 million left for the capital investment. Over a
period of years the doctors would receive $1 million in depreciation deductions that will permit
the free recovery of the $1 million invested in equipment. The "extra" $1 million needed at the
beginning, however, will not be recovered. Moreover, cost recovery is available only over time,
meaning that the deductions are worth less than the investment on a present-value basis. In a
tax-exempt entity, however, only $1 million is needed to invest $1 million. The "extra" $1
million can then be invested in still more equipment (nicer offices?) or else paid out to the doctors
as additional "profits." Moreover, exemption may be important because structural limitations on
the partnership or S corporation form of business may require a "regular" corporate entity. S
corporations, for example, are limited to 35 shareholders, I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A) (1989), so a
group practice with more than 35 doctors would need the exemption to avoid a separate
corporate tax.
123. See infra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
124. Hansmann, supra note 11, at 868:
It is... as if a foundation, tax-exempt and supported in part by public contributions, were
to build office space and then lease it at cost, or less, to Wall Street law firms. One would
not expect to see the lawyers in a hurry to have the foundation converted into an ordinary
profit-making landlord.
The exemption's influence on doctors' preferences under conventional financial arrangements
is evidenced by the different behavior of doctors when they desire to invest in hospitals. In those
instances, they abandon the nonprofit ethic and the exemption subsidy in favor of organizing
their own proprietary hospitals. See generally Marmor, Schlesigner & Smithey, supra note 28;
Relman, Dealing With Conflicts of Interest, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 749 (1985).
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The inadequacy of a concept of charity that mechanically refers to
trust law precedents is acknowledged at least implicitly by the failure
to follow it consistently, even by those who seemingly advocate this
approach. A careful analysis of IRS decisions in the health care field,
for example, reveals that the federal government does not respect in
practice the per se characterization that it espouses in theory.
Through a multitude of rulings the IRS has developed the position
that only inpatient hospital service-not health care per se-is
exempt; the IRS consistently refuses to extend the exemption to physician groups, 125 and consistently imposes more exacting exemption
requirements on health maintenance organizations (HMOs), nursing
homes, and other nonhospital health care services. 126 For example,
the IRS has ruled that a nonprofit pharmacy is disqualified from the
charitable exemption even though supplying drugs is as intimately
connected with health care as administering drugs, and even though
pharmacy sales within a hospital are exempt. 127 A similar dichotomy
exists in some state law decisions, which impose more demanding
requirements for exemption of nonhospital services. 128 Recently, Congress also displayed antipathy to the logical implications of the health
care per se principle when it voted in 1986 to remove the exemption
125. The IRS refuses to exempt physician groups under the theory that they serve the private
interests of doctors rather than the public's interest in health care; but this is transparently
incorrect. As long as physician groups are willing to accept anyone in the community able to pay
and in need of care, there is no distinction between the public quality of services delivered by
physician groups or hospitals. It is true that group practices pay doctors handsome salaries; but
doctors also earn handsome incomes from hospitals. Remuneration for services rendered should
not defeat nonprofit or charitable status unless the amount paid exceeds the fair market value of
the services. See Colombo, supra note 41, at 492-98.
126. See generally id. passim.
127. Federation Pharmacy Servs. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 687 (1979), aff'd, 625 F.2d 804
(8th Cir. 1980); see also Colombo, supra note 41, at 485-92, 512-21.
128. Maryland property tax statutes, for example, specifically exempt property used for
hospital purposes, and exempt property used for general charitable purposes. MD. TAX-PROP.
CODE ANN. § 7-202 (1986). A recent Maryland case nevertheless held that the property of an
HMO was not exempt because the HMO was not "charitable" despite its unrestricted
membership (consisting at the time of some 65,000 Maryland residents). Montgomery County v.
Group Health Ass'n, 308 Md. 151, 517 A.2d 1076 (1986). Similarly, some states have taken the
positon that rental of office space by hospitals to physicians for private practice violates
exemption requirements, notwithstanding the fact that such space is used to provide general
health care. See Greater Anchorage Area Borough v. Sisters of Charity of the House of
Providence, 553 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1976); Genesee Hosp. v. Wagner, 47 A.D.2d 37, 364 N.Y.S.2d
934 (1975); Gifford Memorial Hosp. v. Randolph, 119 Vt. 66, 118 A.2d 480 (1955). Nursing
homes sometimes also face disparate state treatment. Fairview Haven v. Department of
Revenue, 153 Ill. App. 3d 763, 506 N.E.2d 341 (1987) (no exemption unless nursing home
accepts some charity patients); Lutheran Home v. Board of Assessment, 100 Pa. Commw. 244,
515 A.2d 59 (1986) (same).
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from Blue Cross/Blue Shield and from TIAA/CREF 2 9 because it
viewed selling insurance as an inherently "commercial" activity,t 30 a
charge that is equally applicable to all forms of health care business,
including hospitals. 3 '
It is evident from these varied sources that courts, legislatures, and
taxing authorities are searching for a limiting principle that will define
which activities deserve the exemption and which do not. 132 For reasons that remain unarticulated, they find that doctors, pharmacies,
and insurance companies-which are fully capable of functioning
without a subsidy-do not merit exemption, even though they are
organized and operated in the same fashion as nonprofit hospitals.
These decisions are reasoned on bases that in some cases are unprincipled, in others inconsistent, and in others undiscernible. Thus, while
the prevalent instinct to constrain the boundaries of the exemption is
correct, these decisions fail to isolate and articulate a workable limit133
ing principle.
The scope and content of a proper limiting principle is the subject of
the remainder of this Article. At this point, the Article has only estab129. Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association/College Retirement Equities Fund
(TIAA/CREF) is the life insurance and retirement annuity company that serves most nonprofit
educational institutions.
130. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1985, H.R. REP. No.
426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 664 (1985) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 501(m) (1988)) (it is
"inappropriate" to exempt an "inherently commercial" activity, such as selling insurance "to the
general public at a price sufficient to cover the costs of insurance"); UBIT Hearings,supra note 6,
at 991 (statement of Gabriel Rudney) (discussing this legislative action).
131. Indeed, overturning Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202, is implicit in the pending
Charity Care and Hospital Tax-Exempt Status Reform Act, H.R. 790, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137
CONG. REC. E395-97 (1991) (discussed infra note 151 and accompanying text).
132. See Buchele, supra note 117, at 273 ("The extended scope of humanitarian functions
necessary to qualify for exemption must be defined or limited in some way. Otherwise all
property owners would... claim tax exemption."); Fox, The Uneasy Law of Real Estate Tax
Exemptions in Pennsylvania, 39 U. Prr. L. REV. 175, 248-49 (1977) ("Although the rationale of
the court is far from clear, it is apparent that the court was seeking to limit the extent of activities
which could qualify as charitable... [based] upon the court's view of public policy."); Ginsberg,
supra note 54, at 312 ("[O]f itself, the [public] benefit theory is too broad to be useful.... [It]
must be coupled with corollary propositions relating to the nature of the benefits... that would
be useful to a court or tax assessor making case-by-case determinations of exempt status .... ");
Thompson, supra note 80, at 53 (1985) ("[T]he danger is that the charitable exemption will...
become an unlimited and undefinable concept.").
Professor Thompson misperceives the nature of the problem; he maintains that the boundless
nature of charity can be avoided by relying on "the common law legal concept of charity." Id.
This Article, however, explains that the scope of charity at common law was also without
bounds.
133. For instance the current position of the IRS, that nonprofit hospitals deserve the subsidy
and nonprofit physician groups do not, Colombo, supra note 41, at 492-98, does not resolve the
exempt status of hospital/physician joint ventures that proliferate in the current reimbursement
environment. See Hall, supra note 22, at 493.
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lished that virtually everyone who has given thought to the matter
recognizes that some substantial subject matter limits must be imposed
on the charitable exemption. As a consequence, the health care per se
position drawn from charitable trust law-to which many decisions

pay lip service-cannot be sustained,"' and in fact is not followed.
B.

Charity Care and the Relief of Government Burden

L

The Basic "Quid Pro Quo" Theory

The conventional alternative to the position that health care is a per
se charitable enterprise is that only those organizations devoted to
serving the poor should be eligible for the charitable exemption, in

keeping with the popular conception of charity. The essence of this
theory is that tax exemption exists as a quid pro quo for the production by the private, nonprofit sector of goods and services that absent
exemption would be the burden of government-treatment of uninsured patients for example. In the words of Senator Hollis, "[flor
every dollar" of taxes forgone "the public gets 100 per cent" return in
the form of free hospital services.13 5 Relief of the government's obliga-

tion to care for the poor or to provide other social services is the most
widely accepted general theory for the exemption in the modern
state,136 and it is essentially the theory adopted with respect to health
care providers in Utah County.1 3 7 It is also the primary rationale for
134. It is possible to reach the per se exempt position through routes other than the law of
charitable trusts. These alternate theories are discussed as variants of the community benefit
theory. See infra notes 258-68 and accompanying text (discussing the public trust variant); infra
notes 269-76 and accompanying text (discussing the plow-back variant).
135. 55 CONG. REc. S6728 (1917) (statement of Sen. Hofis). The Senator made these
comments in reference to the charitable deduction, not the exemption; but the Supreme Court
has applied the same rationale to both as they are in pan materia. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 590 (1983).
136. See, eg., McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 456 (D.D.C. 1972) ("The rationale
for allowing the deduction of charitable contributions has historically been that by doing so, the
Government relieves itself of the burden of meeting public needs which in the absence of
charitable activity would fall on the shoulders of the Government."); Legat v. Adorno, 138
Conn. 134, 83 A.2d 185, 191 (1951) ("The grant of tax exemption to... hospitals... encourages
and facilitates their performance of a governmental duty which would otherwise have to be
performed by the state."); H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938) ("The exemption
from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and other purposes is based upon the
theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from the financial
burden which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds ....");B.
HOPKINS, supra note 31, at 6-7.
137. 709 P.2d 265, 269 (Utah 1985). However, the Utah court failed to consider the specific
measure of deservedness required, as developed in the text that follows.
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pending legislation that would reform the exempt status of nonprofit
1 38
hospitals.
This section proceeds by first examining how the quid pro quo theory applies to hospitals. It explains precisely how the theory should
operate if it is to satisfy the deservedness criterion and demonstrates
that nonprofit hospitals by and large fail to meet the proper test. It
then turns to a theoretical assessment of the validity of the theory.
This assessment reveals that the failure of hospitals to satisfy the quid
pro quo test should not foreclose their exemption because, under our
criteria for evaluation, the charity care standard is not an adequate
statement of the exclusive basis for the exemption.
2.

Deficiencies in Applying the Theory to Nonprofit Hospitals

a. Deservedness
When applied to nonprofit hospitals, the relief of government burden theory encounters major problems under the deservedness criterion. To satisfy this criterion, the health care sector must show that
the service on which exemption is based (free care for the poor) would
be irreplaceably compromised without the subsidy. While empirical
evidence establishes that nonprofit hospitals give away a significant
portion of their services, 139 for-profit institutions do so as well in the
form of write-offs for bad debts. Because for-profit hospitals exist as a
ready substitute for nonprofits, the relief of government burden theory
can meet the deservedness criterion only if nonprofit hospitals provide
a greater proportion in uncompensated care than the for-profit
hospitals. 1'

To illustrate, if for-profit hospitals give away four percent of their
care in the form of bad debts, nonprofit hospitals must show that they
138. See infra note 151 (summarizing the Charity Care and Hospital Tax-Exempt Status
Reform Act, H.R. 790, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. E395-97 (1991)).
139. J. BENNETr & T. DILORENZO, supra note 17, at 84 (quoting the AHA's claim that
nonprofit hospitals gave $22 billion in free medical care to the poor over a five-year period).
140. Accord Hyman, supra note 51, at 361; see Relman, Are Voluntary Hospitals Caringfor
the Poor?, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1198, 1199 (1988) (tax exemption would be "troubling" and

"hard to justify" if nonprofits are not doing more for the poor than for-profits).
It is insufficient to speak of nonprofit hospitals doing their "fair share." See Yoder, supra note

11, at 113 ("It is, accordingly, difficult even in theory to provide a standard for determining
whether a particular hospital has done its 'fair share' of charity care or, indeed, whether the
notion of 'fair share' makes sense ....
). The required standard is capable of quantification at a

level independent of prevailing local demand for charity care. The measure of performance
should not be fixed to local needs, but to the value of the exemption. Thus, even concrete
percentages, such as 3% of operating expenses required under the Hill-Burton Act, 42 C.F.R.
§ 124.503 (1979), or the 15% of revenues required by Alabama, supra note 64, are arbitrary
unless based on a comparative estimate of charity care provided by for-profits.
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give away a higher percentage to meet the threshold test of deservedness. This comparison with for-profit hospitals is necessary under the
government burden theory because, without nonprofits, the full
amount of the free care for-profits provide would not fall on the
government.
Moreover, a certain portion of free care provided by nonprofits is
not voluntarily given in the spirit of charity but merely reflects "a
business decision that the cost of attempting to collect on a debt is
greater than the potential gain."14' 1 This fact presents a second justifi-

cation for deducting from the nonprofits' free care ledger the proportionate amount of free care rendered by for-profits. The bad debt

component of uncompensated care represents an ordinary cost of
doing business borne by nonprofits and for-profits alike. Deducting
from the nonprofits' free care figure the proportion of free care rendered by for-profit hospitals is justifiable under the approximation that
essentially all for-profit free care constitutes bad debt.142
141. Simpson & Lee, Nonprofit Community Hospital Tax Exemption: Issues for Review 10
n.14 (May 1987), reprintedin UBITHearings,supranote 6, at 778 n.14. As one court criticized,
"[t]hese 'uncompensated care' patients... are aggressively pursued by [the hospital] through
every avenue of the collection process. [The hospital] has sued the very patients that it would
now have this court deem objects of charity." School Dist. v. Hamot Medical Center, No. 138A-1989, slip op. at 14 (Pa. Ct. C.P., Erie Co., May 18, 1990).
142. Accordingly, the term "charity care" generally signifies services for which the hospital
requests no compensation. In contrast, "uncompensated care" or "free care" signifies bad debts
"plus true "charity care."
Some hospitals attempt to claim "contractual adjustments" as charity care. Contractual
adjustments represent the difference between a hospital's normal charges and the amount the
hospital agrees to accept from a third-party payor. See Rammell & Parsons, supra note 52, at 80.
Because for-profit hospitals treat the same proportion of Medicare and Medicaid patients as
nonprofits, see Sloan, Property Rights in the HospitalIndustry, in HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA
103, 135 (1988), and negotiate discounts with private insurance companies, these contractual
adjustments generally are the same for both sectors. Therefore, most authorities disregard
contractual adjustments in these calculations. See Yoder, supra note 11, at 98; Simpson & Lee,
supra note 141, at 778 n.14; Sloan, Valvona & Mullner, supranote 37, at 16. See generally Lewin
& Associates, Setting the Record Straight: The Provision of Uncompensated Care by Not-ForProfit Hospitals 28 (1988) (unpublished).
Measuring the value of charity care-charges or costs, and if costs, average or marginalpresents another complication. Most studies use the hospital's normal charge structure, which
represents the most generous measure of the hospital's sacrifice. Some analysts, however,
complain that this measure of charity care disproportionately benefits proprietary hospitals
because they tend to have a somewhat higher mark-up of charges over costs. See Lewin, Eckels
& Miller, Setting the Record Straight: The Provision of Uncompensated Care by Not-For-profit
Hospitals,318 NEW ENG. J.MED. 1212, 1215 (1988). The alternative, however, is to use costs as

a measure, in which case it would be inappropriate to use average rather than marginal costs.
See Hyman, supra note 51, at 361; Hyman, Letter to Editor,319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1486 (1988)

(responding to Lewin). The more appropriate cost measure-Lmarginal costs--would greatly
increase the level of charity care needed to justify the exemption. Therefore, nonprofits may have
to tolerate the imperfection inherent in the charge measure. (One possible adjustmejt would
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Using this measure of deservedness, the existing empirical evidence
fails to confirm that nonprofits provide greater relief than for-profits of
the government burden of delivering health care to the impoverished
and uninsured. One national study indicates that "most voluntary and
proprietary hospitals [are] very similar in their willingness to treat
patients freely .... [F]or the nation as a whole there appear[s] to be
only small differences between voluntary and proprietary hospitals in
access to care."' 14 3 What differences exist appear to be narrowing
under the influence of cost containment pressures from private and
government insurers, such that, in the aggregate, nonprofit hospitals
are providing proportionately less uncompensated care than their forprofit competitors.'"
These aggregate, national comparisons have been criticized as
unrepresentative because for-profit hospitals are unevenly distributed
across the country. In a study commissioned by the Volunteer Trustees of Not-For-Profit Hospitals Foundation, Lewin & Associates
observed that for-profits are concentrated mostly in southern and
western states that tend to have less generous Medicaid programs for
the poor and, thus, a greater demand for indigent care by private hospitals. In contrast, nonprofit hospitals are more evenly dispersed
across the fifty states, which means that their average national uncompensated care statistics are diluted by those states where there is much
involve discounting the charge measure by the hospital's average negotiated discount with
insured patients, but this should have no great effect since both sectors grant approximately the
same discounts.)
143. J. HOLLINGSWORTH & E. HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 25, at 106-07. The leading
study found "no clear difference between for-profits and not-for-profits," the former supplying
3.7% of their care for free in 1983 and the latter 4.2%. By comparison, the figure for public
hospitals is 11.5%. Yoder, supra note 11, at 102 ("Overall, the national data from AHA surveys
provide weak support for the hypothesis that for-profit hospitals do less than not-for-profit
hospitals to meet the needs of patients who are unable to pay."). The numbers were even closer
when this study was repeated in 1985. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC
HOsPITALS: SALES LEAD TO BETTER FACILITIES BUT INCREASED PATIENT COSTS 46 (June

1986) (voluntary hospital sector provided 4.6% free care versus 4.3% for investor-owned
hospitals; citing data from AHA indigent care survey). For 1988, these numbers were estimated
to be 4.8% for nonprofits, 5.2% for for-profits. See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
NONPROFIT HOSPITALS AND THE NEED FOR BETTER STANDARDS FOR TAX EXEMPTION, REP.

No. 90-84, at 2 (May 30, 1990), reprinted in MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE 38,608
[hereinafter GAO REPORT]; see also Herzlinger & Krasker, Who Profits from Nonprofits? 65
HARV. Bus. REV. 93, 103 (1987) ("[F]or-profits gave slightly more access to patients who carry
little or no health insurance than did the nonprofits."); Sloan, Valvona & Mullner, supra note 37,
at 24.
144. Thus the difference in 1983, one year prior to the enactment of Medicare DiagnosisRelated Groups (DRGs), was 0.5% in favor of non-profits, but only 0.3% in 1985, one year after
DRGs. Yoder, supra note 11, at 102. In 1988, the AHA estimated that the non-profit
percentage of total revenue attributable to uncompensated care was .4% less than that of forprofit hospitals (4.8% versus 5.2%). GAO REPORT, supra note 143, at 2.
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less need for private hospital charity. This study demonstrates that, in
a selection of four states where for-profits compete with nonprofits,
nonprofit hospitals outperform proprietary institutions at a level
ample to meet the deservedness criterion at its threshold.14 5 Accordingly, the existing studies lend mixed support to the proposition that
voluntary hospitals generally provide charity care at a level that would
be irreplaceably reduced absent a tax subsidy.
Proponents of hospital exemption frequently attempt to circumvent
these inconclusive statistics by positing a notion of deservedness that is
not grounded on a strict "quid pro quo" formulation. This alternative

theory requires only that tax-exempt hospitals maintain an "opendoor" policy, accepting every patient seeking admission regardless of
ability to pay. 1" Hospitals contend that maintaining an open admissions policy meets their social responsibility because hospitals treat all
indigent patients who actually seek care. Anything more would
require hospitals to provide more free care than is demanded.
Even assuming that nonprofit hospitals practice an open door policy
as fervently as they preach it, 4 7 there are two difficulties with this
formulation of the government burden theory. First, this formulation

does not require a showing that hospitals actually relieve a government burden.' 4 8 If the need for free care ever becomes so slight that
hospitals are prevented from establishing that they render a quid pro
quo for the exemption, then no significant government burden exists
for hospitals to relieve. Realistically, there will always be ample
opportunity to dispense free care, but this open-door formulation
145. Lewin, Eckels & Miller, supra note 142, at 1213-14 (in Florida, North Carolina,
Tennessee and Virginia, the uncompensated care burden is 50% to 90% higher at nonprofit
hospitals than at investor-owned hospitals).
146. The IRS effectively applied the "open door" policy prior to the 1969 ruling by
acknowledging in decisions under the 1956 ruling that the exemption would still exist even
without demand for free care. See Comment, supra note 42, at 758. See generallysupra note 44.
Other examples of courts that adopt or suggest the view that an open-door policy is sufficient
include: Hart v. Taylor, 301 Ill.
344, 133 N.E. 857 (1921); West Allegheny Hosp. v. Board of
Property Assessment, Appeals & Review, 500 Pa. 236, 455 A.2d 1170 (1982); Medical Center
Hosp. v. City of Burlington, 152 Vt. 611, 566 A.2d 1352 (1989). "The Vermont court indicated
clearly and succinctly that the main determinant of a charitable hospital was the availability
rather than the actual amount of free care." O'Donnell & Taylor, The Bounds of Charity: The
CurrentStatus of the HospitalProperty-TaxExemption, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 65, 66 (1990).
147. The GAO Report found that "many [nonprofit] hospitals' admissions and transfer
policies limit elective care for those unable to pay." GAO REPORT, supra note 143, 123,526.
148. One might contend that nonprofit hospitals relieve government burden even when they
serve only paying patients because the government has an interest in fostering the delivery of
health care. This rationale ignores the deservedness criterion. Nonprofits do not earn the
exemption from paying patients unless their services are superior to those supplied by for-profits,
a contention addressed as the "community benefit" theory. See infra Section III.C. The present
discussion is restricted to the government burden theory as it applies to free hospital services.
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allows nonprofit hospitals to shirk their social responsibility by providing less than their share of community needs. This is true because by
convention the hospital corporate entity is passive with respect to
patient admissions. Hospitals generally accept only those patients
admitted by members of the medical staff. Because doctors in private
practice have neither legal obligation, moral dictate, nor financial
incentive to accept charity cases, 14 9 hospitals will not have a significant charity census unless they take affirmative steps to treat uninsured patients, such as requiring doctors to accept some charity work
as a condition of medical staff privileges. 5 °
b. Proportionality
Doubts about the ability of hospitals to justify their exempt status
under the deservedness component of the government burden theory
are settled by the poor performance of nonprofit hospitals with respect
to the proportionality criterion. Even if the value of charity services
delivered to the poor and uninsured would be irreplaceably reduced
absent a tax subsidy, hospitals still must establish that the value of the
subsidy roughly matches the level of deservedness; if not, hospitals fail
to satisfy the proportionality criterion. This test requires at a minimum that the value of free care provided by exempt hospitals, above a
representative proportion of free care rendered by similar for-profits,
match the loss of tax revenues to the government.' 5 1
149. Agnew v. Parks, 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 343 P.2d 118, 123 (1959); Childs v. Weis, 440
S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969). Principle VI of the AMA Code of Medical Ethics, however,
suggests an ethical duty to treat emergency patients because it permits doctors to turn down
patients only in nonemergency situations: "A physician shall.... except in emergencies, be free
T.
T BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
to chose whom to serve ....
ETHICS app. II, at 332 (2d ed. 1983); see also May, Code, Covenant, Contract, or Philanthropy,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1975, at 29.
150. Thus, the GAO Report concluded that "some [nonprofit] hospitals lack proactive goals
or policies for nonemergency indigent care . . . [and] did not generally have strategic goals
designed to expand or improve indigent access to care." GAO REPORT, supra note 143, 23,528.
The deceptiveness of an "open-door" policy is documented by the track record of hospitals
under the Hill-Burton Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 601, 60 Stat. 1040 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291, 291a (1989)). For a time, Hill-Burton regulations required
hospitals that received grants under the program to opt between providing 3% of their annual
operating costs as charity care and maintaining an open door policy. 42 C.F.R. §§ 53.111,
53.113 (1973). Sixty percent of hospitals chose the open door option; yet provision of
uncompensated care remained at very low levels. Dowell, Hill-Burton: The Unfulfilled Promise,
12 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 153, 157 n.16 (1987). For example, "[iun Alabama, the 136
'open door' facilities provided a total of $25,636 worth of uncompensated care, an average of
$190 each." Id. In response to widespread evidence of a similar ilk, the government repealed the
open door option in 1979. Id. at 158.
151. Expressed in terms of an equation where U, represents uncompensated care (charity care
plus bad debts) provided by nonprofit hospitals, Uf is the uncompensated care provided by for-

350

Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals
Unfortunately, much of the data measuring uncompensated care
that researchers have generated in recent years does not directly
profit hospitals, and T. is the tax relief enjoyed by nonprofit hospitals--all in terms of a
percentage of revenues-the tax exemption is fully earned only ifU. - Ur > T.
The Charity Care and Hospital Tax-Exempt Status Reform Act, H.R. 790, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
137 CONG. REc. E395-97 (1991), proposes an approach that matches uncompensated care to the
value of the exemption. The Bill, however, fails to require nonprofit hospitals to exceed the base
of uncompensated care provided by equivalent for-profit hospitals. The Bill also requires only
50% of the exemption be earned through uncompensated care, leaving the remainder to
unspecified "community benefits." Id. § l(a). Curiously the Bill compares nonprofit
performance to for-profit in this second category of community benefits. The following are the
core provisions of this proposed legislation:
(1) An organization which operates a hospital shall not be exempt from tax under [§ 501]
unless [it] (A)... has an open-door policy toward Medicare and Medicaid patients and...
(B) provides in a nondiscriminatory manner sufficient qualified charity care and provides
sufficient qualified community benefits ....
(2)(B)(i) The determination under paragraph (1)(B) shall be based on whether--() the
hospital's unreimbursed qualified charity care costs are 50 percent or more of the value of
the hospital's exempt status for the taxable year, and (II) the hospital's unreimbursed
qualified community benefits costs are 35 percent or more of the value of the hospital's
exempt status for the taxable year. (ii) For purposes of this subparagraph, the term
"qualified charity care costs" means the aggregate of--) the hospital's costs in providing
health care without charge to persons with no or a limited ability to pay or at a discount
based on the ability to pay, (II) the hospital's costs in providing health care for which the
charge was deducted as a bad debt, [and] (III) the excess of the hospital's costs in providing
health care to Medicaid patients over the reimbursements for such care.... (iii) mhe term
"qualified community benefits costs" means . . . the hospital's unreimbursed costs in
providing those community benefits not customarily provided by hospitals which are not
exemptfrom tax ....
Id. (emphasis added). The Bill then prescribes a method for determining each hospital's target
percentage, based on a national average value of the exemption (federal, state and local). In
addition, the Bill allows the IRS to impose an excise tax in the amount of any hospital's shortfall,
rather than denying it exempt status altogether. In attempting to account for 50% and 35% of
the value of the exemption, the Bill does not require initially a justification for the remaining
15%, presuming that nonprofits make up this difference through other, intangible benefits not
provided by for-profits. For informational purposes, the Bill requires hospitals to document
annually "the community benefits.., which are not customarily provided by [for-profit] hospitals ... and which are not taken into account [elsewhere in the Bill]." Id. § l(b). This information would provide the basis for Congress to determine whether this presumption should
continue. Conversations with Gary A. Christopherson, Director, Health Legislation, House
Select Committee on Aging (Oct. 11, 1990 & Jan. 7, 1991) (notes on file with the Washington
Law Review).
Proposals made by Thomas R. Barker, legislative director to Representative Brian Donnelly,
that will be the basis of legislation to be introduced this session, are also based upon the historic
"relief from government burden" theory. Barker suggests that Congress adopt a modified charity care standard as the basic test for exemption, requiring that hospitals show they devote "more
than an insubstantial portion" of their revenues to charity care in order to receive exemption.
Barker, supra note 64, at 350-51. To counter the argument that certain hospitals may be located
in geographic areas where there is little need for charity care, Barker would give the IRS flexibility in implementing the "more than insubstantial standard," suggesting as one approach for measuring charity care need the disproportionate patient percentages used by Medicare to determine
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respond to an analysis of the proportionality criterion because it does

not measure the value of the tax relief given nonprofit hospitals. From
the fragmentary evidence available, it appears that nonprofit hospitals
do not provide incremental free care services that match their foregone
tax revenues.' 52 The only extensive study that directly measures the
tax savings' 5 3 conservatively estimates that California nonprofit hospitals gave $82 million in charity care in 1984-1985 and saved $300
54
million in federal and state tax revenue.1

reimbursement rates. Id. Barker would also permit hospitals that flunk this test to qualify for
exemption if they could demonstrate "significant and substantial community benefit," such as
being the sole community hospital as defined by Medicare. Id. at 351.
Unlike Roybal's Bill, however, which attempts to match the economic benefit of exemption to
the cost of charity care, Barker's proposals essentially are a return to a charity care standard that
has no relationship to the value of the exemption. These proposals, therefore, suffer from the
same serious proportionality defects as current law, and would not meet the baseline test of
requiring hospitals to demonstrate that the incremental free care provided at least matches the
economic benefit of exemption.
In addition, the Utah State Tax Commission recently issued a set of guidelines implementing a
charity care standard with which nonprofit hospitals and nursing homes must comply for property tax exemption. See supra note 67. Like the Roybal Bill, the Utah standards require hospitals to prove that the value of the services they return to the community equals the full value of
the exemption. The Utah standards, however, suffer from two defects. First, the Utah standards
measure only the value of the property tax exemption. Second, they employ an overly generous
measure of the value of charity care services. Id.
152. D. Falcone, America's National Health Insurance Program: The Political Economy of
Tax Expenditures on Hospital Care 10 (Jan. 4, 1988) (unpublished manuscript) (whatever
comparative advantage nonprofits have on free care, "the amount uncovered will not offset even
conservative estimates of hospital tax expenditures").
153. The results of this study are confirmed by smaller-scale studies of individual or groups of
hospitals. A study of 11 nonprofit and 4 for-profit hospitals in Utah found that nonprofits
received an estimated $24 million in tax relief while delivering a total of $15.7 million in
uncompensated care in 1986. Pace Management Services, 1986 Financial/Charity/"Social
Overhead" Performance of Wasatch Front [Utah] Hospitals 3 (1989) (unpublished study
performed by private consulting firm). This aggregate fails to deduct the proportionate amount
of uncompensated care provided by the for-profits. In this instance for-profits provided slightly
more such care (3.46% of net revenue as against 3.21%), id. at 2. Thus, the precise comparison
would reflect $24 million in tax assistance versus $0 of incremental free care. See also U.S.
General Accounting Office, Proposed Job Design: Nonprofit Hospitals' Charitable Role 7 (1989)
(unpublished draft) ("[S]tudies examining hospitals in Texas and Florida showed that once
adjustments had been made for tax subsidies or income taxes paid, investor-owned hospitals
provided as much, or slightly more uncompensated care than nonprofit hospitals."). A similar
study of all Tennessee hospitals based on 1983 data reached the opposite conclusion, finding that
"not-for-profit hospitals contribute more in uncompensated care to the community than
proprietaries incur in the form of bad debts and taxes." Hospital Alliance of Tennessee,
Comparative Economic Performance Among Tennessee's Proprietary and Not-For-Profit
Hospital Sectors 4 (Nov. 1984) (unpublished report prepared by Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc.).
However, this finding is misleadingly based on an aggregation of private nonprofit hospitals with
governmental hospitals. Conversation with David Locke, Vice President, Hospital Alliance of
Tennessee, Inc. (Dec. 18, 1989) (notes on file with the Washington Law Review).
154. Simpson & Lee, supra note 141, at 778. The measure of charity care used is the excess of
uncompensated care (valued at each hospital's standard charges) provided by nonprofits over

Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals
The California study may not represent the nation generally because
California has an atypically generous Medicaid program that reduces
demand for charity care."' 5 Comparisons in other states reveal that
nonprofit hospitals provide significantly more free care than for-profits.15 6 These comparisons, however, do not measure the magnitude of
this increment against the amount of tax loss. When this comparison
is made on a national level, nonprofit hospitals provided an increment
of uncompensated care above that provided by for-profits, in the following amounts: 1982-$1.06 billion; 1981-$0.51 billion; 1980-

$0.41 billion.1 57 These amounts are dwarfed by the $8.5 billion estimate of the annual value of the charitable exemption.158 The same
comparison can be approximated by adding the percentage of revenue
for-profit hospitals typically forego by providing free care to the percentage of revenue they pay in taxes. 159 The proportion of free care
nonprofits provide would have to equal or exceed this sum."6 The

that provided by for-profits. Lost taxes are based both on patient and nonpatient revenue. The
figure for charity care does not account for the large discount (averaging 19%) that California
hospitals give to most payors, nor does it account for the $16 million in gifts and subsidies that
California nonprofits received in 1984-1985. Id. This study's measure of foregone taxes has
been criticized for using the maximum corporate tax rate, unadjusted for tax credits and
deferrals, which substantially reduce the income tax burden at most for-profit hospitals. Lewin
& Associates, supra note 142, at 28. However, these flaws do not affect the study's estimate of
property taxes foregone, and they are not sufficient to make up the four-fold differential between
tax relief and charity care.
155. Lewin, Eckels & Miller, supra note 142, at 1214.
156. Id. at 1213-14 (the uncompensated care burden in several states is 50% to 90% higher
at nonprofit hospitals than at investor-owned hospitals: 7.6% vs. 4.9% in Florida; 6.7% vs. 4.2%
in North Carolina; 5.0% vs. 4.8% in Tennessee; and 7.0% vs. 3.7% in Virginia); Sloan, Valvona
& Mullner, supra note 37, at 18 (Vanderbilt University Hospital provided $16 million
uncompensated care in 1982-13% of its gross inpatient revenue-but since then it has adopted
explicit limits on free care).
157. These numbers are derived from data collected by the AHA, as reported in NORTH
CAROLINA CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, supra note 63, at 48. The AHA declined
to provide similar data for subsequent years.
158. See supra note 18. This estimate is based upon annual data from 1986 and 1988.
159. This formula assumes that nonprofits are relieved from approximately the same
proportion of taxes as for-profits pay. This formula presents a fair approximation for income and
property taxes combined because even though nonprofits may have proportionately less income
than for-profits, nonprofits tend to have higher valued property than for-profits., See Hansmann,
The Effect of Tax Exemption and Other Factors on the Market Share of Nonprofit Versus ForProfit Firms, 40 NAT'L TAx J. 71, 80 (1987). Relman argues against crediting for-profits with
their tax bills in making these free care comparisons because taxes do not result in more health
care. Relman, Investor-Owned Hospitals and Health-Care Costs, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370,
371 (1983). The purpose of accounting for taxes in this discussion, however, is not to determine
who provides the most care for indigents; instead, it is to measure whether the excess in free care
provided by nonprofits is sufficient to earn tax relief.
160. In terms of our previous equation, and adding the assumption that T. = Tr, the
exemption is fully earned only if:
U. > Uf + -Tf
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result on a national level does not justify providing a tax exemption to
nonprofits.16 1 The scattered data on a local level are also equally
unconvincing. 162 When measured at an individual hospital level, however, many particular institutions, especially urban teaching hospitals,
163
may meet this standard.
3. Deficiencies as a General Theory of Exemption
The failure of most voluntary hospitals to justify their exempt status
under the relief of government burden theory does not, by itself, invalidate the theory as a general explanation for charitable tax exemption.
On the contrary, the solution to the difficulties surveyed thus far is
simply to refuse to apply the theory to the particular nonprofit hospitals that fail the test. Further examination, however, reveals that the
government burden conception of charity fails at a theoretical level as
161. For the four largest investor-owned multihospital companies (Hospital Corporation of
America (HCA), Humana, National Medical Enterprises (NME), and American Medical
International (AMI)), in 1983, "the sum of income taxes and uncompensated care (5.6 percent of
gross revenues) exceeded the 4.1 percent of gross revenues that not-for-profit hospitals accounted
for as uncompensated care." Yoder, supra note 11, at 114. Even this unfavorable comparison
fails to account for property taxes paid by the proprietary hospitals, which would substantially
increase the nonprofit deficit.
162. A study of 11 nonprofit hospitals and 4 for-profits in Utah found that in 1986 the
nonprofits provided only one-third the amount of uncompensated care that for-profits incurred in
free care plus taxes (3.2% versus 10.3%, of net revenue). Pace Management Services, supra note
153, at 3. Data reported for 1984 by the NORTH CAROLINA CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY
RESEARCH, supra note 63, at 168-91, revealed one county, Wake County, where 4.0% of the
care rendered by the nonprofit hospitals was uncompensated but, for the investor-owned
hospital, more than three times this amount-14.1% of its gross patient revenues-were
attributable to taxes plus uncompensated care.
For five selected states (California, Florida, Iowa, Michigan and New York), the GAO
compared uncompensated care by nonprofit hospitals with their estimated income tax liability
and found that, by this measure, only 15% of the hospitals failed to pay back their exemption.
GAO REPORT, supra note 143, 23,523. However, this comparison failed to account for the
value of the property tax exemption, the charitable deduction, or tax-exempt bond financing. It
also failed to measure nonprofit uncompensated care against a base from representative for-profit
hospitals. The comparison therefore fails to report data relevant to the proper application of the
government burden/charity care standard.
163. This is suggested by the GAO finding that, when it arrayed individual hospitals by their
percentage of uncompensated care, the upper quartile provided from three to nine times greater
free care than the lower quartile. GAO REPORT, supra note 143, 123,521. A sample of 1987 and
1988 data from four large nonprofit hospitals in Arizona found one that provided less net,
incremental uncompensated care (measured against a state-wide average of six investor-owned
hospitals, which was 3.0%) than the value of its property tax exemption, but three others that
provided substantially more uncompensated care-from 4 to 8 times the value of the property
tax exemption. However, this study did not attempt to measure any other component of the
value of the exemption. Data collected by Mark Hall in preparation for this Article (on file with
the Washington Law Review).
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an exclusive statement of the general basis for tax exemption." 6
Therefore, hospitals' failure to comply should not be conclusive of
their claim to exempt status. The government burden theory
encounters its primary difficulties under the proportionality and historical consistency criteria.16
a. Proportionality
Where the government burden theory is based on the provision of
charity care, it fails to meet the proportionality criterion because of its
perverse tendency to operate in a regressive fashion, awarding the
largest subsidy to those organizations that least need it. Students of
"tax expenditure" analysis will recognize that a general tax exemption
1 66
suffers from the same "upside down" effect as many tax deductions:
those entities with the highest net revenues or the greatest value of
otherwise-taxable property receive the greatest amount of subsidy, yet
these are the entities that least need support.1 67 From the standpoint
of equity among different tax-exempt entities, the result of the general
tax exemption is that entities that are the "poorest" in either an
164. This does not mean that charity care cannot serve as a sufficient standard. See infra note
198.
165. The charity care theory is also defective because it would deny hospitals a fair
opportunity to meet the standard in rate-regulated states where all charity care is automatically
reimbursed, either by being built into each hospital's rate base (and therefore being explicitly
passed on to other payers), or by being explicitly reimbursed from an uncompensated care pool
that is funded through surcharges on hospital charges. See G. ANDERSON, J. LAVE, C. RUSSE &
P. NEUMAN, PROVIDING HOSPITAL SERVICES: THE CHANGING FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT

151-52 (1989) (describing these methods of reimbursing charity care in New York,
Massachusetts, New Jersey and Maryland). Moreover, the observation that "free care" by rateregulated hospitals is not truly uncompensated reveals the weakness of the charity care theory
even for unregulated hospitals, because unregulated hospitals also pass on the costs of free care to
other patients through their pricing structures. See Hadley & Feder, HospitalCost Shifting and
Carefor the Uninsured, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1985, at 4; Kramon, Coaxing the Stanford Elephant
to Dance, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1990, § 3, at 1, col. 2 (Stanford Medical Center charges privately
insured caesarean patients almost twice the cost of the operation to recoup the cost of treating
uninsured patients.)
The charity care theory is also sometimes criticized because it might result in a hospital
"jump[ing] back and forth across the line of charitability from one year to the next." O'Donnell
& Taylor, supra note 146, at 67; see also Medical Center Hosp. v. City of Burlington, 152 Vt. 611,
566 A.2d 1352, 1355 (1989) (under this approach, "uncertainty would reign, with taxability
determined on a yearly basis depending on economic factors not within the control of any one
person or organization"). This defect, however, is merely a matter of administration. It is not
necessary to evaluate a hospital's exempt status each year, or even to determine exemption on a
hospital-specific basis.
166. See S. SURREY & P. MCDANIEL, supra note 12, at 72.
167. At a tax rate of 34%, for example (the current maximum corporate rate), an entity with
net revenues of $1 million receives a tax subsidy of $340,000, while an entity with net revenues of
$100,000 receives a subsidy ofjust $34,000.
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income or property tax sense, and thus most in need of government
assistance to serve impoverished and uninsured patients, receive the
least government assistance. Because uncompensated care is an
expense item, those hospitals with the most net revenues are more
likely to have actually rendered the least free care, all other things
being equal. Similarly, for the property tax exemption, those nonprofit
hospitals that retain the most net surplus for capital expansion, rather
than using surplus to support the poor, will enjoy the largest subsidy.1 68 The same is true for any theory of exemption which ties the
availability of exemption to an expenditure of resources by the exempt
entity. 169
These problems might be ameliorated if the exemption were administered on a hospital-specific, annual basis, requiring each hospital to
demonstrate yearly its delivery of free care in an increment sufficient
to earn the subsidy.17 In such a system, a hospital with sufficient net
revenues would receive a tax benefit exactly equal to the dollar value
of charity care provided by the hospital. 17 ' Nevertheless, such a system would not help those entities that had insufficient revenues to fully
benefit from a tax exemption.' 7 2 Hence, even this theoretical system
168. The first source to note this regressive effect was Note, Exemption of Education,
Philanthropicand Religious Institutionsfrom State Real Property Taxes, 64 HARV. L. REV. 288,
294 (1950); see also Warren, Krattenmaker & Snyder, supra note 119, at 300.
169. Suppose an entity receives a charitable exemption for providing housing for the urban
poor. Rev. Rul. 70-585, 1970-2 C.B. 115. If its net revenues were zero because it uses its income
to subsidize the housing, the value of the income tax exemption would be zero.
170. Alabama, for example, permits a property tax exemption only if the hospital
demonstrates that 15% of its "business" constitutes free care. Each hospital must certify
annually to the tax commissioner that this test is met. ALA. CODE § 40-9-1(2) to -1(3) (Supp.
1990); Gay v. State, 228 Ala. 253, 153 So. 767, 770-71 (1934). The pending Charity Care and
Hospital Tax-Exempt Status Reform Act, H.R. 790, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC.
E395-97 (1991), proposes a more elaborate version of this same approach. See supra note 151.
171. Assume for example that Hospital A has $1 million in net revenue. The value of a tax
exemption on this net revenue at current corporate rates is $340,000. It would be possible to
design a system which conditioned the exemption on the hospital's ability to demonstrate that it
provided incremental free care worth $340,000. If this were done on an annual basis, the
exemption would match perfectly the proportionality criterion for this entity.
172. To take an extreme example, a tax exemption would prove worthless to a nonprofit
hospital that gave away so much free care that its net revenues were zero.
Even if these proportionality problems could be overcome, the charity care theory is still
defective in that there is no guarantee that hospitals receiving a subsidy will in fact devote the
subsidy to indigent care. The subsidy comes in the form of an unrestricted grant. Indeed, one
empirical study of a block grant program operated in New York concluded that unrestricted
[The]
subsidies to hospitals "did not directly increase the amount of uncompensated care ....
hospitals retained the unrestricted subsidies, used them to purchase goods other than
uncompensated care, or both." K. Thorpe & C. Phelps, The Social Role of Not-For-Profit
Organizations: Hospital Provision of Charity Care 10, 13 (Dec. 15, 1989) (unpublished
manuscript).
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would suffer proportionality problems. Such a system would also be
17 3
more cumbersome to administer than the current system.
The second troubling aspect of the government burden theory under
the proportionality criterion stems from the intergovernmental nature
of the tax exemption subsidy and the multi-jurisdictional nature
of many traditionally charitable services. Specifically, the burdens
relieved are not necessarily those of the taxing authority that grants
the exemption. Instead, one governmental unit may be enjoying the
charitable services supported by another's subsidy. This phenomenon
has been explored most comprehensively in the context of the property
tax exemption for education, where, for instance, it is extremely difficult to maintain that the City of New Haven receives a fair quid pro
quo for Yale University's exemption via the City's relief from the burden of operating a university of international stature. Clearly, the government burden would be borne at a state or perhaps national level
absent the tax subsidy. 7 4
These observations do not have quite the same force in the hospital
arena, for the burden of hospital care historically is shared to a much
greater degree among federal, state, and local governments. Nevertheless, it is likely that in many situations a large, regional hospital, particularly one affiliated with a medical school, will draw
disproportionate support from its local municipal tax base.
As noted in Section II.B., one measure of proportionality is to consider whether the particular form of subsidy that the theory contemplates might be more rationally administered through a system of
direct subsidies. 175 This is an apt comparison for health care services
173. See, eg., The Charity Care and Hospital Tax-Exempt Status Reform Act, H.R. 790,
102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REc. E395-97 (1991) (summarized supranote 151); St. Luke's
Hosp. v. Board of Assessment, No. 88-C-2691 (Pa. Ct. C.P., Lehigh Co., Apr. 19, 1990)
(adopting a highly complex, legislative-type rule, to account for the value of community and
charity services provided by a hospital); see also supra note 64.
Another corrective technique would be to replace the exemption with a tax credit,
guaranteeing proportionate support to each hospital by allowing each to subtract the exact
amount or a defined portion of its annual charity care from its tax liability. But a tax credit is not
just a minor repair; it is a repudiation of the exemption, because it replaces the exemption with a
system that is, in effect, simply another means for administering a direct subsidy. Moreover,
unless the law contains a concept of a "refundable credit"-i.e. provides a cash refund to entities
with no tax liability-the system would still suffer from proportionality problems. See generally
S. SURREY & P. MCDANIEL, supra note 12, at 108-11.
174. See Note, Alternatives to the University Property Tax Exemption, 83 YALE L.J. 181,
184-85 (1973); accord Belknap, supra note 4, at 2033 ("[Tihe City of Cambridge clearly is not
giving the exemption [to Harvard] as a quid pro quo for being relieved from a burden that it
would otherwise have to assume.").
175. For authorities advocating this alternative, see, e.g., Brannon & Strand, Alternative
Approaches to EncouragingPhilanthropicActivities, in FILER COMMISSION REPORTS, supra note
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because the state and federal governments in fact provide direct subsidies through the Medicaid program, as do many municipalities. 7 6 A
direct subsidy is infinitely more sensible than the exemption. It easily
accommodates the widely varying needs for charity care over time and
among different localities according to demographic factors, such as
the employment rate, the generosity of the particular state's Medicaid
program and the presence of local municipal hospitals. 7 7 A direct
subsidy spreads the burden of taxation for these services more fairly
across the community than a system that effectively taxes only those
who are sick.' 7 8 It is also just as easy or difficult to administer
properly. 179
Yet another alternative that potentially offers even greater efficiency
is for the government to directly treat the indigent, as it does on a
large scale through the public hospital system, community health centers, Veterans Administration hospitals and the Indian Health Service.
Direct provision of service is a far more targeted means of administering charity care than the charitable exemption.
b. HistoricalConsistency and the Gift-to-the-Community
Formulation
The relief of government burden theory is also deficient as a general
theory of exemption because it circumscribes the field of charitable
activity too narrowly as compared with the traditional categories of
exemption, thus failing the historical consistency criterion. 8 ° The
prime example of a charitable activity that cannot be explained under
the relief of government burden rationale is religion, an activity for
2, at 2361; Gabler & Shannon, supra note 9, at 2544; Stimson, supra note 5, at 423; Note, supra
note 174, at 181.
176. See Sioux Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Yankton County, 424 N.W.2d 379 (S.D. 1988) (county
must pay for emergency hospitalization of indigent); Blendon, Aiken, Freeman, Kirkman-Liff &
Murphy, Uncompensated Care by Hospitals or Public Insurancefor the Poor, 314 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1160 (1986). Also, a number of states have begun to subsidize indigent care through
hospital rate regulation. See Dowell, State Health Insurance Programsfor the Uninsured Poor,
23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 141 (1989).
177. See Warren, Krattenmaker & Snyder, supra note 119, at 301.
178. See infra note 198.
179. S. SURREY & P. MCDANIEL, supra note 12, at 100-02 (observing that degree of
administrative complexity is not a function of the method of subsidy); Warren, Krattenmaker &
Snyder, supra note 119, at 296 (apparent simplicity of the tax subsidy is illusory since it is
purchased at the price of a sacrifice in monitoring and accuracy).
180. See Belknap, supra note 4, at 2033 ("[T]he quid pro quo explanation of tax exemptions
... is not adequate as a justification of the privilege in some of the most important segments of
the general area under discussion. It is evident that the tax exemption privilege has much deeper
roots than the quid pro quo theory would admit."); Warren, Krattenmaker & Snyder, supra note
119, at 240.
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which there is not only no governmental obligation but an outright
prohibition on governmental involvement. The government burden
theory might accommodate this anomaly as sui generis in our governmental structure,""1 except that there are many other instances of traditionally exempt functions that cannot properly be said to constitute
a governmental responsibility. Referring to the listing in section
501(c)(3),"8 2 only education clearly appears to fit the characterization
of a traditional government responsibility, and even it is not a tradi183
tional function of the federal government.
A somewhat modified version of the government burden theory,
known as the "gift-to-the-community" formulation, avoids some of
the deficiencies of the pure "quid pro quo" version by encompassing
any free service, regardless of wh&her the particular service is one the
government traditionally has provided. 8 4 This accords with the
assumption that the government has a strong interest in the relief 6f
poverty even if the government is not affirmatively obliged to directly
render the particular form of relief. This theory avoids the problematic requirement of the strict formulation of the government burden
theory that assumes the government would provide the same service
absent the exemption. In contrast, under the gift-to-the-community
variant, a charitable service merits subsidization if the government
merely has the power to supply the free service itself18 5
This variation of the charity care theory, however, does not come
any closer to qualifying hospitals for the exemption. Also, as a general
theory of exemption, it continues to suffer from the "upside down"
effect and the other proportionality problems noted above. The overriding defect, however, is that this variant fails even at its primary
point of attempted rehabilitation-historical consistency.
181. Indeed, throughout much of the long history of the exemption, religion has been deemed
within the province of government. See supra note 5.
182. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
183. Belknap, supra note 4, at 2033. Moreover, education may not, strictly speaking, be a
government "obligation," because the government is under no constitutional duty to
affirmatively protect or enhance the welfare of its citizenry. DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hosp., Inc.,
826 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1987).
184. See Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 269-70 (Utah 1985)
(charity requires a "gift to the community" that "can be identified either by a substantial
imbalance in the exchange between the charity and the recipient of its services or in the lessening
of a government burden" (emphasis added)).
185. Or, in the special case of religion, it would have the power but for a specific preclusion.
Ginsberg, supra note 54, at 308 ("It appears to be sufficient that the function being performed is

one that might otherwise be performed t public expense.").
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One could argue for a theory of charitable exemption that extends
to the relief of poverty in any manner, based on the Statute of Charitable Uses,

86

18 7
the principal source of the law's concept of charity.

This statute was enacted in conjunction with the Elizabethan Poor
Laws, 88 which sought to address the critical problems faced by the
increasingly destitute populations in urban centers. The Poor Laws
placed the responsibility on local towns to care for their indigent residents. At the same time the Statute of Charitable Uses sought to
lessen this local governmental burden by strengthening the role of private philanthropy. The historical connection between these two statutes demonstrates that the original notion of charity was principally
concerned with the relief of poverty. 89
This notion prevailed for only a comparatively short time, however.
In Commissioners v. Pemsel, "' Lord McNaughten captured centuries
186. An Act To Redress the Mis-Employment of Lands, Goods and Stocks of Money
Heretofore Given to Certain Charitable Uses (Statute of Charitable Uses), 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, ch. 4,
reprinted in 7 STAT. AT LARGE 43 (Eng. 1763).
187. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
188. An Act for the Relief of the Poor, 1601, 43 Eliz. I, ch. 2., reprintedin 7 STAT. AT LARGE
30 (Eng. 1763).
189. See M. CHESTERMAN, supra note 1, at 56-57 ("[A]ccording to the intentions of the
Elizabethan legislature and the authoritative contemporary interpretation, the 1601 preamble's
concept of 'charitable' contained a 'public benefit' requirement calling for benefit to the poor ....
Without this, the Act's objective of lightening the burden of parish poor relief... would not be
achieved."); G. JONES, supra note 97, at 22-23 (discussing the connection between the
Elizabethan Poor Laws and the Statute of Charitable Uses); L. SHERIDAN & G. KEETON, supra
note 80, at 8-9 (same); Adler, supra note 3, at 59, 80:
To prevent vagabondage and begging the state undertook [in the Poor Law] to maintain
only the poor and impotent, the utterly helpless. Those in a position to pay have, therefore,
no claim on state support. In housing such inmates an institution is in no way relieving the
state of a burden which the latter has ever undertaken to bear.
Relief of poverty was also the concept of charity that originally prevailed in IRS rulings during
the first half of this century. See Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1286
& n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Liles & Blum, supra note
2, at 20-21. Finally, care for the indigent was at the core of the rationale for granting hospitals
immunity from tort liability in some states when the doctrine of charitable immunity still existed.
See Ponder v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 256 Ga. 833, 353 S.E.2d 515, 516 ("The proper
standard for an equal protection analysis of the charitable immunities doctrine is whether it bears
a rational relationship to the public policy of care for indigent persons."), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
863 (1987); Morton v. Savannah Hosp., 148 Ga. 438, 96 S.E. 887, 887-88 (1918) (charitable
immunity attaches only to treatment of nonpaying patients); Adams v. University Hosp., 122
Mo. App. 675, 99 S.W. 453, 454 (1907) (the purpose of the charitable immunity is to prevent
funds from being "diverted from such kindly purposes" as "administering relief to those in
need"). But see City of Richmond v. Richmond Memorial Hosp., 202 Va. 86, 116 S.E.2d 79, 83
(1960) ("[S]everal tort cases ... establish that hospitals ... are 'charitable' institutions despite
the fact that they charge all who can afford to pay."); Southern Methodist Hosp. & Sanitorium v.
Wilson, 51 Ariz. 424, 77 P.2d 458 (1938) (same), overruled on other grounds, Ray v. Tuscon
Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951).
190. 1891 App. Cas. 531 (H.L.).
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of precedent in rejecting the relief of poverty as the sole ground for
charitable classification. 1 ' Nor has the concept of poverty relief governed the law of charity in modern times. The other bedrock charitable purposes, religion and education, serve the rich as well as the poor.
Even when hospitals were considered paradigms of charitable organizations, they were not pure charities in the popular sense of serving
predominantly the poor. As Rosemary Stevens has explained:
Voluntary hospitals were never really charities.... Sometimes one
thinks back over hospital history and there is this vague notion that
there was once something called a voluntary hospital, which the leading
donor of the town gave to the community and all it did was to give away
care. This is absolutely untrue. .

.

. We have always had a very

entrepreneurial voluntary sector in this country with respect to the
attraction of private patients ....

They were marketing their services

very early, looking to government agencies for support and lobbying vigorously for such money. 192
The same observation is true for charities generally, which have
devoted only a small portion of their resources to social services for
191. See generally M. CHESTERMAN, supra note 1, at 54-57 (discussing the "distortion" of
the charity concept that occurred during the eighteenth century).
192. Stevens, Voluntary and GovernmentalActivity, HEALTH MATRIxi Spr. 1985, at 26, 28;
see also Southern Methodist Hosp., 77 P.2d at 460-61 (charitable hospital rendered "very little
free medical or hospital attendane ... to anyone"); City of Richmond, "116 S.E.2d at 82 ("The
framers of the (1902) Constitution presumably knew that such charitable organizations as
YMCA's, asylums, and hospitals customarily charge for services.. . ."); J. HOLLINGSWORTH &
E. HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 25, at 30 (at the time the IRS issued Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1
C.B. 202, almost three-fourths of the patients at nonprofit hospitals were insured); id. at 93 (in
1935, voluntary hospitals "in a number of [small] midwestern cities... provided only 10 percent
of their services to nonpaying patients"); D. ROSNER, A ONCE CHARITABLE ENTERPRISE:
HOSPITALS AND HEALTH CARE IN BROOKLYN AND NEW YORK, 1885-1915, at 8-9, 36-61
(1982) (various economic and technological forces transformed New York hospitals from classic
charities to business organizations during the 1890S); P. STARR, supra note 35, at 146 ("[I]n a
matter of decades, roughly between 1870 and 1910, hospitals moved . . . from charities,
dependent on voluntary gifts [to] market institutions, financed increasingly out of payments from
patients."); id. at 160-61 (at the turn of the century, "the old rhetoric of charitable paternalism
was superseded by a new vocabulary of scientific management and efficiency"); R. STEVENS,
supra note 35, at 23 ("Income from paying patients ... represented almost half of the budgets of
nonsectarian private [nonprofit hospitals] in 1904 and almost three-fourths that of the
'ecclesiastical' institutions .... ); Jones & Du Val, What Distinguishesthe Voluntary Hospitalin
an Increasingly Commercial Health Care Environment?, in IN SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH: THE
MISSION OF VOLUNTARY HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS 201, 209 (1988) (in 1904, "as much as
43 percent of [nonprofit] hospitals'] income came from paying patients and 30 percent from
government. In fact, for much of their history, voluntary hospitals have had to strive to be
businesslike in order to survive and prosper."); Mancino, supra note 40, at 1057. Paul Starr
further explains that voluntary hospitals did not evolve directly from almshouses as is often
supposed; instead, the almshouses were the foundation of the public hospital system whereas the
voluntary sector arose from the more particular desires of ethnic and religious groups. P. STARR,
supra note 35, at 150, 169-72.
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the poor since the seventeenth century in England and since the
advent of the massive governmental welfare programs in the United
States.193
One might attempt to rebut these historical authorities by observing
that they establish only that charities need not exclusively serve the
poor; none "supports the much bolder proposition that a nonprofit
hospital is a charitable organization even it if provides no care for the
'
poor." 194
Likewise, the government burden theory, including its giftto-the-community variant, does not require total devotion to relief for
the poor,1 95 only sufficient free services to match the level of deservedness to the level of subsidy. Nevertheless, the law of charities has long
held that charitable trusts need not serve the poor at all.1 96 Indeed,
several of the classic instances of tax-exempt organizations in modern
times serve the rich almost exclusively. 197 Accordingly, a conception
of charity limited to free services to the poor would dramatically alter
the current scope of the exemption.
In sum, both the traditional formulation of the relief of government
burden theory and the gift-to-the-community variant are not only
unsatisfactory as an explanation for the exemption of voluntary hospitals, but they also fail the proportionality and historical consistency
criteria from the standpoint of a general theory of tax exemption. For
these reasons, they are unacceptable both as justifications for the
193. Roberts, A Positive Model of Private Charity and Public Transfers, 92 J. POL. ECON. 136,
141 (1984) ("[p]rivate charity in the United States is approximately zero" in the sense of helping
the poor; only 10% of donations go to "social services" and only a fraction of that amount goes
to the poor); id. at 147 & n.147 (in England after 1660, "payments under the Poor Law became
almost everywhere the ordinary source of relief for indigence with private charity a
supplementary source of varying importance, called on for great efforts only in times of
extraordinary distress").
194. Note, Hospitals, Tax Exemption, and the Poor, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 653, 679
(1975) (emphasis added).
195. See Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 282 (Utah. 1985)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Charitable hospitals need not be self-liquidating.").
196. For holdings and statements to this effect in the context of hospitals, see Southern
Methodist Hosp. & Sanitorium v. Wilson, 51 Ariz. 424, 77 P.2d 458, 462 (1938) ("If the purpose
of the institution is one which is recognized in law as charitable, . . . we think the institution is
properly characterized as a charitable one, notwithstanding the fact that it charges for most, if
not all, of the services which it may render .. "),overruled on other grounds, Ray v. Tuscon
Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951); EvangelicalLutheranGood SamaritanSoc'y v.
Board of County Comm 'rs, 219 N.W.2d 900, 909 (N.D. 1974) ("[A]n institution which is engaged
in the charitable purpose of supplying care and attention to the aged . . .does not lose its
charitable character.., because it has never provided care for a patient on a free basis ....
");
In
re Resch's Will Trusts, [1969] 1 App. Cas. 514, 544 (P.C.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 376 comment c (1959); SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 92, § 372.
197. See B. HOPKINS, supra note 31, at 80-83; Simon, supra note 69, at 85 (property tax
exemption historically applied to "schools for the sons of gentlemen").
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exemption of nonprofit hospitals and as general theories on which to
base eligibility for tax exemption. Because a successful theory of charitable exemption must encompass more than free services to the poor
and the relief of government burden, nonprofit organizations should
be allowed to demonstrate that they earn their subsidy by benefitting
the community in other ways. 198
198. Rejecting free care as a necessary standard for the exemption does not necessarily
preclude its serving as a sufficient standard. If the test is both properly formulated and met by a
particular hospital (i.e., the hospital demonstrates that it dispenses an incremental level of charity
care equal in dollar value to the value of the exemptions), granting the exemption is not bad
public policy, despite the several possible reasons why one might have qualms about the
government supporting a nonprofit institution that subsidizes the poor solely from sales to paying
patients. In the hospital context, one might object that this form of redistribution through crosssubsidization, which, in contrast with government taxation, conceals from patients and insurers
their support of a system that cares for the poor by "taxing" the sick. See P. FELDSTEIN,
HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 268-69 (1979) (criticizing hospital internal cross-subsidization);
Phelps, Cross-Subsidies and Charge-Shifting in American Hospitals, in UNCOMPENSATED
HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 108 (1986) (same); Clark, supra note 10, at
1438-39, 1467 (describing as "elitist" the "minigovernment" model of hospital exemption which
fosters redistribution of income through covert "taxation," effectively "disenfranchising" the
public); Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. ScI. 22 (1971) (seminal
discussion of the economic effect of hidden taxation). However, this form of redistribution by
voluntary private transaction, unlike government taxation, is not coerced. Moreover, if the
hospital did not treat the poor, its pricing behavior for paying patients would not necessarily be
any less irrational or exploitive. It would only make different use of the profits.
The second basis for concern about government support for private redistributional schemes is
that such schemes may not be structured to yield optimal benefits, and may deter the government
from undertaking this function in a superior fashion. For instance, to the extent government
relies on private hospitals to meet the health care needs of uninsured patients, it fosters an
irrational public health policy that treats members of this population only when medical
conditions deteriorate to a very severe level. Nothing, however, prevents the government from
requiring hospitals to meet part of their free care obligation in an outpatient setting that offers
preventative and primary care services. Indeed, the Utah County Tax Commissioner bargained
for this precise solution in negotiating a settlement with the hospital company involved in the
Utah County case. Tolchin, HospitalsUse Charity To Fend Off Tax Collectors, N.Y. Times, May
3, 1988, at C3, col. I ("For reasons not altogether altruistic, Intermountain Health Care Inc.
recently opened a clinic here to treat homeless men and women... [it] began providing health
care at a local soup kitchen and at a center for Indochinese refugees [a]nd it expanded health
services on Indian reservations and for the rural poor.").
The third criticism of using the charitable tax exemption to support free care dispensed by
private hospitals is that the exemption allows the government to shift to private industry its
responsibility to subsidize this care directly. See Yoder, supra note 11, at 195 ("Ensuring
adequate health care is a societal obligation, and government should make provision for its
financing when private coverage is lacking."). The government, however, does directly fund
health care for the poor at some level. Even if greater government involvement existed, there
would always be a role for private hospitals to play, for instance in treating transients, illegal
aliens, and others who may fall through the cracks of government programs. See Sager, Pricesof
EquitableAccess The New MassachusettsHealth InsuranceLaw, 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 21
(1988) (Massachusetts provides comprehensive health care coverage largely by using the tax
system to impose the responsibility for health insurance on private employers).
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C. Community Benefit and the Nonprofit Ethic
1.

The Community Benefit Theory

Nonprofit hospitals face a pair of correlative problems under the
two conventional theories of exemption examined thus far. Nonprofits
easily satisfy the health care per se theory, but that theory, applied
logically, does not test whether they earn the exemption. In contrast,
the relief-of-poverty branch of the government burden theory, which
does contain such a test, is too demanding for most hospitals in the
present health care economy. Recognizing these twin difficulties, the
nonprofit hospital sector maintains that the proper test for the exemption should consider whether they benefit the community in a variety
of ways less obvious or tangible than direct charity care, such as providing services superior to that of investor-owned hospitals, responding to community needs better than for-profits, or fostering desirable
medical values in ways that proprietary medicine does not.
Unlike the per se theory drawn from trust law, the community benefit theory does not automatically validate the exemption of any nonprofit activity. Instead, this theory seeks to identify particular
nonprofit activities in which the community values the special quality
or ethic that the nonprofit enterprise offers. 199 In the hospital context,
199. Perhaps the most forceful statement of the community benefit theory, made in the
context of religious institutions, is that nonprofit institutions promote values:
such as benevolence, charity, generosity, love of our fellowmen, . . . and all those comely
virtues and amiable qualities which clothe life 'in decent drapery' and impart a charm to
existence,... furnish a sure basis on which the fabric of civil society can rest, and without
which it could not endure. Take from it these supports, and it would tumble into chaos and
ruin. Anarchy would follow order and regularity, and liberty, freed from its restraining
influence, would soon degenerate into the wildest license, which would convert the beautiful
earth into a howling pandemonium, fit only for the habitation of savage beasts and more
savage men.
Trustees of the First Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of Atlanta, 76 Ga. 181, 192-93 (1886).
Of like mind, but of less apocalyptic manner is Belknap, supra note 4, at 2033-35:
The true explanation, and the only principle that affords a complete justification covering
the entire field of [charitable] exemptions ... is that government relieves from the tax burden religious, educational, and charitable activities because it wishes to encourage them as
representing the highest and noblest achievements of mankind[,] . . . activities which by
common understanding are agreed to rate among the highest in the scale of social values.
Professor Atkinson provides another, more measured, but particularly clear description of this
view (which is not his own):
Charities are said to provide what I will call "metabenefits," benefits that derive not from
what product is produced or to whom it is distributed, but rather from how it is produced or
distributed. Traditional theory has identified two ways charities provide such
"metabenefits." In the first place, they are said to deliver goods and services more efficiently, more innovatively, or otherwise better than other suppliers. In the second place,
their very existence is said to promote pluralism and diversity, which are taken to be inherently desirable ....
This theory rests on the fairly explicit premise that not only particular
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the community benefit theory maintains that nonprofits are socially
privileged by virtue of their superior quality of service or the superior
ethic of nonprofit medicine.2 'o As summarized in the preeminent
study of organizational form in medicine:
[S]ome observers believe that the rise of for-profit health care threatens
the values and ideals that should guide... health care organizations....
It is feared that something essential will be lost if a service ethosexpressed in terms such as caring, community responsiveness, fiduciary
responsibility-is
abandoned or replaced with a principle based on eco20 1
nomic goals.

The theory of exemption based on the superiority of the nonprofit
ethic in medicine comes closer to meeting the deservedness criterion
than the per se approach because it requires a positive demonstration
of a community benefit that profit-making firms do not offer. 20 2 Thus,
goods and services, but also particular modes of supplying them, can be identified as especially good for the public under neutral principles administrable by a government agency,
the Internal Revenue Service, subject to judicial review.
Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations,31 B.C.L. REv. 501, 605-06 n.266 (1990); see also
Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970) ("[C]ertain entities that exist in a harmonious
relationship to the community at large, and that foster its 'moral or mental improvement,' should
not be inhibited in their activities by property taxation ....
The State has an affirmative policy
that considers these groups as beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life .... ); cf E.
JAMES & S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 3 (proposing a view of nonprofits that "emphasizes the independent role of ideology as a fundamental justification for [their] existence and a
basic explanation of their behavior"); id. at 51:
We believe that a key feature of nonprofit production is ideology.... [Miany organizations
are nonprofit because their founders have a set of strongly felt beliefs which motivate them
more than money alone. The kind of services they chose to produce [and] the consumers
who prefer these services... are directly tied to the founders' beliefs.
200. The leading advocates of this position are AMERICAN HosPrrAL ASSOCIATION, supra
note 39; Seay & Sigmond, supra note 39, at 3; Seay & Vladeck, supra note 39; see also Falcone &
Warren, supra note 18, at 735-36 ("[Pluralism in health services delivery is desired and has a
price which Americans... have agreed to pay via tax expenditures .... ); Horwitz, Corporate
Reorganization: The Last Gasp or Last Clear Chancefor the Tax-Exempt Nonprofit Hospital, 13
AM. J. L. & MED. 527, 558-59 (1988) ("[C]ommitment... to service, rather than to profit, even
if greater in spirit than in deed, may be enough to warrant retention of the nonprofit concept.").
See generally Hyman, supra note 51, at 363-76 (explaining and critiquing this position).
201. Yoder, supra note 11, at 182.
202. The proposed Charity Care and Hospital Tax-Exempt Status Reform Act, H.R. 790,
102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. E395-97 (1991) (discussed supra note 151), adopts this
approach to justifying up to half the value of exemption.
Similarly, the proposals of Thomas Barker, described, supra, note 151, would make
community benefit an explicit alternative for exemption, permitting hospitals who failed the
charity care standards to qualify for exemption if they could demonstrate a "significant and
substantial community benefit" by serving, for example, as the sole community hospital as
defined by the Medicare statutes. Barker, supra note 64, at 351. Barker, however, would not
accept as community benefits certain services currently touted as such by nonprofit hospitals,
such as weight loss clinics, "stop smoking" clinics, or cholesterol-screening clinics operating at
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tax exemption proponents maintain that nonprofit hospitals provide
many unique benefits besides free care: they support physician education and medical research;20 3 provide a full range of services regardless
of each service's profitability;2 " and support community health education and preventative services such as childbirth classes, meals for the
elderly, and immunization clinics.2" 5 More amorphously, they claim
to foster an ethos more conducive to proper medical practice than that
20 6
prevailing in profit-oriented environments.
The community benefit theory also avoids the difficulty that the
relief-of-poverty justification faces under the proportionality criterion.
Because this theory postulates that a benefit inheres in all of the organization's services, a subsidy matched to the size of the operation-as
income tax and property tax exemptions generally are-is well calibrated to the extent of deservedness under this theory. The more
property a nonprofit hospital has and the more income it earns, the
more superior services it can render to the community. 20
2. Deficiencies in the Community Benefit Theory
a. Deservedness
Closer examination of this theory reveals that it also suffers from
serious infirmities, primarily under the deservedness and proportionality criteria. With respect to deservedness, the community benefit theory should show that the social benefits claimed by nonprofit firms
local shopping malls. Barker observes that hospitals often make money on such services, which
at the very least provide free advertising for the hospital and its physicians. Id.
203. Seay & Vladeck, supra note 39, at 6-7.
204. Id. Examples of services that are usually unprofitable include burn units, trauma
centers, and neonatal intensive care, Id.
205. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 39, at 36-38.

Nonprofit sceptics,

however, discredit the deservedness of these services, observing that many are undertaken
primarily for marketing purposes. See supra note 202.
206. Jones & Du Val, supra note 192, at 230 ("[T]he voluntary hospital embodies a set of
values in health care that helps quicken the conscience of the community concerning the sick and
poor and inspires a vision of what medicine and health care can accomplish for mankind, beyond
what the marketplace demands .... "); Wikler, The Virtuous Hospital:Do Nonprofit Institutions
Have a Distinctive Moral Mission?, in IN SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH: THE MISSION OF
VOLUNTARY HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS 127, 142 (1988) ("Nonprofit hospitals are often
regarded as better for society than for-profit hospitals precisely because they aspire to, and often
do, achieve virtue.").
207. For the same reason, this theory addresses the universality criterion by seeking to justify
both types of exemption. It also has the potential to explain a number of the restrictions on these
exemptions such as the prohibition on lobbying and the restraint on unfair competition, because
these restrictions are apparently designed to protect the public's interest. This theory also
comports with the historical consistency theory to the extent that it draws from the notion of
public benefit that exists in charitable trust law. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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would be lost without the exemption. Without this "but for" connection, the economic benefit of tax exemption is a windfall. In the context of hospitals, it is necessary to ask first, why voluntaries are
preferred to proprietaries, and second, why the exemption is needed to
secure this preference. These two inquiries mirror the "worthiness"
and "neediness" components of the deservedness criterion discussed
earlier. The extensive literature devoted to both the theoretical and
the empirical dimensions of these two inquiries reveals no support for
the proposition that whatever social benefits are provided by the nonprofit form in medicine would disappear absent a tax exemption.
Scholars of the nonprofit enterprise have long been fascinated with
the hospital industry because it provides an intriguing mix of all three
sectors of the economy operating in tandem: proprietary, government,
and nonprofit firms.20 8 These scholars have developed several competing theories to explain why nonprofit hospitals have historically outnumbered for-profits. 2" Some explanations relate to a plausible
community benefit, while others do not. The theories that find no
inherent benefit in the nonprofit form directly refute the worthiness
component of the community benefit theory; those that support the
notion of social benefit inherent in the nonprofit form must still pass
the "but for" (neediness) component of the deservedness criterion.
1) Negative Theories of Nonprofit Dominance
Theories that are neutral or adverse to nonprofits discern no rationale for preferring this organizational form in medicine, observing that
health care is no more ethically incompatible with profit motivation
than are other essential goods and services, such as food, shelter, and
transportation. 1 0 These nonprofit skeptics offer essentially two rationales for the dominance of the nonprofit form. First, some theorists
blame the tax exemption and other forms of unjustified governmental
favoritism for the prevalence of nonprofit hospitals.2" Nonprofit
208. Over the past fifty years, the relative mix of these three sectors has remained remarkably
stable, as follows (in number of beds): public (governmental) hospitals-20% to 25%; voluntary
hospitals-around 70%; proprietary hospitals-from 5% to 10%. J. HOLLINGSWORTH & E.
HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 25, at 20-21.
209. For an historical overview of nonprofit dominance, see Marmor, supra note 27, at
321-25.
210. P. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 198, 218 (2d ed. 1983) ("[If] it is immoral to
profit from sickness, why then can people profit from hunger and the need for shelter?");
Hansmann, supra note 11, at 880-81; Sloan, supra note 142, at 109 ("[Mlost physicians, dentists,
optometrists, and pharmacists work for proprietary firms, that many nursing homes are forprofit, [and] drug and medical devices are manufactured by such firms .... ").
211. See In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives Bill 85-H-7748, 519 A.2d
578 (R.I. 1987) (upholding the constitutionality of proposed legislation that would deny licensing
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skeptics therefore characterize the exemption for hospitals as an
anachronism that remains "in large part as a consequence of institutional inertia,"2 t2 or even as a mindless subsidy that perpetrates a
"fraud" on the public.2 3
Others maintain the "parasitic hypothesis" that nonprofit hospitals
proliferate because doctors prefer nonprofits for reasons of economic
to publicly traded health care facilities); Bays, Why Most Private Hospitals are Nonprofit, 2 J.
POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 366, 367 (1983) (the National Labor Relations Act explicitly
exempted nonprofit hospitals until 1974); id. at 377 ("[H]ospital planning agencies appear to
have a bias against for-profit hospitals, according to anecdotal evidence."); id. ("[iln some
states[,] . .. Blue Cross originally refused reimbursement to for-profit hospitals or reimbursed
them at a lower rate than . . . nonprofit hospitals," a pattern that the original Medicare
reimbursement formula copied); Foster, Hospitals and the Choice of OrganizationalForm, 3 FIN.
ACCOUNTABILITY & MGMT. 343, 353-54 (1987) (discussing various barriers to entry by forprofits); Hall, supra note 22, at 509-17 (discussing the inhibiting effect that the corporate practice
of medicine doctrine has on proprietary enterprise in health care); Marmor, Schlesinger, &
Smithey, supra note 28, at 224-27 (discussing the preferential treatment nonprofits receive from
the Hill-Burton hospital construction program and from Blue Cross/Blue Shield); Steinwald &
Neuhauser, The Role of the ProprietaryHospital,35 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 817, 835 n.27 (1970)
(documenting the preferential treatment nonprofits receive from hospital planning agencies);
Note, The Quality of Mercy: "CharitableTorts" and Their Continuing Immunity, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1382 (1987) (documenting the modified survival of charitable tort immunity for nonprofit
hospitals). See generally Clark, supra note 10, at 1474.
Empirical evidence fails to either confirm or refute the hypothesis that the exemption alone
accounts for a significant portion of nonprofit hospital market share. The only study on point
concluded, using 1975 data, that the property tax exemption has a modest differential effect
(accounting for 6.3% of the nonprofit market share in an average state) while the corporate tax
exemption has almost no effect. Hansmann, supra note 159, at 76-77. The quality of the data
supporting these findings, however, fails to meet standard tests for statistical significance. Id.
212. Hansmann, The Evolving Law of Nonprofit Organizations: Do Current Trends Make
Good Policy?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 807, 814 (1989); see also Foster, supra note 211, at
353-54.
213. Clark, supra note 10, at 1447. Clark does not squarely endorse these terms-he uses
them only to characterize what he describes as the "exploitation hypothesis;" but he is clearly
more sympathetic to this hypothesis than the competing "fiduciary hypothesis." An even more
forthright critic is Hyman, supra note 51, at 374 ("By disguising themselves as non-exploitative
agents, the nonprofit hospitals add deceit to their offenses.").
Herzlinger and Krasker are perhaps the most notorious critics of nonprofits. They claim to
document that "nonprofits have not fulfilled their social promise" and "do more to maximize the
welfare of the physicians who are their main consumers." Herzlinger & Krasker, supra note 143,
at 104. Further, they contend that "many emotional protests against for-profits may be attempts
by the medical profession to preserve a cozy arrangement." Id. To the extent that this study
relies on empirical findings rather than on theoretical assumptions, it has been subject to sharp
attack. See, e.g., Reinhardt, FlawedMethods CrippleStudy on Not-For-Profits, HOSPITALS, Apr.
20, 1987, at 136 (suggesting that this study would not meet the standards required of "a
Princeton undergraduate [who] proposed to perform this sort of analysis" and accusing the
authors of "bend[ing] empirical findings to preconceived notions"); N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1987, at
Dl, col. 2, D8, col. 5 ("The authors' bias for privatization screams out from every page of the
study. I'm concerned by the apparent attempt to propagate personal bias in the guise of science."
(quoting health economist Uwe Reinhardt)). There is, however, no dispute that Herzlinger and
Krasker accurately reflect a respectable theoretical position.
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self-interest inconsistent with socially optimal patient care. The two
principal theories2 14 that rely on physician self-interest are the "physician control theory" and the "managerial prestige theory." These differ in that the first posits physicians' financial interest as the primary
determinant of hospital organization and operation, whereas the second views physician interest as derivative of nonprofit managers' util-

ity function.

215

The physician control theory holds that physicians prefer nonprofits
because this institutional form tends to increase physicians' control
over the financial affairs of hospitals by virtue of the absence of any
shareholders with overriding or competing authority. 216 The resulting
managerial laxity is said to allow doctors to control their competitors'
access to the medical staff or to direct hospital pricing decisions to
2 17
their own advantage.
The "managerial prestige" theory of nonprofit preference posits that
physicians enjoy derivative benefits from the way in which nonprofit
managers naturally tend to behave. According to one leading explanation, "the utility of hospital administrators is a function of the status
214. Another "negative" theory for nonprofit preference on the part of physicians posits
simply that physicians benefit from the exemption itself, as well as from other preferential forms
of social subsidy such as volunteer labor and research funding. Bays, supra note 211, at 377
(these various subsidies "lower the total cost of the complementary hospital inputs and therefore
increase the price that physicians can charge" across the board) Because this theory is
derivative of other preferential phenomena discussed elsewhere, see supra note 211, it is not given
independent treatment here, although it may represent the most convincing reason for the
nonprofit preferences of doctors. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
215. See generally P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 198, at 212-23.
216. Pauly & Redisch, The Not-For-Profit Hospital as a Physicians' Cooperative, 63 AM.
ECON. REv. 87 (1973); see also Blumstein & Sloan, Antitrust and Hospital Peer Review, L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spr. 1988, at 7, 19-20.

217. Bays, supra note 211, at 377 ("[P]hysicians as a group prefer nonprofit hospitals not
because they are allergic to the notion of profit, but because restrictions against for-profit
hospitals have been one way of controlling entry."); Clark, supra note 10, at 1436-37, 1441-47.
This explanation is flawed on two counts. First, to a large degree, doctors prefer not to be
involved in hospital financial matters. Thus it has been said that they use their influence
purposefully to avoid the day-to-day details of hospital management. Hall, supra note 22, at 440.
Second, to the extent doctors do desire control, private standards of hospital accreditation--on
which the medical profession has a major influence-guarantee largely the same degree of
control over both types of hospitals. Id. at 528-30; Majone, Professionalism and Nonprofit
Organizations 8 J. HEALTH POL., POL'y & LAW 639, 654 (1984). Even absent these standards,
there is no solid documentation that nonprofit hospitals give more managerial control to doctors.
See P. STARR, supra note 35, at 165 ("Oddly enough, proprietary hospitals [during the first half
of the century] were one of the main ways of resisting corporate domination and establishing
professional control."); Alexander, Morrisey & Shortell, Physician Participation in the
Administration and Governance of System andFreestandingHospitals: A Comparison by Type of
Ownership, in INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, FOR PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 402, 408

(B. Gray ed. 1986) (for-profits "appear to have greater physician representation on hospital
governing boards").
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of the hospitals in which they serve" and "the status of a hospital is
assumed to vary directly with the range of services available and the
extent to which expensive and highly specialized equipment and personnel... are available." 2' 18 Nonprofit hospitals are thought to spend
more than for-profits on physician and patient amenities because they
are required to retain their earnings within the institution. In economic jargon, it is said that nonprofit institutions are "volume maximizers" or "output maximizers," rather than profit maximizers.21 9
The same notion is captured in the colloquialism accusing hospital
managers of suffering from an "edifice complex." However expressed,
the result is that nonprofit hospitals are charged with a "bias against
producing low-quality products, even if they are demanded by a certain segment of the population," and are blamed for "the often
maligned duplication of sophisticated and expensive equipment," both
of which represent a "misallocation of resources."220
2) Positive Theories of Nonprofit Dominance
Theories that support nonprofit enterprise in medicine hold that this
organizational form predominates because it is preferred by patients
and doctors for socially valued reasons. One such theory is drawn
from Professor Hansmann's pioneering work in which he explains that
218. Lee, A Conspicuous Production Theory of HospitalBehavior,28 S. ECON. J. 48, 49 (1971).
219. Newhouse, Towarda Theory of Nonprofit Institutions:An Economic Model of a Hospital,
60 AM. EON. REV. 64, 64-65 (1970).
220. Id. at 69, 70, 73. This theory cannot completely explain the predominance of nonprofit
hospitals because at bottom the managerial motives it posits are not fundamentally different than
those prevailing at proprietary hospitals. The theory of managerial prestige attributes hospital
behavior to that which pleases doctors, because the size and quality of a hospital's medical staff is
the principal determinant of its prestige. See Lee, supra note 218, at 49 ("In order to attract and
maintain physicians, [nonprofit] hospitals are responsive to the demand of their medical staffs.").
But the size and quality of the medical staff also determine a hospital's profitability, so one would
expect largely the same physician-pleasing behavior from both sectors.
Another branch of the managerial behavior theory is based on the observation that the
convention of separate billings for doctor and hospital services masks the economic reality that
the patient is paying a joint price for a single product. Accordingly, doctors have an incentive to
prefer the organization that charges the least, leaving most of the joint price for them to capture.
Nonprofits are thought to price lower, at least for hospital services that have a large physician
participation such as surgery, because they are less concerned about profit margins. See Bays,
supra note 211, at 372; Hansmann, supra note 11, at 866.
This explanation assumes, however, that nonprofits are less interested in making money than
for-profits. In fact, nonprofits also desire to earn a surplus; they simply have different "utility
functions," i.e., different uses for the money, such as facility expansion. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra
note 198, at 215-18. It also assumes that market constraints have traditionally operated to cap
the total price for the "joint product." In fact, the hospital price historically has imposed no
constraint on doctors' charges because independent sources of reimbursement have not been
sufficiently price sensitive.
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patrons tend to favor the nonprofit organizational form when complex
and difficult-to-evaluate services are involved. Patrons prefer nonprofits because they have less trust in firms whose profit incentive provides
them a stronger bias to behave opportunistically. Hansmann maintains nonprofits enjoy greater public confidence because a "nondistribution constraint" attaches to nonprofit status, precluding anyone
from having a private interest in the organization's economic performance and requiring the institution to retain any net income to further
its public service mission. 2 '
Hansmann's trust theory for the existence of nonprofit enterprise
has superficial appeal in the medical arena because health care is a
service that is difficult for consumers to evaluate. 2 2 It is thus surprising that Hansmann finds his theory a poor fit in the hospital industry.
221. The strongest application of this "trust theory" for the existence of nonprofit enterprises
explains why donors choose to make contributions exclusively to nonprofits when they desire to
support traditional charitable services such as disaster relief and care for the poor. Hansmann
characterizes donors as "purchasing" these relief services for others, and observes that, as a
consequence of the third-party nature of this transaction, donors are not in a position to monitor
whether and how effectively the desired aid is rendered. See generally Hansmann, supra note 11.
Red Cross, for instance, is in the business of "selling" disaster relief services to contributors for
delivery to third-party beneficiaries. As the contributors generally have no way of determining
the quality of Red Cross's relief services or whether such services actually are performed, the
"consumer" (the contributor) cannot engage in comparative shopping. As a result, the consumer
is better off buying such services from a nonprofit entity, since the prohibition on the distribution
of profits by a nonprofit to private individuals (the prohibition against private inurement) gives
the consumer some assurance that the money "paid" for the service will actually be used for the
service.
This trust explanation also holds for two-party commercial transactions in which consumers
purchase services for themselves that are difficult to evaluate because of the intangible nature of
the services. Prominent examples include child care and education. See B. WEISBROD, supra
note 8, at 6, 23; Hansmann, supra note 11, at 862-72. As these services are typically purchased
on behalf of someone else in the family, they too are not pure two-party transactions, which may
partially explain the difficulty of monitoring these services. Krashinsky, Transaction Costs and a
Theory of Nonprofit the Organization, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPRoFrr INSTITUTIONS 114,
117 (S. Rose-Ackerman ed. 1986).
For a partial rebuttal of the trust theory and a development of a theory that explains the
existence of mutual benefit organizations, the other major category of nonprofits, see generally
Ellman, supra note 11.
222. See Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care 53 AM. EcON.
REv. 941 (1963). Health care is difficult to monitor because of its inherently complex and
qualitatively subjective nature, and because an individual patient rarely has an opportunity to
experience how an alternative provider would have treated the same ailment. See B. WEISBROD,
supra note 8, at 46. It might also be observed that health care is usually purchased through
third-party transactions, by virtue of the payment coming from the insurance company, but this
is an inappropriate characterization for these purposes because the insurer merely indemnifies the
patient (or hospital) for the choice of care made and does not itself make the purchase. However,
to the extent that insurance companies are becoming increasingly selective in which hospitals to
cover, as through so-called "preferred provider organizations" (PPOs), then perhaps there is
some merit to this third-party characterization.
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The reason the trust theory does not readily extend to hospitals is that
patients rarely undertake to evaluate hospital services independently.
Instead, they rely heavily on the judgment of their physicians in selecting a hospital. Indeed, it is sometimes said that the true consumers of
hospital services are doctors, not patients.2 23 Because patients tend to
follow the advice of learned intermediaries, the difficulty of lay evaluation of hospital care is corrected without adopting the nonprofit form.
This explanation stops short of a full examination of the trust theory's application to hospitals because it fails to inquire whether doctors also have socially valued reasons to prefer nonprofit hospitalsreasons equivalent to consumer trust. According to one body of scholarship, doctors and, by derivation, patients, do have such reasons.
Patients trust their doctors' choice of hospitals in part because doctors
are perceived to be guided by a professional ethos binding them to
ethical norms of fiduciary responsibility to their patients. Hence, doctors have good reason to promote practice environments that foster
this professional ethos. Nonprofits are considered "superior from the
point of view of professional ideology and practice" 224 because
"[m]any features that are generally considered to be specific characteristics of the professions-altruism, autonomy, an emphasis on quality
of service, and a certain anti-market and anti-bureaucratic ethoshave also been singled out, quite independently, as the raisonsd'etre of
nonprofit institutions. "225 Nonprofit hospitals stress these values
because they tend to attract the managers whose values correspond
with those of the founder. 22 6 For these reasons, "the nonprofit nature
of a service organization tends to reinforce the fiduciary component in
the relationship with clients, thus increasing professional authority
and autonomy. "227 This professional ethic theory contrasts with the
physician control theories already discussed in that it maintains that
223. See Hansmann, supra note 11, at 866-68; Newhouse, supra note 219, at 72.
224. Majone, supra note 217, at 639.
225. Id. at 640.
226. See D. YOUNG, IF NOT FOR PROFIT, FOR WHAT? (1983) (developing this sorting theory
in some detail).
227. Majone, supra note 217, at 654. The same point is made with negative emphasis as
follows:
[P]rofit-making organizations do not possess the appropriate characteristics required for the
social control function in the health care system. This is so mainly because the decisionmaking mechanism in profit-making organizations is inherently at cross purposes with the
unique characteristics of the health care segment of society-namely, the unusual and
personal nature of the physician-patient relationship and the centrality of health and disease
to individuals and to society.
Nonprofit organizations, on the other hand, do seem to possess-at least potentially-the
social control mechanism required to protect individual patients and society.
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physicians are primarily concerned with the clinical as opposed to the
financial control of their practice.2 2 8
Although this theory supports the notion that there is an inherent
social benefit in the nonprofit form, the theory fails to satisfy the neediness ("but for") component of the deservedness criterion. The reason
for this failure is that why nonprofits exist is a fundamentally different
question than whether they should be exempt,22 9 a point that many
writings on the subject fail to recognize. 23 ° Even assuming that the
favorable view of nonprofit hospitals is accurate and that it is possible
to confirm the production of sufficient net benefits to earn the exemp-

tion's subsidy, the deservedness criterion would still not be met
because, a priori, there is no reason to assume that nonprofits would
not continue to predominate absent the subsidy. Indeed, there is every
reason to suppose the contrary. 231 The favorable view holds that nonGreenlick, Profit and Nonprofit Organizationsin Health Care: A SociologicalPerspective, in IN
SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH: THE MISSION OF VOLUNTARY HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS 155,

175 (1988).
228. Majone, supranote 217, at 654 ("Professionals in for-profit organizations must submit to
managerial controls, enforced by a central monitor who is responsible to the stockholders and is
motivated to overrule the professionals whenever their interests and attitudes come into conflict
with the goal of profit maximization.").
229. B. WEISBROD, supra note 8, at 88 ("Public policy can be devised simply'to permit
nonprofit organizations to exist; to permit nonprofits to compete with for-profit firms; to provide
for public subsidies for nonprofits; or to provide for specific forms of subsidies ...").
230. Eg., Falcone & Warren, supra note 18, at 740 (justifying the exemption because
"Americans have demanded pluralism in hospital care," as if the issue were whether nonprofit
hospitals should exist at all); Guggenheimer, Making the Case for Voluntary Health Care
Institutions. Policy Theories and Legal Approaches, in IN SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH: THE
MISSION OF VOLUNTARY HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS 35, 36-41 (1988) (defending the
exemption merely by observing why nonprofit hospitals should exist); Horwitz, supra note 200,
at 558-59 (arguing for "retention of the nonprofit concept," again, as if the issue were whether
nonprofit hospitals should be banned).
231. Hyperbolic fears, sometimes expressed as "complete proprietary corporate control over
the distribution of American health care," are entirely unfounded. Dolenc & Dougherty, DRGs:
The Counterrevolutionin FinancingHealth Care, HASTINGS CENTER REP. June 1985, at 19, 27.
"[Tihe American people never came close to giving up their voluntary community hospitals and
private medical practitioners for an investor-dominated, professional management structure
whose goal has been the maximization of profit." Ginsberg, For-ProfitMedicine:A Reassessment,
319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 757, 760 (1988); accord Marmor, supra note 27, at 348 ("Both sides view
the recent growth of the for-profit sector as foreshadowing a system-wide transformation-and
perhaps even a complete conversion to proprietary auspices--of the health industry. In fact, it
seems quite unlikely that such radical changes will occur."); id. at 320-33 (rise of proprietary
hospitals is only a minor fluctuation in cyclical pattern that has prevailed throughout the
century); Seay, Vladeck, Kramer, Gould & McCormack, HoldingFastto the Good: The Future of
the Voluntary Hospital, 23 INQUIRY 253 (1986) (for-profit hospitals continue to operate at the
industry's periphery; no major change in their relative numbers for 20 years). The hysteria over
for-profit medicine has resulted more from the rapid consolidation of proprietary hospitals into
large corporate chains than from an absolute increase in their proportion of the market. Even
the consolidation phenomenon is overstated because nonprofits have more than twice as many
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profits prevail in medicine because this is the socially valued preference of doctors and patients. But if there is no obstacle to effectuating
these preferences, then there is no reason to subsidize them.2 3 2 In
these circumstances, a subsidy provides a complete windfall.2 33
This observation, first made clearly by Professor Hansmann, holds
true for any number of services that we might prefer to purchase from
nonprofit firms, owing to our greater trust that they act less opportunistically.2 34 Since consumers are free to make this purchasing decision themselves and have every incentive to do so, they need no
encouragement from the government. Any such support would not
only be wasteful, it would inappropriately hinder those whose preferences differ by lessening or eliminating their access to a proprietary
provider.
It is surprising that this point is not better recognized. Elsewhere,
government is not in the habit of paying large amounts of scarce public funds as gratuitous rewards for good deeds.23 5 It is socially desirable to mow our lawns, but no one thinks to reward us for this
community benefit, nor do we think to ask for any such reward. No
more should the government forego billions of dollars in revenue from
nonprofit hospitals for the simple reason that society values their services. In sum, the community benefit theory fails, not only because of
the difficulties it encounters in documenting the amorphous nature of
the claimed benefits, but also because the theory is insensitive to
whether a public subsidy is necessary to produce those benefits.
Obstacles to the optimal provision of some nonprofit goods and services may exist, but the theory does not attempt to identify them.
3) The EmpiricalEvidence
The conclusion that the positive theories of nonprofit dominance fail
the deservedness criterion is bolstered by extensive literature exploring
beds in corporate chains as for-profits, a number that has almost doubled since 1970. Yoder,
supra note 11, at 27-30.
232. Professor Jensen made this point over 50 years ago:
[T]he service deserving [a tax subsidy] must be incapable of being fostered adequately on a
commercial, quid pro quo basis.... Transportation is a necessary public service, but it is not,
ordinarily, necessary to subsidize it. The state has no interest in extending it beyond the
point where the beneficiaries will pay for it.
Jensen, supra note 3, at 148.
233. See S. SURREY & P. MCDANIEL, supra note 12, at 82.
234. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
235. The Minneapolis Star once asked facetiously: "Is just being a 'nice guy' enough to get
you on the property-tax free list?" A. BALK, supra note 1, at 81; see also Stone, supra note 9, at
45.
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the empirical dimensions of this nonprofit/for-profit hospital debate.
By ,,and large, the literature demonstrates that the two sectors are
remarkably similar in their performance characteristics. The overriding consensus of these studies is that "available evidence on differences
between for-profit and not-for-profit health care organizations is not
sufficient to justify a recommendation that investor ownership of
health care organizations be either opposed or supported by public
policy."2' 36 For the most significant measures of hospital performance-quality and cost 237 -- there is little or no difference between the
two sectors. 238 Likewise, for the more amorphous grouping of services
referred to as community programs-health screening, community
education, immunizations, temporary housing, transportation, and the
like-nonprofit and for-profit hospitals perform approximately the
same. 239 Hospital behavior is remarkably uniform because the two
sectors share identical sources of financing: private and public health

insurance.24'

The operational incentives created by these sources of

236. Yoder, supra note 11, at 191.
237. J. HOLLINGSWORTH & E. HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 25, at 111-14; Yoder, supra
note 11, at 76-77 (nonprofits are somewhat less costly, controlling for size and patient mix, but
the annual increase in costs for the two sectors is the same); id. at 138 ("Evidence now available
does not support the fear that for-profit health care is incompatible with quality of care, nor the
belief that public ownership might provide some assurance of quality."); Schlesinger, Marmor &
Smithey, supra note 27, at 437; Sloan, supranote 142, at 130 ("In summary, empirical research to
date suggests that for-profit and voluntary hospitals are quite similar in terms of accounting
cost."); id. at 132 ("Considering results from all of the studies, it appears that efficiency
differences between private not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals are small, at most.").
A recent study, however, found that mortality rates were significantly higher at for-profit
hospitals in 1986 (121 deaths per 1,000 patients, versus 114 for nonprofits). Hartz, Krakauer,
Kuhn, Young, Jacobsen, Gay, Muenz, Katzoff, Bailey, & Rimm, Hospital Characteristicsand
Mortality Rates, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1720, 1720 (1989). There is some question, though,
whether this study properly adjusts for severity of illness. See Green, Wintfeld, Sharkey, &
Passman, The Importance ofSeverity of Illness in Assessing HospitalMortality,263 J. A.M.A. 241
(1990) (HCFA's mortality data, on which the prior study was based, "does not adequately
account for patient severity").
238. See J. HOLLINGSWORTH & E. HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 25, at 86, 116 ("An
analysis of the behavior of hospitals in the three sectors [including public hospitals] during the
past fifty years demonstrates that they have become increasingly similar. The differences that
persist are small in comparison with the vast differences that existed fifty years ago."); Ermann &
Gabel, Multihospital Systems" Issues and Empirical Findings, HEALTH AFF., Spr. 1984, at 50
(review of over 400 studies and articles; concludes the two sectors are largely the same); Horwitz,
supra note 200, at 531 ("The nonprofit hospital offers, looks like, acts like, and imitates the forprofit hospital in every way except for the distribution of excess revenue ....
); Marmor, supra
note 27, at 334-39.
239. The GAO found that a majority of both types of hospitals offered a wide range of
community services, but that nonprofits are modestly more likely to do so than for-profits. GAO
REPORT, supra note 143, at 4. However, nonprofit hospitals "were equally likely to charge a fee
for community services [and] more likely to cover the costs of providing the services." Id.
240. See generally J. HOLLINGSWORTH & E. HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 25.
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revenue tend to swamp whatever contrasting incentives exist by virtue
of organizational form, a likely result in any industry.24 '
Nonprofit defenders observe that these studies were conducted
before private and public reimbursement systems placed hospitals
under great financial pressure. With the advent of increasingly stringent reimbursement controls, the defenders claim the performance of
the two sectors is likely to diverge as proprietary hospitals sacrifice
quality of care and comprehensiveness of services for profitability.24 2
It is, however, a matter of pure assertion that nonprofit hospitals will
not be equally sensitive to reimbursement constraints. This assertion
is belied by the very premise that the behavior of both sectors has been
molded into similar patterns in the past by financial considerations.24 3
Even if nonprofit hospitals respond differently, it is at least arguable
whether a response is socially desirable if it ignores the intent of these
reimbursement reforms to foster market-like incentives in health care
and to eliminate excessive duplication, unnecessary services, and inefficient cross-subsidization. Thus, what some observers will characterize
as "profiteering," others will view as necessary economizing.
Defenders of the voluntary sector respond that the assertions of similarity are flawed because the studies control for an excessive number
of variables in a manner that masks important differences between the
two sectors. This is persuasive. For instance, it may be the case that,
controlling for facility size and location, the two sectors have very similar service mixes, but hospital size and location are not irrelevant or
purely exogenous hospital characteristics; they are important variables
that hospitals affect by how they choose to spend surplus revenue. 2"
241. Sloan, supra note 142, at 138-39.
242. E.g., Relman, supra note 159, at 372:
Now that we appear to be on the threshold of a new era of prospective payment, incentives
will probably change, and the profitablity of the investor-owned hospitals may come to
depend on their ability to control costs rather than on ... the manipulation of prices. It will
be interesting to see what happens then.
243. See J. HOLLINGSWORTH & E. HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 25, at 128-29 (nonprofits
and proprietaries both respond to reimbursement limits with automated management,
elimination of unprofitable services, diversification, aggressive marketing, and reduced charity
care); Friedman & Shortell, The FinancialPerformanceof Selected Investor-Ownedand Not-ForProfitSystem HospitalsBefore and After Medicare ProspectivePayment, 23 HEALTH SERVS. RES.
237 (1988) (ownership type had no independent effect on initial hospital response to Medicare
payment reform).
244. As explained in Ermann & Gabel, supra note 238, at 59:
The studies suffer from one serious methodological flaw. [Multi-hospital] systems do not
randomly choose where to locate, but self-select into favorable market areas ... with lower
Medicaid and indigent patient loads. Systems also purchase or build hospitals with certain
services and size, avoiding large tertiary care hospitals with heavy research and teaching
commitments. Studies which compare an experimental group (system hospitals) with a
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Facility size and location have independent importance because these
characteristics do not vary randomly across the two sectors, and they
are positively associated with hospitals' level of technological sophistication and the number of unprofitable services. Because nonprofit
hospitals tend disproportionately to be larger in size and to locate in
urban, inner-city areas, they tend to have a proportionately greater
number of novel, expensive, and sometimes unprofitable services, such
as premature nurseries, burn units, and magnetic resonance imaging.245 For similar reasons, the two sectors differ even more dramati-

cally in their support of medical education and research. 24 There is
not complete agreement, however, over the significance of even these
performance differences.24 7
These hotly contested issues need not be resolved in a manner that
attracts substantial consensus. It is sufficient for present purposes to
observe that neither the positive theories of nonprofit dominance nor
the empirical evidence supports the proposition that, absent tax
exemption, nonprofit medical care would lose whatever superiority of
quality or ethic that it offers. Without showing that the exemption
overcomes a barrier that creates suboptimal production of the desired
service, it is equally likely that the subsidy causes too high a level of
production-in short, too much of a good thing. Accordingly, the
community benefit theory fails the deservedness criterion.
matched control group (independent hospitals) may find no differences simply because the
matching process eliminated hospitals providing different services or teaching programs.
245. See J. HOLLINGSWORTH & E. HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 25, at 108-10; Schlesinger,
Marmor & Smithey, supra note 27, at 437; Shortell, Morrison, Hughes, Friedman, Coverdill &
Berg, The Effects of Hospital Ownership on NontraditionalServices, 5 HEALTH Ai., 97, 101
(1986) (nonprofits provide 50% more "alternative services" than for-profits; for-profits offer 60%
fewer unprofitable services than nonprofits).
246. J. HOLLINGSWORTH & E. HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 25, at 109 (only 1% of forprofits have residency programs, compared to 22% of nonprofits); Yoder, supra note 11, at 142.
247. See Yoder, supra note 11, at 142-43 (observing that lower level of research may be due
to past refusal of funding sources-including the National Institutes of Health, the nation's
largest source of biomedical research funds-to support for-profit institutions); id. (in the last
couple of years, since this discrimination has ceased, "investor-owned hospital companies have
greatly increased their involvement in education and research"); id. at 145 (when for-profit
hospitals have tried in the past to acquire teaching hospitals, they met with intense opposition;
citing Hospital Corp. of America's attempt to buy Harvard's McLean Hospital); Hansmann,
supra note 159, at 80 (suggesting that differences in locational preference may result from the
exemption itself simply because the property tax exemption makes higher-taxed, inner-city land
more attractive to nonprofits than to for-profits); Simpson & Lee, supra note 141, at 780
(concerning unprofitable services, "given the well-documented excess hospital capacity in the
U.S., we are skeptical of any argument that maintaining services for which there is insufficient
demand constitutes a public service"); id (superior educational and research programs do not
earn the exemption because they receive substantial independent support from public sources).
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Proportionality

In addition to failing the deservedness criterion, the community
benefit theory has difficulty meeting the proportionality criterion, primarily because the less tangible benefits to which it refers are either
difficult to quantify in monetary terms or are inherently unquantifiable. There is no methodologically sound way to measure the soft values that inhere in the claim of a superior nonprofit medical ethic.
Without such quantification, it is impossible to verify whether society
is receiving its money's worth from the exemption.
David Seay, of the United Hospital Fund, claims to have devised a
quantifiable measure of commitment to community values by articulating the "key elements of a community benefit standard for hospitals
...in quite specific terms... [that] demonstrate that... the notion of
'community benefit' [is] not necessarily soft or ambiguous."2'4 8 These
"key elements," however, simply ask hospitals to identify community
needs, develop programs to meet those needs, and make changes in the
hospital's mission statement, governance structure, and organization
necessary to carry out a program of community responsiveness. These
standards do not quantify the community needs that are met and,
more importantly, do not measure whether nonprofit hospitals are
outperforming for-profits in meeting community needs.24 9
As Professor Bittker has expressed, "Lacking a method for measuring these appealing but elusive virtues, one must perforce rely on intuition in comparing the achievements of private charities with those of
government [and profit-making enterprises], when they are performing
similar functions." 2 5 Not every decision of government need be made
248. Seay & Sigmond, supra note 39, at 30.
249. Indeed this statement of the community benefit standard describes precisely, although in
somewhat foreign terminology, what for-profit hospitals do when they sell their services to the
community. See Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 276 (Utah
1985):
[The defendant hospitals] confuse the element of gift to the community.., with the concept
of community benefit, which any of countless private enterprises might provide. We have
no quarrel with the assertion that [the hospitals] meet great and important needs of persons
within their communities for medical care. Yet this ... cannot be the sole distinguishing
characteristic that leads to an automatic property tax exemption .... Such a "usefulness"
rule would have to be equally applied to for-profit hospitals... which also provide medical
services to their patients.
250. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 8, 332-33; see also R. STEVENS, supra note 35, at 354
("[H]istory has shown that these words [community, voluntary and charity] have long had
vague, emotive meanings. They have expressed a rhetoric of intention.., rather than any exact
program or method."); Bromberg, CharitableHospital,supra note 40, at 248-51 (characterizing
the community benefit standard as "existential"); Ginsberg, supra note 54, at 315 ("It would be
difficult to state a vaguer test than 'other purposes the accomplishment of which is beneficial to
the community'...."); Wikler, supra note 206, at 153 ("Hospitals ... aspiring to virtue face
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by calculator, particularly social policy decisions made by Congress,

but a standard that relies entirely on intuition is inappropriate in an
administrative arena that requires courts and agencies to apply a legislative mandate. 25 1 The degree of legislative abdication inherent in the
community benefit standard is particularly troubling considering that
it leaves to tax collectors-rather than departments of government
legitimately concerned with substantive public policy-the task of
determining what constitutes socially worthy activity across the broad
range of nonprofit enterprise. 2 This arrangement has a high potential for producing capricious results, 2 53 a potential that has been realized in the hospital context. The IRS has ruled, for instance, that
hospital cafeteria sales are exempt because they keep doctors close to
the hospital in the event of an emergency, but that income from a
hospital's laboratory services for its doctors' office patients is not
exempt even though the hospital provides this service as a convenience
to keep the doctors in an adjoining medical office building. 254 Among
further problems in defining and calibrating virtuous character. It is an elusive concept.");
Reinhardt, Charity at a Price, N.Y. Times Book Rev., Aug. 20, 1989, at 14 (The "ideals of,
private charity and voluntarism... act as the opiate of the American public, deluding a basically
decent people into believing that ...deeply troubling social problems requiring whole dollars for
their solution can .. .be adequately addressed with just two bits' worth of trickle-down
generosity ....").Even defenders of the exemption concede that "self-satisfaction and selfrighteousness... is perhaps an occupational hazard" among nonprofit hospital administrators,
who tend to "have an almost reflexive belief in the inherent superiority of voluntary health care."
Seay & Vladeck, supra note 39, at 4-5.
251. See generally Dripps, DelegationandDue Process, 1988 DUKE L.J. 657; Pierce, The Role
of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEx. L. REv. 469 (1985);
Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine"Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. Rv.
1223 (1985); Symposium, The Uneasy ConstitutionalStatus of the AdministrativeAgencies: PartI,
Delegation of Powers to Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U.L. REV.295 (1987). The Supreme

Court recently observed that such a role is particularly troubling with respect to the religious
exemption because "inquiry into the particular contributions of each religious group 'would
introduce an element of governmental evaluation and standards as to the worth of particular
social welfare programs, thus producing a kind of continuing day-to-day relationship which the
[first amendment] policy of [religious] neutrality seeks to minimize.'" Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 22 n.2 (1989).
252. Persons, Osborn & Feldman, supra note 2, at 1942 (IRS is forced to become the "arbiter
of the public good"); Warren, Krattenmaker & Snyder, supra note 119, at 302, 309 (describing as
"legislative abdication" the decision to leave these important social policy decisions to the lowest
level of the administrative echelon); see Fox & Schaffer, Tax Policy as Social Policy: Cafeteria

Plans, 1978-1985, 12 J. HEALTH PoL., POL'Y & LAW 609, 633, 653 (1987) (exploring this
phenomenon in the context of tax deductions for health insurance).
253. See Thompson, supra note 80, at 56 (accusing the IRS of having decided "to abandon
completely any attempt to administer the exemption and [having decided to] treat cases on an ad
hoc, nonanalytical basis... using definitional strategies based on subjective, unarticulated factors
rather than on objective, verifiable criteria").
254. Rev. Rul. 69-268, 1969-1 C.B. 160; Rev. Rul. 85-110, 1985-2 C.B. 166; see Colombo,
supra note 41, at 514-17.
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exempt organizations generally, the IRS has a long history of ad hoc
and inconsistent determinations concerning which activities must provide free services to qualify for an exemption.2 55
A second reason the community benefit theory of the charitable
exemption abdicates governmental responsibility is that the theory
leaves decisions concerning priorities for spending the subsidy to the
private entities that receive it. Thus, assuming that taxing authorities
are capable of judging which industries are better structured on a nonprofit basis, once this determination is made, any further decisions
about how the subsidy is spent are left to the firm's managers, constrained only by the requirements of maintaining nonprofit status.
Thus, hospital managers can choose to use the subsidy to support
facility refurbishment rather than meet the more pressing need of
treating greater numbers of uninsured patients. This abdication of
national health care policy to private parties is especially bizarre considering the many facets of the health care crisis that demand immediate government redress.2 56 In short, given the inherent difficulty in
quantifying the socially desirable values of the nonprofit form and the
degree of government abdication in administering the exemption,
there can be no assurance that the level of support provided by an
exemption even roughly matches the level of deservedness.
3.

Variants of the Community Benefit Theory

The primary strand of the community benefit theory seeks to justify
selective coverage of nonprofit organizations by maintaining that the
special ethic of nonprofit enterprise is important only in certain activities, and then devising a means to identify those activities-a highly
problematic undertaking. Two variants of the community benefit theory attempt to avoid this difficulty by maintaining that these special
qualities inhere in all nonprofit organizations, in whatever activities
they are engaged. These two variants-the "public trust" theory and
255. Hospitals need not provide any free care except in the emergency room, nursing homes
may refuse uninsured patients at the outset but may not discharge patients for failure to pay,
public interest law firms may receive compensation for only half the costs of their services,
consumer credit counseling agencies must discount all their services, and grocers serving lowincome customers may not charge anything. See B. HOPKINS, supra note 31, at 104 (describing
IRS's "illogical and unfair discrimination" among activities that may charge fees for their
services); Persons, Osborn & Feldman, supra note 2, at 1940, 1941, 1949 (discussing various
rulings and noting a "considerable degree of ad hoc line-drawing by the IRS ... in this area");
Simon, supra note 69, at 85.
256. The two principal aspects of this crisis are uncontrollable health care inflation and 35
million people without any public or private insurance coverage. M. HALL & I. ELLMAN,
HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS IN A NUTSHELL 3-6 (1990).
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the "plowback" theory-might be rejected as merely artful ways of
restating the discredited per se theory drawn from charitable trust
law;2 7 however, because their rationales are different, they require
separate responses.
a.

The Public Trust Theory

The "public trust" variant of the community benefit theory holds
that all legitimate nonprofits earn the charitable exemption by virtue
of state law provisions that impose more stringent organizational and

operational constraints on nonprofit than for-profit enterprises to
ensure increased attention to community interests.25 8 For example,
managers of nonprofit corporations have a fiduciary responsibility to
the public to exercise care in managing the corporation's assets, a public trust duty enforceable by state attorneys general. The exemption
might be viewed as an exchange for the imposition of these greater
public responsibilities.25 9
However, this public trust theory also fails the deservedness test.
Although the law remains somewhat unsettled, nonprofit organizations simply are not under any unique corporate duties. 2 ° Nonprofits
generally owe no greater fiduciary responsibility to the public than forprofits owe to their shareholders. 261 A number of older cases, drawing

by analogy from the law of charitable trusts, have applied heightened

26 2
"trust-like" duties to nonprofit corporations classified as charitable;
but "the modern trend is to apply corporate rather than trust principles in determining the liability of the directors of charitable corpora-

tions, because their functions are virtually indistinguishable from
those of their 'pure' corporate counterparts.

' 26"

The leading decision,

257. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
258. Guggenheimer, supra note 230, at 48-49; Seay & Vladeck, supra note 39, at 15-17.
259. Ellman, supra note 11, at 1006 n.22 (collecting cases). Heightened community
responsiveness by nonprofit hospitals is apparent in West Virginia where nonprofits must draw
40% of their governing board members from designated groups that represent the community at
large. The court that sustained this measure against an equal protection challenge brought by
the nonprofits (who claimed it discriminated in favor of for-profit hospitals) relied in part on the
observation that the tax exemption compensates nonprofits for this organizational burden.
American Hosp. Ass'n v. Hansbarger, 600 F. Supp. 465, 473 (N.D.W.V. 1984), aff'd, 783 F.2d
1184 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820 (1986).
260. The West Virginia statute for hospitals is limited to that activity and that state. See also
Ellman, supra note 11, at 1006 n.23 (discussing the "unusual" California nonprofit law that
adopts a special standard of self-dealing).
261. Ellman, supra note 11, at 1006 n.25; Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit CorporationLaw,
129 U. PA. L. REV.497, 567 (1981).
262. ElIman, supra note 11, at 1006 n.22.
263. Stem v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381
F.Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974). The distinction between trusts and corporations recognizes
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for instance, judged a nonprofit hospital's managers by the same rules
concerning mismanagement and delegation of duties that govern all
corporations. 2 64 Even where this decision is not followed, the additional restrictions placed on "noncharitable" nonprofits do not accrue
to the net benefit of society. Instead, the restrictions exist primarily to
compensate for the fact that nonprofit managers are not subject to
shareholder oversight and therefore they may present a greater risk of
misbehavior than managers of investor-owned companies.26 5
Implicit in much of the argument that underlies the public trust
variant is that nonprofits somehow better represent the entire community's interests precisely because they do not have to answer to private
shareholders. This assumption peculiarly posits that the interests of
shareholders and customers of proprietary establishments differ from
the interest of the public at large. Granting this assumption, nonprofits are under the same distorting influences. Those nonprofits that primarily sell products and services must also satisfy the demands of
their customers. Moreover, nonprofits must respond to the demands
of the investment community because commercial nonprofits still must
rely on borrowed capital to substitute for lack of equity or donated
capital.26 6 The similarity in the sources of operating and capital funds
helps to explain the essentially indistinguishable behavior of the two
hospital sectors,2 67 in particular, their eagerness to earn a profit.26 8
"the fact that corporate directors have many areas of responsibility, while the traditional trustee
is often charged only with the management of the trust funds and can therefore be expected to
devote more time and expertise to that task." Id. at 1013. It may also simply recognize the fact
that it is rational to give the founder of a charity a choice between two organizational forms, one
that is more flexible but less protective than the other.
264. Id.
265. See C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND PoLicy 209 (1988);

Karst, The

Efficiency of the CharitableDollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433,
436 (1960) (charities lack any "interested . . . individual to call the charitable fiduciary to
account"); cf. Hansmann, supra note 262, at 568 (arguing for stricter trust standards for
nonprofits because "the patrons of a nonprofit are generally much less able to look out for
themselves than are the shareholders in a business corporation"). A prime example of such a
compensatory rule is the authority of state attorneys general to challenge nonprofits for breach of
their duties. A second example is a prophylactic rule against self-dealing transactions by
nonprofit directors. See Ellman, supra note 11, at 1007-08.
266. Wikler, supra note 206, at 148:
True, bondholders do not vote, but since institutional behavior must be geared toward
meeting the expectations of future bondholders, the interests and wishes of the investor
community influence hospital behavior without a direct vote. For most intents and
purposes, then, voluntary and for-profit hospitals have become more or less the same ....
267. See supra notes 236-41 and accompanying text.
268. See J.HOLLINGSWORTH & E. HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 25, at 64 ("[I]n the past
two decades it has become increasingly clear that voluntary and public hospitals have similar
motives. Their desire is to acquire reserves, a form of profit, which have become an important
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b.

The "Plow-back" Theory

The plow-back theory represents a second attempt to salvage the
community benefit theory by resurrecting the per se theory of exemption. It argues that all nonprofits deserve a public subsidy because
they plow their income back into a public institution rather than dispersing it to private investors.2 6 9 Professor Atkinson recently published the most sophisticated development of this theory. 7 He argues
that the ongoing devotion of earnings to the institutional goals of any
nonprofit organization is deserving of subsidy because it represents, in
effect, an altruistic decision for nonprofit organizers to forgo profits.
"Under the altruism theory, the presumption would be that any activity carried on altruistically [i.e., on a nonprofit basis] is worthy of
encouragement through tax exemption."27 "The altruism theory
would exempt [any organization whose income] ...is being used to
subsidize consumption by someone other than those who control the
organization.... Under this theory, there would be no inquiry into
the merits of such [consumption], no search for public benefits flowing
'272
from it. The metabenefit of altruistic production would suffice."
There are two crucial flaws in this thoughtful statement of the plowback theory,27 3 both of which implicate the criterion of deservedness.
First, because the theory eschews examination of the worth of theprimary benefits that nonprofits provide (for example, any attempt to
show that nonprofit hospitals are better than for-profits), but instead
relies on the secondary benefits of the nonprofit form, proponents of
this theory must demonstrate why we should value this "metabenefit."
Atkinson balks at this critical juncture. Conceding that "[i]t would be
source of capital expansion in the past."); Yoder, supra note 11, at 86, 185, 202 n.7 (in several
recent years, nonprofit income was proportionately greater than for-profit income); Chang &
Tuckman, The Profits of Not-For-ProfitHospitals, 13 J. HEALTH POL., POL'y & L. 547, 549-50
(1988) (nonprofits earned 14.8% from Medicare in 1985 versus 17.9% by proprietary hospitals).
269. Levinsky, Letter to the Editor,318 Naw ENG. J. MED. 1486 (1988); Mancino, supra note
40, at 1070-71; see Seay & Vladeck, supra note 39, at 17-18.
270. Atkinson, supra note 199.
271. Id. at 629.
272. Id. at 619.
273. In addition, this theory fails the historical consistency and universality criteria. It is not
historically correct because it contradi6ts the established understanding that "charitable"
encompasses a smaller set of activities than do all nonprofits; otherwise the very complex
structure that differentiates among the various forms of tax exemption, see Simon, supra note 69,
would be largely redundant. Universality is not met because the argument that nonprofits
deserve exemption if they put their profits to good use would apply to profits so devoted
regardless of the source of those profits. This theory thus contradicts the imposition of any
"unrelated business income" tax, and would return the law to its pre-1950 stage where
exemption was determined by a "destination-of-income" test. Cf. Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de
Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578 (1924).
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logical for me here to prove that altruism [in the special sense of forgoing the distribution of profits] really is a good thing and thus worthy of
tax favors," he states that the task "is too ambitious" because it entails
ascertaining "what is ultimately good." He therefore leaves the matter
to one of "faith, of freely chosen values and visions." 27' 4
The sweeping expansion of the multi-billion dollar public subsidy
suggested by Atkinson's argument cannot be sustained by a mere leap
of faith. To assume without argument or explanation that society
places great value on nonprofit enterprise per se, simply because no
profit is distributed, is to adopt a question-begging posture that argues
in favor of expanding the exemption based on a bare description of the
present state of the nonprofit sector.27 5
The second, and more fundamental, flaw in the argument for subsidizing the altruism common to all nonprofits is that it does not explain
the need for a subsidy. It merely describes the fact that nonprofit
organizations are required by law to plow their earnings back into the
enterprise. Even assuming the worth of this devotion of profits to any
endeavor that presently or in the future might be encompassed within
the broad scope of the nonprofit sector, we still must ask why is a tax
subsidy necessary to achieve this result? The plow-back variant is as
silent on this question as is the main line of the community benefit
6
theory.

27

4. Recapitulation
The various strands of the community benefit theory constitute the
nonprofit sector's most sophisticated attempt to justify the present
scope of the exemption. This theory makes its case on the inherently
unquantifiable values that nonprofit enterprise serves. There is considerable merit to the view that nonprofit organizations offer advantages
over both proprietary markets and the government; otherwise we
would not have such a large nonprofit sector. On the other hand, the
size of the nonprofit sector may largely result from the exemption
274. Id. at 630. He continues: "I must admit my suspicion that the question of inherent
goodness may not be subject to proof, in the case of either altruism or other proposed
desiderata." Id.
275. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
276. This is not to say that these questions require a negative answer. Indeed, the donative
theory of exemption presented in this Article shares much in common with Atkinson's altruism
theory. Both theories advocate subsidizing activities motivated by altruism. But, a careful
development of why this is appropriate reveals precisely what counts as a donation. For instance
Atkinson incorrectly counts as a donation the forced retention of earnings by nonprofits, a point
developed in a subsequent article. See M. Hall & J. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the
Charitable Exemption (forthcoming).
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itself. The existence of both possibilities demands some demonstration
that society needs the exemption to effectuate its preference for the
higher values and greater diversity that nonprofits offer. Because the
community benefit theory is unable to provide a convincing response,
it fails to establish a coherent basis for the exemption. Having
exhausted the conventional rationales for the charitable exemption, we
turn to less conventional theories propounded by academics.
D.

Academic Theories

1.

Bittker's Income Measurement Theory

Academics have devoted less attention to the charitable tax exemption than to related topics, such as the deduction for charitable donations277 and the general theory of nonprofit enterprise. 278
Professor Bittker offered the first notable,279 comprehensive treatment of the federal income tax exemption in 1976.280 Along with his
student George Rahdert, Professor Bittker developed the theory that
charitable organizations are exempt from corporate income tax
because it is difficult to apply conventional accounting concepts of revenue and expense to much of their receipts and expenditures. 2 81 For
instance, it is awkward to classify donations as income because they
would seem to be gifts excluded from income under section 102 of the
Code.2 82 More serious characterization problems exist on the expense
side. Ordinary principles of tax law would inappropriately hold that
disbursements to beneficiaries of the charity are not deductible as
"ordinary and necessary business expenses," because an entity that
does not seek profit is generally not considered to engage in a "trade or
business" under section 162.283
277. Eg., Gergen, The Casefor a Charitable ContributionsDeduction, 74 VA. L. REv. 1393
(1988); McDaniel, An Alternative to the FederalIncome Tax Deduction in Support of Private
Philanthropy,in TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, TAX IMPACTS ON PHILANTHROPY (1972).

278. See supra note 11.
279. Less ambitious, but still useful, theoretical discussions of the federal exemption are
found prior to Bittker's work in Persons, Osborn & Feldman, supra note 2; Belknap, supra note
4; and after his work in J. DOUGLAS, supra note 8, ch. VIII; Dale, supra note 71; Simon, supra
note 69; Stone, supra note 9; see also infra note 291.
280. Most discussions of the property tax exemption focus narrowly on the details of
particular statutory and decisional law of an individual state. Eg., Buchele, supra note 117;
Sierk, supra note 1. The few universal or theoretical analyses of the property tax exemption
proceed along the conventional lines previously discussed. See P. SWORDS, supra note 70;
Ginsberg, supra note 54; Stimson, supra note 5; Warren, Krattenmaker & Snyder, supra note
119; Note, supra note 168.
281. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 8.
282. See id. at 308.
283. Ial at 310 and authorities cited therein.
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To the extent that this "income measurement" theory argues that
true charities are not taxed on their income because they in fact earn
no income, it is consistent with the theory for exemption of non-charitable organizations-so-called mutual benefit organizations such as
social clubs and condominium associations-which are viewed as
pooling assets prior to consumption rather than earning income.2 84
This commonality in theory suggests a degree of universality that
other theories do not share, since all other theories, including our own
developed later in text, are limited to the charitable exemption.28 5
This "income measurement theory," however, is ultimately unconvincing. Professor Hansmann, also of the Yale Law School faculty,
persuasively demonstrated that the theory is simply incorrect as
applied to many of the traditional categories of 501(c)(3) exempt organizations, particularly those such as hospitals that rely predominantly
on the sale of goods and services rather than on donations, so called
"commercial nonprofits."2" 6 The theory, moreover, does not attempt
to define charity-the operative statutory concept-other than as any
activity for which it is difficult to measure income. Bittker's theory is
at odds with the consistent understanding in the legislative history and
decisional law that the charitable exemption exists as a form of subsidy.28 7 In essence, then, the income measurement theory attempts to
avoid the deservedness and proportionality criteria altogether.
The income measurement theory also falls short of the universality
criterion since it does not even purport to explain the property tax
exemption; there is no more difficulty measuring the value of charitable property than property owned by IBM or AT & T.28 8 The theory
284. See supra note 29.
285. See generally Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 8, at 307-14.
286. Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizationsfrom Corporate
Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 59-61 (1981). "[N]ot-for-profit organizations can and do
make profits... in the customary accounting sense of the term. Indeed, in 1984 the average total
net margin ...of U.S. hospitals, most of which are not-for-profit, was 6.2% ....
" Yoder, supra
note 11, at 9.
287. According to Bittker and Rahdert, "The exemption... is neither a special privilege nor
a hidden subsidy. Rather, it reflects the application of established principles of income taxation
to organizations which . . .do not seek profit." Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 8, at 357-58.
Contra notes 12, 70, supra, and accompanying text; see also note 12, supra; cf Thuronyi, Tax
Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155 (stressing the subsidy nature of tax
loopholes).
288. One could construct a variant theory that attempts to justify the property tax exemption
based on tax, as opposed to social, policy. That theory would hold that tax equity requires
taxation according to the ability to pay, and property devoted to charitable purposes is least able
to pay; but such a theory would not survive scrutiny either. See Warren, Krattenmaker &
Snyder, supra note 119, at 289-91 (articulating, but rejecting, this theory). Essentially, this
theory is an alternate explanation for the relief-of-poverty theory that was rejected in Section III
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also offers little explanation for the various limitations on the income
tax exemption2" 9 and it offers no explanation for the deduction for
charitable contributions that follows automatically from exempt
status.

2.

290

Hansmann's CapitalSubsidy Theory

Professor Hansmann's alternative theory suffers from many of the
same defects. In the second comprehensive article to address the federal charitable exemption, 29 1 he develops a "capital subsidy" theory

that justifies the exemption because it assists nonprofits in overcoming
the comparative barriers they face in capital markets by virtue of the

"nondistribution constraint" disabling them from offering profit shares

to private investors.2 92 Hansmann's explanation elegantly addresses

the proportionality criterion. Assuming ideal market conditions,
Hansmann demonstrates that the income tax exemption provides the
most capital subsidy to nonprofits when the industry faces increasing
consumer demand, and hence the greatest capital needs exist. This is
true because an increase in demand results in an increase in taxexempt earnings. Correlatively, the subsidy phases out as capital
needs lessen in times of reduced consumer demand.2 9 3
Hansmann's capital subsidy theory, however, has severe shortcomings in other respects, as Hansmann recognizes.2 94 Under the deservbecause (1) it is too narrow to satisfy the major categories of the exemption, which extend beyond
relief of the poor, and (2) the exemption is regressive under this theory since it provides the most
relief to the wealthiest organizations. See supra notes 190-98 and accompanying text.
289. For instance, if the exemption exists because the entity has difficulty measuring income,
why should it matter whether the entity is, for example, engaged in legislative lobbying (an
activity which ordinarily would deny an entity exempt status under § 501(c)(3))?
Nevertheless, the theory does have the advantage of explaining the tax on unrelated business
income, to the extent that "unrelated" might be taken to mean "easy to measure" under this
definition of who is a charity.
290. The donative theory developed in Section IV, infra, suggests that Bittker's theory is
actually closer to the mark than this (and his) description portrays. The primary difficulty in
applying traditional concepts of income to charities lies in how to characterize donations to the
institution. Thus, to the extent Bittker's theory supports exemption for only donative nonprofits,
it is consistent with the donative theory. However, his theory fails to account for the use of the
exemption as a subsidy, and it fails to explain why a subsidy should be given to donative
nonprofits. As a result, it fails to identify which nonprofits, in borderline situations, should be
classified as charitable.
291. After Hansmann's work, the literature remained essentially silent on this topic until
Atkinson, supra note 199. Atkinson's theory, which deserves coequal status with these earlier
"academic theories," is not discussed here because his analysis relates to the community benefit
theory. See supra notes 269-76 and accompanying text.
292. Hansmann, supra note 287, at 72-75.
293. Id. at 76-85.
294. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
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edness criterion, the theory offers no test for determining the existence
and scope of a capital disadvantage. Nonprofit hospitals, for instance,
appear to suffer no capital funding shortage at all.2 95 Extending this
determination to other nonprofit activities imposes the burdensome
task of verifying capital disadvantage in each instance.2 9 6
Hansmann's theory is also flawed under the proportionality criterion. Although the subsidy modulates to fluctuations according to the
level of capital need within one organization over time, it is not sensitive to differences in capital need among different deserving nonprofits.
This defect exists because the theory uses income as a proxy for capital
need. However, one organization with heavy capital needs may have
little income (and hence a small subsidy), while another with only
slight needs may have a large income. Therefore, as Hansmann concedes, the exemption operates as an "extremely crude mechanism" for
conferring the subsidy.29 7 A much more direct and efficient method
for subsidizing capital formation exists through direct construction
grants or tax-exempt bonding, as has occurred on a massive scale in
the hospital industry.29 8 Hansmann's theory does not explain why the
income tax exemption should be used in preference, or even as a supplement, to these other methods that respond much more precisely to
variations in the need for capital.
Nor does Hansmann's theory satisfy the universality criterion. Like
Bittker's theory, it attempts to justify only the income tax exemption.
Indeed, it operates perversely with respect to the property tax exemption, which gives the greatest subsidy to those organizations with the
most capital resources. Finally, Hansmann fails to address the historical consistency criterion. He offers no evidence that Congress, courts
or taxing officials have ever considered the exemption as a subsidy for
295. See generally D. COHODES & B. KINKEAD, HOSPITAL CAPITAL FORMATION IN THE

1980s (1984). This situation may change, though, as a result of sweeping limitations in public
and private health insurance. See J. HOLLINGSWORTH & E. HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 25, at
40-42. On the other hand, continuing a capital subsidy would defeat the purpose of these
reimbursement reforms, namely to eliminate excess duplication and force hospitals to operate
more efficiently.
296. Hansmann's theory also requires identification of those activities that are more efficiently
provided by the nonprofit form. See Hansmann, supra note 287, at 66, 85-89. This
determination is no easier under Hansmann's theory than under the community benefit theory
discussed supra Section III.C.
297. Hansmann, supra note 287, at 92.
298. See id. at n. 113 (discussing direct capital subsidies to hospitals through the Hill-Burton
hospital construction funding program during the 1950s and 1960s); Schramm, The Legal
Identity of the Modern Hospital: A Story of Evolving Values, in IN SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH:
THE MISSION OF VOLUNTARY HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS 65, 74 (1988) (one-third of hospital
construction in 1980 was supported by tax-exempt municipal bonds; in 1985, the $30 billion in
hospital bonds accounted for nearly 20% of all municipal bond sales).
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capital formation. More troubling, the theory ignores the statutory
language by failing to develop a workable definition of charity; the
only concept of charity it offers is those socially valuable nonprofits
that suffer a comparative disadvantage in capital markets. Thus, it is
inaccurate to characterize Hansmann's capital subsidy explanation as
a theory of the charitable exemption at all, for it is only a sophisticated
explanation of one-but not necessarily the only-effect of the exemption. Hansmann's theory does not identify which organizations
should receive capital subsidies. We must look elsewhere in order to
develop an understanding of charity that helps us answer the more
fundamental question of identification.
IV.
A.

THE DONATIVE THEORY OF THE CHARITABLE TAX
EXEMPTION
Introduction

The present contest over hospital tax exemption has reached a stalemate. The theories of charitable exemption that nonprofit hospitals
advocate to rationalize their exemption-health care per se and community benefit-fail to establish a basis for determining deservedness
or proportionality. The alternative theories, which disqualify hospitals-charity care and Hansmann's capital subsidy theory-are
equally flawed. They either fail under the proportionality criterion to
establish a logical basis for subsidy through the tax system, or they are
at odds with the notion of an exemption that applies to "charitable"
organizations. Moreover, they explain only a small portion of the
interrelated aspects of the taxation of exempt organizations, violating
the principles of historical consistency and universality.
This same stalemate exists for justifying the exemption of charitable
organizations generally. Defining charitable in the popular sense of
poverty relief is countered by examples of symphonies and prep
schools; broadening the exemption to cover the relief of any government burden overlooks the separation of church and state; and the
search for a concrete sense of community benefit fails to keep the
exemption within administrable bounds. In frustration, most conventional thinkers have resorted to a superstitious faith in the mystical
guidance of the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses, while academicians
have proposed theories that ignore our basic intuitions about what
constitutes a charity.
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These failures of the several conventional and academic theories of
exemption require that we search for a new theory of exemption2 99
that satisfactorily ties together a convincing understanding of why
nonprofit organizations exist, why they should be tax exempt, and the
origins of the legal concept of charity. This theoretical rebuilding
reveals that the primary rationale for the charitable exemption is to
subsidize those organizations capable of attracting a substantial level
of donative support from the public, a theory that has not previously
received full articulation and development. 3° This section proceeds
by first describing the two foundations for the donative theory: (1)
economic theory concerning the socially valuable reasons for the existence of nonprofit organizations; and (2) charitable trust law, from
which tax exemption jurisprudence draws its concept of charity. This
section then demonstrates that the exemption of donative organizations presents a concept of charity that best meets the four criteria
developed above--deservedness, proportionality, universality, and historical consistency. This section concludes by examining how hospi299. Buchele, supra note 117, at 272-73, suggests that a single, comprehensive theory is not
necessary because these various theories, although individually flawed, fit together in a pattern of
concentric circles that adequately explain the universe of charitable exempt organizations. Thus,
at the center, it does not make sense for the government to tax itself by including public facilities
in the tax base. As an extension of this logic, the government does not tax private facilities that
provide services the government would otherwise have to assume. In the outer ring of the circle,
the government does not tax "humanitarian activities" serving a government interest. Buchele
admits, though, that the circle of "humanitarian activities" is far too broad. He also does not
address the failure of the government burden theory (the second ring) to meet the proportionality
criterion. These and other defects are not offset by the concentric nature of the theories.
300. Several major antecedent works, however, point the way to this theory. Professor
Hansmann's acknowledgement that the exemption is justified for donative nonprofits comes
closest to the donative theory of exemption. Hansmann, supra note 11, at 887-889. However,
Hansmann's rudimentary discussion fails to capture important aspects of the justification for
subsidizing donative nonprofits through the tax system rather than through direct government
grants, fails to tie the donative exemption to the law of charitable trusts, and fails to demonstrate
the ability of the donative theory to integrate all major components of the taxation of charitable
organizations.
Economist Burton Weisbrod, whose work also influenced this theory, more thoroughly
establishes the theoretical groundwork for subsidizing donations, but he does so in the limited
context of the charitable deduction. He does not extend his explanation to the exemption, and
does not incorporate the common law concept of charity. Another major work upon which the
donative theory relies, but which also falls short of recognizing the full dimensions of the theory,
is that of James Douglas. See J. DOUGLAS, supra note 8; see also note 290, supra (acknowledging
the contributions of Bittker and Rahdert to this theory).
Finally, Professor Atkinson's work also stresses the role of altruism. His theory is directed
principally to categorizing the types of altruism that exist in nonprofit organizations; he does not
develop a normative argument to explain why the exemption should attach to altruistic activities.
See supra notes 272-76 and accompanying text. As a consequence, Atkinson's work departs
from the donative theory developed in this Article by extending the exemption to essentially all
legitimate nonprofits.
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tals fare under this theory and by briefly mentioning issues that remain
for further exploration.
B.

The Positive Economic Theory of Nonprofit Organizations

A stimulating body of economic and political theory has emerged
over the past decade attempting to explain why the United States has
such a large "third sector" as an alternative to proprietary firms and
the government. This literature has developed a combined theory of
market and government failure: nonprofits arise where the two principal sectors of society fail adequately to supply desired goods and services. Different categories of nonprofits result from different forms of
market and government failure. The particular application of the
twin-failure theory most fruitful for present purposes is that which
explains the existence of donative nonprofits. This branch of the positive theory of nonprofit enterprise, lying at the intersection of classic
microeconomic and public choice theory, identifies the best case for a
tax exemption subsidy.
1.

Market Theory

The primary economic explanation for the willingness to contribute
voluntarily to certain causes is the desire to overcome the private market's undersupply of what economists refer to as public goods.3 °1 Pure
public goods in the economic sense are those characterized by two
conditions: durability and indivisibility. The good does not wear out
as others use it, and its nature is such that, once produced for one
consumer, it is impossible to exclude its consumption by anyone else.
Impure public goods partake of these characteristics to a lesser degree.
Classic examples of nearly pure public goods include air pollution control, border defense, and legislative lobbying. The private market is
incapable of supplying pure public goods at any level regardless of
their value because no one has an incentive to pay their proportionate
share of the benefit, and the supply of impure public goods similarly
can be expected to be suboptimal.
This market failure exists because the durability and the indivisibility of public goods present a severe free-rider problem. As a consequence of durability, consumers realize that if anyone else pays, they
can take a free ride. As a consequence of indivisibility, consumers
301. Leading discussions of the public goods theory of the existence of nonprofit enterprise
include B. WEISBROD, supra note 8, at 59-60; B. WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT
SECTOR (1977); Gergen, supra note 277, at 1397-99; Hansmann, supra note 11, at 848;
Krashinsky, supra note 221, at 119-21.
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realize that if they pay, everyone else can take a free ride on them.
Even if some consumers are willing to pay for a public good, they will
pay much less than is necessary to produce the good at its socially
optimal level because of its large "positive externalities." As a result,
coercion or voluntarism are the only means for providing public goods
at an optimal level.
Coercion is discussed below. As for voluntarism, it is sufficient to
observe that classic economic theory is imperfect since some people
are willing to overcome severe free-rider incentives by taking a collective view that induces them to contribute individually to the production of a broad social benefit. Thus, donors contribute to education,
which entails the public good of raising society's level of knowledge
and bolstering the economy with skilled workers. Another classic
object of philanthropy-disaster relief and aid to the poor-provides
the public good of assuaging society's collective concern over the
plight of the nation's or world's destitute.30 2
2.

Public Choice Theory

Classical economics tells us that providing public goods is the quintessential role of government, since the government is able to correct
the free-rider defect through its power to tax-in essence coercing the
public's purchase of public goods. Why then should donors ever need
to contribute to the private production of public goods? The answer
lies in the vagaries of majoritarian voting logic, which result in the
government systematically undersupplying certain public goods.
Economist Burton Weisbrod first had this insight.30 3 Employing public choice theory, he demonstrated that certain blocs of voters will predictably lack the voting strength to force the government to meet their
public good needs. This is true because governmental decisions in a
democracy are roughly shaped by the desires of the majority of the
electorate. 3" The government will therefore supply any given public
302. See P. SWORDS, supra note 70, at 217-21 (discussing public goods nature of poverty
relief, education, and cultural activities); Roberts, supra note 193, at 139 (characterizing
redistribution to the poor as a "public good" for which the "private solution is inefficient"). See
generally J. DOUGLAS, supra note 8, at 57-58 (observing that the Statute of Charitable Uses
contains several obvious instances of public goods).
303. See generally B. WEISBROD, supra note 301, at 53-61; Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the
Voluntary Non-Profit Sector, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 171 (E. Phelps
ed. 1975).
304. One might attempt to turn the government failure explanation against the donative
theory by maintaining that this line of public choice analysis would validate a decision by a
majority of the electorate to support another theory of the exemption or to support extending the
exemption to an industry (say, hospitals) that does not meet the donative criterion. However this
observation is unresponsive to the issue at hand because it is made at a metalevel of analysis that
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good at a level approximating that desired by the median voter. As
illustrated in Figure 1 for a hypothetical public good, if the government were to move much beyond the median demand to a level of
production Qb, then the number of voters who prefer a lower level of
the public good would vote down the increase (Vnb versus Vpb). Conversely, high demanders prevent the government from lowering the
provision of public goods to, say, Qa (Vpa versus Vna). As a result,
the voting equilibrium settles near the middle of the range of voter

tastes (Qm).

Positive

Negative

Vnb

Number of
Voters

Qa

Qrn

Qb

Quantity

Figure 1 - Quantity of a public good suplied by government as a
function of positive and negative voter demand

considers whether the charitable exemption should be abandoned altogether, or whether there
are other distinct categories of exemption other than charities. This Article takes the charitable
exemption as a given-for it is the form of the exemption that the electorate has in fact
validated-and proposes a theory of exemption and a concept of charity that best explain its
function.
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This system of majoritarian politics works reasonably well provided
the desire for a public good is fairly homogeneous. In that case, the
level of median demand is close to the level of demand at either
extreme.3" 5 This logic does not hold, though, for public goods for
which there are heterogeneous, widely divergent tastes. In such situations, voting logic predicts an undersupplied minority of high demanders, indicated by the shaded area of Figure 1. This supramedian group
has no ready alternative other than to make voluntary contributions to
a private organization.30 6
3.

The CharitableExemption and Deduction as Shadow Subsidies

Government failure combined with market failure provides the
most rigorous case for private donations. This combination of theories
explains why some nonprofits exist and the function they serve. Yet
this explanation does not demonstrate why these nonprofits should be
subsidized. The critical insight derives from the preceding economic
analysis that demonstrates that the classic instances of giving are characterized by a free-rider effect. Donors partially overcome market disincentives that attach to public goods, but unlike the government,
which enjoys the coercive power of taxation, nonprofit providers of
public goods must rely on persuasion, which inevitably falls short of
inducing all consumers to contribute commensurate with their level of
benefit.
Where donative support for public goods exists, one can therefore
anticipate persistent undersupply of that good. This is illustrated in
Figure 2, where Qg represents the level of a hypothetical public good
provided by the government, and Qd the additional quantity produced
through private donations. The shaded area represents a remaining
level of unsatisfied demand. Some form of funding is needed that
matches private donations with an additional subsidy to amplify the
305. The positive-voter line would be more vertical; the negative line would be lower and
more horizontal.
306. Confirmation of the relationship between government failure and donative behavior
comes from observing whether rapid drops in donative activity follow sharp increases in
government spending. Several economists have posited that government spending has a
"crowding out" effect on donations, such that as government spending increases, the need for
charities to solicit donations, and the willingness of donors to give, diminishes. See, e.g., Abrams
& Schmitz, The Crowding-Out Effect of Governmental Transfers on Private, Charitable
Contributions, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 303 (S. Rose-Ackerman ed.
1986). One study confirms this crowding-out thesis with data relating to the drop in giving to
social welfare services following the government's New Deal programs that grew out of the
Depression. Roberts, supra note 193. However, other studies have found less crowding out
effect than theorists have posited. See Andreoni, Giving and Impure Altruism: Applications to
Charity and Ricardian Equivalence, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1447 (1989).
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donations, in order to take up the slack left by the free-rider disincentive and move the level of production further toward Qs.

Negative

Positive

Number of
Voters

Q9

Qd

Qs

Quantity
Figure 2 - The effect of donations and a donative subsidy on the
production of a public good

This matching, or shadov' subsidy, function is precisely the explanation that Weisbrod has offered for the charitable deduction.30 7 A
deduction from personal income taxes for donations to charities is, in
economic analysis, a system that provides a proportionate government
subsidy for each dollar of private philanthropy. Thus, in a thirty percent tax bracket, a taxpayer who donates $100 is in effect contributing
only $70, because, absent the donation, the taxpayer would have paid
$30 in tax on those earnings.3 08 By forgiving part of the tax bill, the
government is in effect providing the taxpayer with a rebate in lieu of
307. B. WEISBROD, supra note 8, at 29-30.
308. McDaniel, supra note 277, at 174 ("The deduction for charitable contributions is simply
a mechanism whereby the federal government matches private donations to charity.... The
taxpayer is denominated the paying agent for the government's share and is given the right to
designate where that share will go.").
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writing a check directly to the charity. This government assistance is
funded by increasing the tax burden on the public, including those
members of the public who take a free ride by choosing not to
donate.3 °9
Weisbrod's insights about the deduction can be extended to the
exemption from income and property taxes. The exemption is also
capable of providing a form of shadow subsidy if it is administered
with this donative theory in mind. Exempting donative nonprofits
from income and property taxation helps to remedy the systematic
underprovision of public goods by allowing the donation to be more
productive than it would be if it, or its earnings, were taxed. °
Unlike the deduction, though, the exemption lacks a sliding scale quality because it is applied in an all-or-nothing fashion that is not tailored
to the precise level of donative support. This defect is easily moderated by applying the exemption only to those specific portions of property, and the income derived therefrom, that receive some defined level
of donative support. 31' Alternatively, degrees of exemption can be
awarded according to the degree of donative support.3 12
C. The Donative Element in Charitable Trust Law and Other
Precedents
An appealing feature of the donative theory of the charitable
exemption is that, while its economic justification is rigorous and
sophisticated, it leads to a fundamentally basic and intuitive concept of
charity-a concept that reaffirms the popular sense of charity as "the
309. B. WEISBROD, supra note 8, at 30 ("Tax subsidies therefore represent, in effect,
contributions from low demanders to stimulate the high demanders to contribute.").
310. Id. at 29 (tax subsidies "increase the amount of output the donor can buy for any given
donation").
311. The property and income tax exemptions are currently administered in a similar fashion.
Only the portion of property and income related to an exempt purpose qualify for exempt status.
This is the function of the unrelated business income tax contained in I.R.C. §§ 511-14 (1989).
312. In fact federal tax law already distinguishes among levels of donative support in
administering the charitable deduction. It allows individuals to deduct contributions up to 50%
of their adjusted gross income (AGI) for donations to churches, schools, hospitals, medical
research entities, and any other entity which receives a "substantial part of its support" from
public contributions or the government. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) (1989). In contrast, the
maximum deduction for contributions to other charities is limited to 30% of AGI. The
regulations establish one-third of receipts as a safe-harbor for meeting this "substantial [donative]
support" test. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(2) (1973). A similar kind of "sliding scale" could be
designed for the tax exemption, permitting full exemption for entities which receive over onethird of their income from public support, and something less than full exemption for other
entities, diminishing to zero exemption where there is only negligible public support.
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impulse to give."3' 13 The public goods explanation for donative behavior is captured in the popular conception of altruism that reflects a
donor's disregard of the narrow perspective of economic self-interest
and, in the very etymology of philanthropy, the love of mankind. It is
incontrovertible that society has an interest in encouraging giving and
supporting the objects of philanthropy.3 1 4 It is thus serendipitous that
a more conventional analysis of precedent and history confirms the
common sense notion of giving as the archetype of charity.3" 5
1.

The Role of Donationsin CharitableTrusts

The connection between tax law and trust law, discussed in Section
III.A., emerges as one of the great puzzles of the charitable exemption. 1 6 Anglo-American law has employed a uniform concept of
charity for centuries. Yet even casual examination of these two bodies
of law reveals that they serve disparate purposes. Charitable trust law
addresses the proper purposes for which the law will relieve a trust
from the requirements of having definite beneficiaries, a limited duration, and an achievable purpose. These comparatively minor concerns
allow trust law to consider as charitable any purpose that provides a
conceivable social benefit; trust law can afford to be lenient because
enforcing a benefactor's disposition of his own assets imposes relatively minor public costs. It seems absurd, then, to adopt this same
sweeping concept of charity-one that encompasses essentially any
313. Persons, Osborn & Feldman, supra note 2, at 1911; id. at 1945 (discussing "unselfish
giving" as central to the charitable concept).
314. See Atkinson, supra note 199, at 628-30 (taking the worth of altruism as a given).
315. Legal and historical precedent also confirm the government failure component of the
donative theory. The core of this rationale is contained in the Supreme Court's explanation that
"charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefita benefit which the society or the community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or
which supplements and advances the work of public institutions already supported by tax
revenues." Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983).
The government failure rationale is further confirmed by the history of the charitable
exemption, which has its strongest application to religion, the dominant form of charity
throughout the ages. As summarized supra note 5, in ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome, temples
were exempt because it was thought beyond the power of man to tax gods--an extreme form of
government failure. The religious exemption carried over into medieval England for the simple
reason that there was no centralized government capable of imposing a tax. In the American
colonies, which were established as theocracies, churches were not taxed because no government
thinks to tax itself. After the constitutional adoption of the separation principle, though, the
religious exemption is justified by the prohibition on government supporting religion's
worthwhile activities in any more direct manner. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)
(upholding constitutionality of charitable exemption applied to religion). The government failure
theory is but a weaker version of this modern rationale applied to forms of governmental
incapacity other than direct prohibition of funding.
316. See generally notes 78-134 and accompanying text.
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activity that benefits the public at large in any manner-to justify a tax
exemption that costs the public billions of dollars in lost tax revenue
each year. Yet this is precisely what virtually every tax law authority
ostensibly advocates.3 17
The notion of a uniform concept of charity is so entrenched that a
successful theory of the exemption must offer a satisfactory explanation of the relevance of trust law. Only the donative theory connects
these two bodies of law in a sensible fashion. It does so by focusing
attention on the donative aspect of trust creation to reveal the following, crucial limiting principle contained in charitable trust law: the
reason that trust law does not evaluate what purposes are of sufficient
public importance to deserve special legal protection is that the selfsacrifice entailed in forming a trust without private benefit provides
safe assurance that its founder has considered the object's deservedness. As one early decision explained:
What is the tribunal which is to decide whether the object is a beneficent
one? It cannot be the individual mind of a Judge ....
On the other
hand, it cannot be the vox populi, for charities have been upheld for the
benefit of insignificant sects, and of peculiar people. It occurs to me that
the answer must be-that the benefit
must be one which the founder
3 18
believes to be of public advantage.
In other words, the conception of charity embodied in trust law can
afford to be essentially boundless because it contains the inherent limitation that a donor must be willing to divert his wealth from himself or
his family to support the public purpose in question. Therefore, tax
exemption law blunders terribly if it transplants trust law's concept of
charity without maintaining this crucial limiting principle-the selfsacrifice entailed in a gift. To avoid doing so, tax exemption law must
define a charitable purpose as one that the public perceives to be sufficiently meritorious to warrant sacrificing a significant amount of per319
sonal resources to support it.
This simple observation is made even more apparent by reexamining
the foundational trust law authorities with the donative factor in
mind.3 2 ° Many of the leading authorities that articulate a boundless
317. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
318. In re Cranston, [1898] 1 I.R. 431, 446 (Ir. H. Ct.).
319. Not only must tax law retain the element of a gift, but, because a tax exemption entails a
public subsidy rather than just the protective function served by the trust law, see supra notes
107-08 and accompanying text, the decision by a single donor to sacrifice personal assets is not
enough to justify an exemption. Rather, the tax law must in some manner identify activities
which the public in general has chosen to support.
320. In addition to the observations made in the following text, trust law reinforces the public
goods component of the donative theory because the legal concept of public benefit that defines
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public benefit concept of charity qualify their description of charity
with the proviso that a gift be devoted to the stated purpose. The
listing of charitable purposes in the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses,
the seminal codification of the legal concept of charity, is explicitly
premised on giving. The statute's preface stated as its rationale for
creating a rigorous enforcement mechanism for charitable trusts that
"lands, goods,... [and] money.., have been heretofore given.., by
sundry... well disposed persons" to these purposes.3 2 1 The seminal
American decision defined "a charity, in the legal sense, ... as a gift,

to be applied.., for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons.

322

The leading modem British case that establishes the per se charitable
status of hospitals declares that "a gift for the purpose of a hospital is
prima facie a charitable gift. '32 3 Even those authorities that do not
speak explicitly in terms of a gift implicitly recognize this element by
reminding us that the definition of charitable is in the context of a
trust established for the stated purpose.3 24
2.

The Role of Donations in Tax Exemption Precedents
The donative theory is also confirmed by the central categories of

charitable activity established in tax exemption law. Religion and education, the two categories that uniformly enjoy per se'charitable status,
are traditional recipients of large amounts of philanthropy.32 5 One
might object that the per se exemptions conferred on these two activities refute the donative theory because they seem to declare that
charitable trusts seems to capture the same notion as the economic concept of positive
externalities that describes the market failure inherent in public goods (those for which the
benefits to others are much larger than the benefits captured by the price charged to an individual
purchaser). See J. DOUGLAS, supra note 8, at 19.
321. Modern English quotation taken from Persons, Osborn & Feldman, supra note 2, at
1913.
322. Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 556 (1867) (emphasis added); see also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 212 (5th ed. 1979) (defining "charitable" as "every gift for a general
public use").
323. In re Resch's Will Trusts, [1969] 1 App. Cas. 514, 540 (P.C.) (emphasis added).
324. Eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 372 (1959) ("A trust for the promotion of
health is charitable.").
Also, the element of gift is fundamental to tort law's former willingness to clothe charities with
immunity: "'If an organization for charitable purposes founded upon the bounty of others who
supply funds for the purpose of administering relief... may have its funds diverted from such
kindly purpose, would it not inevitably operate to close the purses of the generous and benevolent
who now do much to relieve the suffering of mankind?'" Dille v. St. Luke's Hosp., 196 S.W.2d
615, 617 (Mo. 1946) (quoting Adams v. University Hosp., 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S.W. 453, 454

(1907)).
325. In 1988, religion received 46.2% of all gifts, amounting to $48.21 billion. Education
received $9.78 billion. GIVING USA, THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE
YEAR 1988, at 9 (1989).
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churches and schools are eligible for exemption regardless of their
donative support. However, the statutory enumeration of religion and
education creates only a presumption of exempt status; the enumeration is still subject to baseline requirements implicit in the common
law concept of charity. In Bob Jones University v. United States,32 6 for
instance, the Supreme Court upheld the authority to deny the charitable exemption on public policy grounds to racially discriminatory private schools, despite the statute's omission to impose a general public
policy requirement. The Court reasoned that the public policy screen
is one of the "certain common-law standards of charity" drawn from
32 7
charitable trust law that "under[lie] all relevant parts of the Code.)
Likewise, the donative aspect of the trust law concept of charity
underlies all enumerated categories of charitable organizations. Hospitals that enjoy per se charitable status under some state constitutional and statutory provisions 328 therefore should still be required to
meet this basic requirement of charitable status, just as they are still
bound by general public policy dictates and required to serve the public at large.
The existence of this systemic limitation of the charitable exemption
is not left to mere speculation. State court decisions provide significant precedential support for the donative element of the charitable
exemption despite their apparent endorsement of a more sweeping per
se view of exemption.32 9 In particular, many of the state court decisions that most liberally extend the exemption to hospitals are, upon
closer examination, premised on a donative theory. For instance, City
of Richmond v. Richmond Memorial Hospital,33 0 one of the leading
cases thought to establish hospitals as per se exempt regardless of their
willingness to treat indigent patients, observed that "these hospitals
were built through charitable impulses. Over thirty thousand charita33
bly inclined citizens contributed to the construction. , 1
326. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
327. Id. at 586.
328. See supra note 33.
329. See generally W. WELLFORD & J.GALLAGHER, supra note 55, at 134 ("Many states
take into account the level of charitable support an organization receives in determining whether
it is charitable.").
330. 202 Va. 86, 116 S.E.2d 79 (1960).
331. Id. at 82; see id. at 80 ("[S]ome 33,000 individuals and businesses contribut[ed]
approximately $4,000,000 in the fund-raising campaign."). Similarly, the Nebraska Supreme
Court, which is often cited for its classic statement of the per se view, see Young Men's Christian
Ass'n v. Lancaster County, 106 Neb. 105, 111, 182 N.W. 593, 595 (1921), observed in St. Elizabeth
Hosp. v. Lancaster County, 109 Neb. 104, 189 N.W. 981 (1922), that the entity in question was
founded from many small donations, and that the hospital was run by nuns who contributed
their services for free. "Charitable gifts and gratuitous services are contributed to the welfare of
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The donative theory also finds explicit precedential support in the
federal sphere. One study of federal tax exemption rulings concluded
that "there is a strong tendency on the part of the IRS to require that a
'332
charitable organization embody to some degree a donative factor.
More recently, Congress expressed implicit support for the donative
theory by denying the federal exemption to certain inherently commercial activities. 333 In 1986, Congress withdrew the charitable
exemption from "commercial-type insurance" 334 and in 1987 held
extensive hearings inquiring into the concern that tax-exempt nonprofits are engaged in a vast array of commercial activities that constitute
unfair competition with proprietary businesses. 335 The essence of
commercial activity is the sale of goods and services on a quid pro quo
basis. Commercial nonprofits are thus polar opposites of those that
raise their revenues through donations. Therefore, rejection of the
society." St Elizabeth Hosp., 189 N.W. at 982; see also Southern Methodist Hosp. v. Wilson, 51
Ariz. 424, 77 P.2d 458, 460-461 (1938) (hospital charitable despite rendering "very little free
medical or hospital attendance to anyone," but "the property which it took over [when it
converted to charitable status] was heavily burdened with debt, and... there were various
contributions made from time to time amounting to forty to fifty thousand dollars in all"),
overruled on other grounds, Ray v. Tuscon Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951);
Fredericka Home for the Aged v. San Diego County, 35 Cal. 2d 789, 221 P.2d,68, 71 (1950)
(citing fact that 35% of income of entity came from endowments and donations as evidence of
charity); In re Appeal of Sunny Ridge Manor, Inc., 106 Idaho 98, 675 P.2d 813, 816 (1984)
(noting paucity of donations in denying exempt status); Mayo Found. v. Commissioner of
Revenue, 306 Minn. 25, 236 N.W.2d 767, 773 (1975) (noting importance of support by
"benevolent contributions" to assessment of charitable status); Oregon Methodist Homes, Inc. v.
Horn, 226 Or. 298, 360 P.2d 293, 303 (1961) (home for aged not exempt, in part because "there
are no gifts of land and buildings; no endowment fund; no gifts from outsiders to offset the
operating losses"); In re Prange's Will, 208 Wis. 404, 243 N.W. 488, 491 (1932) ("A hospital
which pays no dividends and is largely supported by donations is a charitable institution."); cf
Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 273 (Utah 1985) (level of
donations important factor in determining charitable status).
332. Persons, Osborn & Feldman, supra note 2, at 1947-48. For example, HardingHosp. v.
United States, 505 F.2d 1068, 1077 (6th Cir. 1974), used the lack of charitable donations to
support the denial of exempt status for a specialized psychiatric hospital. The lack of
contributions was also noted by the Eighth Circuit in denying an exemption to a nonprofit
pharmacy. Federation Pharmacy Servs. v. Commissioner, 625 F.2d 804, 808 (8th Cir. 1980); see
W. WELLFORD & J. GALLAGHER, supra note 55, at 97 (1988) (noting a number of federal cases
outside the health care field in which lack of charitable donations was a contributing factor to
denial of exemption); see also Fides Publishers Ass'n v. United States, 263 F.Supp. 924 (N.D.
Ind. 1967); Easter House v. United States, 12 Ct. Cl. 476 (1987); EST of Hawaii v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1067, 1081 (1979); B.S.W. Group v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352, 359
(1978); Bromberg, FinancingHealth Car supra note 40, at 180.
333. See W. WELLFORD & J. GALLAGHER, supra note 55, at 95-97; Note, Religious
Nonprofits and the Commercial Manner Test, 99 YALE L.L 1631, 1632, 1640 (1990).
334. I.RC. § 501(m) (1989). Congress had in mind the 501(c)(3) exemption for the
Teacher's Insurance Annuity Association and the § 501(c)(4) exemption for Blue Cross/Blue
Shield. See TAX REFORM AcT op 1985, H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 663 (1985).
335. UBITHearings,supra note 6.
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exemption for commercial activity can be seen as a tacit endorsement
of the donative standard.
As a consequence of these many avenues of precedential and historical support for the donative theory of the exemption, it is already
embodied in the present structure of the charitable exemption. Thus,
applying the notion explicated in Bob Jones University and the IRS
regulations that "certain common-law standards of charity" drawn
from charitable trust law "under[lie] all relevant parts of the Code,"3'36
the donative theory could be adopted and implemented without further legislative directive.3 37
D.

The Donative Theory's Scorecard

1. Deservedness
The donative theory of the charitable exemption offers an elegant
rationale for subsidizing the objects of donative activity, one that fully
meets the deservedness criteria in both its worthiness and neediness
components. Because the impulse to give stems from the public's recognition of a socially valued service, the donative theory assures that
donations are directed to activities worthy of subsidy. And because
those worthy activities that rely on voluntary support systematically
receive less support than society as a whole desires, donative activities
need to be subsidized.
The donative theory avoids the difficulties that other theories face in
establishing exemption deservedness because it does not require a government official to determine need or worth on an activity-specific
basis. For instance, the community benefit theory forces us into a
morass of conflicting data and theory over the desirability of the nonprofit form in medicine;3 3 likewise, Hansmann's capital subsidy theory requires us to isolate those socially valued nonprofits that need a
capital subsidy to help them compete on an even footing with proprietary enterprise. 339 The donative exemption employs a mechanism that
makes these intensely empirical determinations automatically by
targeting, within the universe of activities that conceivably deserve
support, those activities that actually earn the exemption by providing
services that are not otherwise available. This theory also actively
336. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983).
337. Although the IRS possesses the authority to interpret and exercise the charitable
exemption consistent with the donative theory presented in this Article, it is perhaps undesirable
for the IRS to implement such a major change on its own initiative.
338. See supra Section III.C.
339. See supra note 296.
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induces those nonprofit firms with sagging support to search out new
ways to satisfy public needs. 3"
2. Proportionality
On first inspection, the donative theory appears to meet the proportionality criterion only roughly. Unlike the charitable deduction, the
exemption does not automatically match donations dollar for dollar by
a proportionate amount of tax support. Nevertheless, the exemption
fares passably well for the property tax exemption because the amount
of property a donative nonprofit holds is proportionate to the amount
of contributions it receives.3 41 For income tax, the connection
between the size of the subsidy (determined roughly by earned surplus) and the criterion for deservedness (donations) is much more
attenuated. 34 2 At least it can be said, in contrast with some of the
theories of the exemption explored above,34 3 that the correlation
between earnings and donations is not perverse. Instead, donations
have an unpredictable, or at best a neutral, relationship to the income
tax subsidy. As a result, the subsidy is not so much disproportionate
as nonexistent.
Even this level of compromise in proportionality seems unsatisfactory until one realizes that the donative theory, despite these imperfections, provides the most accurate measure of deservedness available.
This insight is revealed by Weisbrod's explanation of government failure. The principal litmus test for proportionality is whether, assuming
340. B. WEISBROD, supra note 8, at 7 ("An organization that relies on donations to aid the
poor must tailor the form of that aid to the wants of prospective donors, who are, in effect, the
economic demanders of the organization's services.").
341. For similar reasons, the subsidy under the sales tax exemption for purchases is also
proportionate to the level of donations.
342. Generally, gifts are not considered as income to the recipient. I.R.C. § 102 (1989). Even
if they were, they would likely be entirely offset by the expense entailed in the organization's
provision of its services for free. Therefore, purely donative organizations would receive no
implicit subsidy at all. For mixed donative and commercial nonprofits that potentially earn
taxable income, such as education and the performing arts, analysis of the proportionality
criterion is more complex because the relationship between the indicium of deservedness and the
level of subsidy may turn on whether donations are devoted to capital or operating costs. A
nonprofit that applies its contributions to capital funding needs is likely to generate more
revenues. Schools with the largest endowments are thus likely to have the most tuition-paying
students because they will have the largest facilities. However, there still may not be a positive
relationship to taxable income because even donated capital assets generate depreciation expenses
to offset the enhanced revenues. Donations applied to operating costs can paradoxically result in
less taxable income since funds spent on the organization's revenue-producing activities are
deductible as business expenses. Stated differently, organizations that need to devote donations
to operating expenses probably generate no operating surplus. The fact that they need to solicit
donations indicates that, over the long run, their business receipts are less than their expenses.
343. See supra notes 166-69, 185 and accompanying text.
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a given activity deserves subsidy, the exemption is a more sensible
means to administer the subsidy than a direct government grant. The
"twin failure" rationale underlying the donative theory confronts this
inquiry directly. It reveals that where substantial donations exist,
direct government aid must be unavailable because it is the failure of
the government to serve a high-demanding minority that leaves donors
with no other alternative than to make voluntary contributions. In
essence, the donative theory is designed to cover only cases where the
tax subsidy is necessarily a second best solution because the theory
excludes all cases where the government in fact subsidizes directly in
sufficient amount. Proportionality is thus satisfied because, instrinsically, no more accurate mechanism for direct government support is
available in cases where the donative theory applies.
3.

Universality and Historical Consistency

The earlier discussion observed the complementary aspects of the
donative tax subsidy: the charitable deduction is directed to the donor
to stimulate making the gift while the exemption goes to the recipient
to enable the gift to go further. 3" This symmetrical aspect of the donative theory provides one of its greatest strengths. Unlike all other
theories of the charitable exemption, it satisfies the deservedness criterion for both the income tax exemption and the property tax exemption at the same time that it justifies the charitable deduction. This
universality is critical to a successful theory of charity because, under
the structure of the federal and most state codes, all three tax benefits
follow automatically once the organization is characterized as charitable. Only by defining charities as organizations that receive substantial donative support is it possible to make sense of the unified federal/
state, exemption/deduction structure.
A further dimension of the donative theory's universality is its ability to explain the value-added tax exemption that many states confer
on sales to charities.34 This exemption from paying sales tax provides
344. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
345. Thirty-four states and the District of Colombia grant nonprofits exemption from paying
sales taxes. ALA. CODE § 40-23-5(m) (Supp. 1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-1321(5)
(1980); ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-52-401(21) (Supp. 1989) (exempting sales to hospitals); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 39-26-114(1)(a)(II) (Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-412(5) (West
Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-2005(3) (1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.08(7)(m) (West
1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 91A-4503(g) (Harrison Supp. 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. 237-23(8)
(Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE § 63-3622o (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, 1441(b) (SmithHurd Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-2.5-5-25(a)(1) (Bums 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 793606(b) (1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139.470 (Baldwin 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36,
§ 1760(16) (1990); MD. TAX-GEN. CODE ANN. § 11-204 (Supp. 1990); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
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a form of matching subsidy that assists donations in being more productive by relieving them of the tax that otherwise is imposed when
the donations are used to purchase supplies. Notably, the donative
theory would not provide strong support for a value-added tax exemption on sales by nonprofits since such an exemption would target primarily commercial nonprofits. 34 Consistently, very few states exempt
charities from charging sales tax.r
Finally, the discussion of charitable trust law and other precedents
demonstrates that the donative theory meets the historical consistency
criterion. It offers a concept of charity that comports with intuition
and fits well with the classic applications of the exemption-religion,
education, relief of the poor, and the fine arts. But does it justify
extending the exemption to modem hospitals?
E. How Hospitals Measure Up
L

The Low Level of PresentHospital Donative Support

Nonprofit hospitals nicely illustrate the full dimension of the donative theory. Although they appear on first inspection to be good candidates for the receipt of charity because many of their services have
strong public good characteristics, hospitals receive sufficient government funding that they have almost no need to solicit donations.
Thus, while they display many of the classic incidents of market failure, they are not affected by severe government failure.
Hospital services primarily consist of patient care sold through ordinary commercial transactions. Nevertheless, several hospital services
64H, § 6(e) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 205.54a (West Supp. 1990);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 297A.25 (West Supp. 1991); MIsS. CODE ANN. § 27-65-11 l(a) (1972); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 144.030.2.(19) (Vernon Supp. 1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2704 (1986); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 54:32B-9(b)(1) (West 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-29 (1990); N.Y. TAX LAW
§ 1116(a)(4) (Consol. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.02 (Anderson Supp. 1989); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7204 (Purdon 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-18-30 (Supp. 1990); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 10-45-10 (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-6-322(a)(8) (1989); TEx. TAX
CODE ANN. § 151.310(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-12-104(8) (Supp.
1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 9743(3) (Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-608 (Supp. 1990);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 77-54(9a)(f) (West 1989); Wyo. STAT. § 39-6-405(a) (1990). Delaware,
Montana, New Hampshire and Oregon do not have a sales tax at all.
346. Donative nonprofits also raise revenue from sales, such as tuition paid to schools and
ticket sales by the performing arts. Most value-added taxes however do not include such services
in the tax base. Even if they did, an exemption would still fail the proportionality criterion
discussed in the following text.
347. Only seven states provide general exemptions for sales by charitable organizations.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-52-401(3) (Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-2.5-5-26(a)(1) (Bums
1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.45(3) (West 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:32B-9(b)(1) (West
1986); N.Y. TAX LAW § 11 16(a)(4) (Consol. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-12-104(8) (Supp.
1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 9743(3) (1981).
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are candidates for classic public good characterization. Indeed, Burton Weisbrod uses the hospital industry as one of the principal confirmations of his public goods rationale for the existence of nonprofit
enterprise by demonstrating that most hospital services with public
good characteristics-research, physician education, and the treatment of indigent patients-exist disproportionately in voluntary hospitals. 34 8 These are also precisely the services that nonprofit hospitals
use to justify the exemption under the conventional government burden and community benefit theories.34 9
But it is not enough to demonstrate the existence of substantial public goods production to justify a tax subsidy. The subsidy is deserved
only if the government is supplying these goods at a suboptimal level,
as demonstrated by actual public contributions to make up the difference. Today, nonprofit hospitals receive in proportionate terms only
negligible support from public donations. 350 This was not always the
348. B. WEISBROD, supra note 301, at 3, 80-81, 93-98:
[Using 1969 data,] we find that the nine particular services/facilities-out of a total of
thirty-one-that had been judged a priori to be primarily private in character are found
disproportionately in the for-profit hospitals, while the twenty-two services that had been
judged to have the greatest degree of collective-good quality are found disproportionately in
the governmental and voluntary nonprofit hospitals ....
See also Weisbrod, supra note 303, at 193.
349. See supra notes 203-05, 245-47 and accompanying text. However, the superior
performance record of nonprofits in treating indigent patients is not nearly as clear. See supra
notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
350. For no apparent reason, statistics on giving as a percentage of hospital revenues are
imprecise, but the discrepancies are immaterial for present purposes. The National Association
of Hospital Development (NAHD) reports that, in fiscal 1987-88, its 1,425 member hospitals
received 1.6% of their "total budgets" (expenditures) from cash donations. Telephone
conversation with Ron Childress, NAHD Communications Manager (Jan. 22, 1990) (notes on
file with the Washington Law Review); see also G. ANDERSON, J. LAVE, C. RUSSE & P.
NEUMAN, supra note 165, at 147-48 ("[B]y 1985, philanthropy represented less than 1.3 percent
of funds used for hospital care .... ); Yoder, supra note 11, at 100, table 5.2 (in 1983, nonprofit
hospitals received 0.4% of revenues from contributions-$370.9 million in all); Herzlinger &
Krasker, supra note 143, at 95 (donations amounted to only 1% of total hospital expenses in
1983, from a selected sample of nonprofit chain hospitals); UBIT Hearings,supra note 6, at 183
(statement of Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Independent Sector) (2% of 1982 hospital revenue
came from private contributions); id. at 996 (statement of Bradford H. Gray, Institute of
Medicine) ("Charitable contributions used to be an important source of funds for hospitals, but
they have now declined to less than one-half of 1 percent of hospital revenues .... ").
Scattered information from individual hospitals confirms these national aggregates. In 1988,
SamCor, one of the southwest's largest nonprofit chains, raised less than one-half of one percent
of its revenues from donations. 1988 SAMCOR ANNUAL REPORT 19, 28 ($2,156,000 in donations
out of $560,611,000 in total operating receipts). A group of 11 nonprofit hospitals in Utah
received approximately 1% of their 1986 revenues from donations and endowment income. Pace
Management Services, supra note 153. Vanderbilt University Hospital received $259,000 in gifts
in 1987, as against $237 million in revenues budgeted for 1988, a ratio of one to one thousand.
Vanderbilt University Medical Center: Facts 1988 at 5 (copy of pamphlet on file with the
Washington Law Review).
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case. At the turn of the century, hospitals depended on philanthropy
for roughly one-quarter to one-third of their operating budget and for
the bulk of their capital funds.35 1 Tracing the history of the deterioration of hospital giving and the changing characteristics of the nonprofit hospital sector over time helps to confirm the rationale for
supporting only donative institutions.
The primary impetus for the growth of the voluntary hospital sector
prior to World War II was the desire of diverse ethnic and religious
groups to create institutions that would cater to their distinct treatment needs without discrimination. The early growth of voluntary
hospitals after the turn of the century "reflected the idiosyncratic qualities of the community they served." '52 Thus, Catholics desired a hospital where last rites would be administered and Jews desired one
where the staff spoke Yiddish and served kosher food.35 3
These distinctive characteristics allowed voluntary hospitals to
appeal to defined interest groups for strong philanthropic support to
ensure that treatment would be available when the need arose.354 This
association between heterogeneity in demand for hospital services and
the strength of donative support confirms the role public choice theory
plays in explaining the existence of philanthropy as a response to government failure.
As a result of the third-party reimbursement structure that developed after World War II, hospitals no longer suffer significantly from
government or market failure. Private insurance spread rapidly during the 1950s and the government began directly funding a substantial
portion of hospital operations through Medicare and Medicaid in the
1960s. The government also increased direct subsidies to specific public good activities, such as hospital construction, medical research and
education. As a consequence, nonprofit hospitals no longer depended
on donative support to expand. Moreover, third-party sources of
351. J. HOLLINGSWORTH & E. HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 25, at 29 (in 1904, voluntary
hospitals received 36% of revenues from gifts); id. at 92 ("During the late 1920s almost threequarters of capital for hospital construction came from philanthropy ....").
352. Rosner, Heterogeneityand Uniformity: HistoricalPerspectiveson the Voluntary Hospital,
in IN SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH: THE MISSION OF VOLUNTARY HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS

87, 93 (1988). Strong confirmation of the role of religious and ethnic ideology and the influence
of societal heterogeneity on the pattern of hospital development comes from a cross-national
study that found that "in all countries with one prevalent religion, hospitals were run by the
government,... but where competition existed among religious groups, they retained control of
hospitals to protect and extend their sphere of influence." P. STARR, supra note 35, at 176
(describing study in W. GLASER, SOCIAL SETTINGS AND MEDICAL ORGANIZATIONS: A CROSSNATIONAL STUDY OF THE HOSPITAL (1970)).

353. P. STARR, supra note 35, at 169-70, 173; Clark, supra note 10, at 1458.
354. ".
HOLLINGSWORTH & E. HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 25, at 5-6, 24-25, 37.
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funding replaced the quasi-insurance function that donations served of
securing a future source of services. 355 This displacement of charitable
giving has caused hospital philanthropy to decay rapidly since 1968,
with a half-life of about five years.3 56 Either hospitals have felt little
need to solicit philanthropic support, or if they have sought it, the
public has seen little need to contribute.35 7 Coincident with these
changes, the character of nonprofit hospitals has become remarkably
homogeneous. One noted medical historian comments that "[b]y the
mid-1960s, . . . the notion of an institution closely connected to its
community seemed like a romantic remnant of a 'pre-scientific'
358
era."
Hospitals complain that this government generosity is quickly ending, eliminating their ability to cross-subsidize many underfunded but
desirable services from the ample surplus previously generated by
insured patients.3 59 But until the pinch becomes severe enough to
motivate hospitals to enter the philanthropy market more aggressively,
and donors to respond with more enthusiasm, these assertions are
irrelevant under the donative theory. At present, the lack of donative
support is evidence either that nonprofit hospitals do not provide a
service materially different than that otherwise available, or that if
they do, they are sufficiently supported in more direct ways. Accordingly, there is a weak case for supplementing this support with a tax
subsidy. 3"
355. See Foster, supra note 211, at 348-50.
356. D. COHODES & B. KINKEAD, supra note 295, at 23; J. HOLLINGSWORTH & E.
HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 25, at 37 ("By 1981, philanthropic contributions to hospitals...
[were] less than one-fourth of the level when Medicare began."); Yoder, supra note 11, at 55
(philanthropy, as a percentage of funding for hospital construction, decreased from 21% in 1968,
to 10% in 1973, to6% in 1978, to4% in 1981); Foster, supra note 211, at 350-51. See generally
J.Terenzio, A Survey of the History and Current Outlook of Philanthropyas a Source of Capital
for the Needs of the Health Care Field, in HEALTH CARE CAPITAL: COMPETITION AND
CONTROL (1978).

357. See F. Sloan, J. Hoerger, M. Morrisey & M. Hassan, The Demise of Hospital
Philanthropy (Jan. 1989) (developing and documenting this "crowding out" thesis) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the Washington Law Review).
358. Rosner, supra note 352, at 122.
359. Dyer, HospitalsSaw Patient Margin Vanish in 1988, HOSPITALS, May 5, 1989, at 56.
360. The same lack of donative support for certain non-hospital health care providers (such
as HMOs, physician practice associations, nonprofit pharmacies, and nursing homes) indicates
that the IRS's current posture of attempting to deny exemption to these entities may be the right
result reached on the wrong analytical grounds. In a prior article, Professor Colombo argued
that the IRS could not consistently adhere to a per se theory of exemption for hospitals while
continuing to deny exemption to these other health care providers. See generally Colombo, supra
note 41. The remedy for this inconsistency suggested in that article, to extend the exemption to
all legitimate nonprofit providers of health care services, was premised on the continuation of the
per se theory of exemption. Id. at 523. That article also recognized, however, that
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2.

The Possibilitiesfor Hospital Exemption

Despite the presently low level of proportionate donative support
for hospitals, it is misleading to conceive of hospitals as receiving no
such support. In fact, the aggregate level of donations is quite large. 6 1
While donative support may not be sufficient to qualify all of the nonprofit hospital sector's holdings and earnings for property and income
tax exemption, it also seems unfair to disregard this support simply
because it represents a small portion of the nonprofit operation. Fortunately, the donative theory is capable of fine-tuning its application to
account for degrees of support. First, it is hardly necessary for hospitals to receive 100% of their revenues from donations. Few traditionally charitable organizations do. 36z The precise threshold of donative
support required to qualify for charitable status is ultimately a legislative or administrative policy decision; however, one might speculate
that a threshold based on the level of support hospitals received when
they were still considered classic charities-on the order of 30% for
capital funds-would represent a reasonable application of the donative theory.36 3
Hospitals that fail to meet this threshold for their overall operations
may qualify for the exemption if they are capable of segregating those
reconsideration of the fundamental basis of the exemption offers another solution. Reevaluation
of the exemption resolves the inconsistency by denying exemption to all forms of commercial
health care enterprise.
361. The 1,425 member hospitals of the National Association of Hospital Development
received $1.90 billion cash donations in fiscal 1987-88, an average of $1.3 million each.
Telephone conversation with Ron Childress, NAHD Communications Manager (Jan. 22, 1990)
(notes on file with the Washington Law Review).
362. W. WELLFORD & J. GALLAGHER, supra note 55, at 29:
A common misconception . . . is that once there was a golden age when charitable
organizations in the United States raised funds almost exclusively through the generosity of
the public and the benevolence of a few great philanthropists ....
Even before the Civil
War, charities relied to some extent on fees to support activities and programs ranging from
publication and distribution of religious tracts to organization and maintenance of food
relief for the poor. After the Civil War, fees played a central role in expanding educational
and medical services, in initiating school lunch and work training programs, and in
developing social casework programs.
See id at 45-46, 58-59.
363. See Foster, supra note 211, at 351, table I (during the post-war era until 1968,
philanthropy provided from 20% to 30% of hospital construction funding); supra note 351.
Another indication that this level is appropriate is the test currently used for giving more favored
status to some charities for purposes of capping the level of contributions that individuals may
deduct in computing their income tax. Individuals may deduct up to 50% of their adjusted gross
income for contributions to charities that receive at least one-third of their support from the
public; but only up to 30% of their income for charities that receive less than one-third of their
support from the public. See supra note 312. For further development of the appropriate
threshold, see M. Hall & J. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Exemption
(forthcoming).
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activities that attract the most donative support into separate corporate entities.3" For instance, oncology and pediatric services are popular objects of hospital giving, particularly when combined into
children's cancer units.3 65 Moreover, a taxing authority may make the
same accounting adjustment even without formal corporate segregation.36 6 The extent to which particular nonprofit hospitals might qualify for the exemption depends in large part on the details of
administering a donative theory of exemption, details to be developed
in a subsequent article.3 67
364. See J. HOLLINGSWORTH & E. HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 25, at 30 (very little giving
to hospital operating budget, or even to a general endowment; instead, donations are usually for
specified purposes, such as to endow a particular service or facility). This approach of
subdividing hospitals into service units is consistent with the approach often taken of
apportioning the property tax exemption according to the particular assets or operations of an
entity that are allocated to charitable purposes. Using donative support as the measure of
charitable apportionment solves the difficult problem of evaluating which assets are so used.
365. For instance, while this Article was being written, the hospital that successfully defended
an attack on its exempt status in Medical Center Hospital v. City of Burlington, 152 Vt. 611, 566
A.2d 1352 (1989), ran the following quarter-page advertisement in the Burlington (Vt.) Free
Press, Sunday, June 4, 1989, at DI:
When our children hurt, we all hurt.
[Pictures of four bandaged and ill infants]
Help them. Give generously. . . . Your money buys equipment and programs for
MCHV's children's cancer clinic, burn prevention program, poison center, and intensive
care nursery.
See also UBIT Hearings, supra note 6, at 938-39 (statement of Shriners Hospitals for Crippled
Children) (in 1987, 22 hospitals provided "totally free hospital care for children in need," as a
result of $140 million of gifts and $279 million of endowment income).
366. The 1983 reform of the Medicare payment system for hospitals (known as the "DRG"
reimbursement system, for "diagnosis-related groups") might facilitate such an accounting
process because it forms the basis for measuring revenues on a service-specific basis. Vladeck,
Medicare Hospital Payment by Diagnosis-Related Groups, 100 ANN. INT. MED. 576 (1984).
Thus, a hospital might be able to exempt a portion of its patient care revenue by demonstrating
that it receives substantial donative support for a burn unit and a neonatal intensive care unit,
without having to separately incorporate these integral parts of its operation.
367. The present Article presents only the basic contours of the donative theory. Full
understanding and implementation of the theory require consideration of additional theoretical
and practical issues. The theoretical issues that remain include: Should the donative theory
count all contributions even if they are motivated by selfish or evil ends? Is the theory based
purely on efficiency grounds or does it include a moral dimension? Might it be used to justify an
exemption for all nonprofits under the argument that every nonprofit donates its earnings to
itself? Does the donative theory justify other elements of the charitable tax exemption--such as
the exemption's restriction to nonprofit entities, the limitation on political activity, and the
unrelated business income tax-or are these side constraints that are unconnected to the core
theory? Other issues center around practical problems that exist in the implementation of the
donative theory: What should be the required quantum of donative support? Should it be
measured on an industry or on an institution-specific basis? When and how often in the life of
the institution should it be measured? Should the exemption apply different measures to different
sources of donations, such as foundations, bequests and large donors? Do grants count?
Donated labor? Will the donative theory encourage more fund raising abuse? These issues await
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V.

CONCLUSION-REFINING AND IMPLEMENTING THE
DONATIVE THEORY

We have reached the donative theory of the charitable exemption by
proceeding in two analytical modes: whittling away and building up.
A negative analysis demonstrates the deficiencies of other theories; a
positive analysis demonstrates the strengths of the donative theory.
Others who have reflected on the rationale for the charitable exemption have taken for granted the case for applying the exemption to
donative institutions; their primary focus has been to consider whether
to broaden the exemption beyond this base that, apparently, has .universal acceptance. This framing of the issue has caused commentators
to overlook the merits of using donations as the basic standard for
applying the exemption. The donative theory should not be taken for
granted. Understanding its strength illuminates whether there should
be an exemption at all and, if so, how it should be properly
administered.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of nonprofit hospitals.
Commentators who judge the issue of exemption for hospitals by
inquiring whether they uniquely provide a community benefit are asking a question for which the evidence is largely subjective. By asking
instead whether the public chooses to support nonprofit hospitals with
donations, it is possible to evaluate the need for tax subsidization on a
more objective basis. Precisely how much donative support is needed
to qualify for the exemption, and exactly what counts as a donation,
turn on questions of theory and administration that await further
development and that, ultimately, must be resolved in the political
arena. These further undertakings will be worth the effort if we have
chosen to pursue a concept of charity that is correct at its core.t

our sequel. See M. Hall & J. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Exemption
(forthcoming).
t As this article was going to press, Representative Donnelly introduced H.R. 1374, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. Rc. E896 (1991), which incorporates some of the suggestions
published by his legislative director in Barker, supra note 64, as described supranotes 66, 151 and
202. If enacted into law, this bill would require nonprofit hospitals to maintain their exempt
status by either: (1) devoting 5% of gross revenues to charity care apart from bad debts and
contractual allowances, or (2) devoting 10% of gross revenues to primary health care or
substance addiction treatment in medically underserved areas of the country. A hospital would
not have to meet those requirements, however, if it is a sole community hospital, or if it treats a
disproportionate share of low income patients, as defined under Medicare statutes. The
Secretary of Health and Human Services would be authorized to issue regulations that
distinguish bad debt from charity care for purposes of the 5% threshold. Moreover, the IRS may
designate other community services that qualify for the 10% threshold.

